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ART. I. — *Critik der reinen Vernunft*; VON IMMANUEL KANT. Siebente Auflage. Leipzig. 1828.

IN order to comprehend and appreciate Kant's Critical Philosophy, or indeed any particular system of philosophy, we must begin by determining the class to which it belongs, and its appropriate place in the general history of philosophy. But all classification, if it is to be of the least scientific value, must rest on a necessary principle of classification, be founded, not in the caprice or convenience of the critic or the historian, but in the very nature and reason of science itself. There is, then, always, a preliminary question, concerning the principle of classification, which we must not pass over, if we mean our ulterior labors shall contribute at all to the better understanding of the particular system we propose to discuss, or to the advancement of science in general. Our readers must, therefore, suffer us to pause, and linger awhile on this preliminary question.

I. CLASSIFICATION OF SYSTEMS.

MODERN historians of philosophy, for the most part, contend, that we should classify the several systems of philosophy, which are put forth from time to time,

according to the assumed principles of their psychological origin. This is especially the case with M. Cousin, whose brilliant courses of lectures in 1828 and 1829 must, doubtless, be familiar to all those of our readers who interest themselves in the study of philosophy. M. Cousin assumes, that all philosophy has its origin in psychology, and is, in fact, nothing but a method, or doctrine of science, and its application. There can be in philosophy nothing, the principle of which is not in human nature. One system of philosophy can differ from another, only in the different degree of importance attached by its author, in constructing it, to one or another of the original elements of human nature. As certain, by a rigid analysis and classification of all the facts of consciousness, according to their psychological origin, the number and characteristics of all the fundamental elements of human nature, and you have determined the number and characteristics of all possible systems of philosophy.

The number of original elements of human nature, under the present point of view, according to M. Cousin, is four; 1. SENSIBILITY; 2. INTELLIGENCE; 3. SPONTANEITY; 4. GOOD SENSE. There are, then, four psychological principles of philosophy; and every possible system must be referred to the predominance of one or another of these as its principle.

If, in philosophizing, we take the point of view of the senses, that is, of sensibility, we shall recognize no objects as really existing, except such as do, or such as may, affect the external organs of sense. We shall then assume as valid only those cognitions which have their origin in sensation alone, and attempt to explain the world, man, and God, by means of mere sensations. Hence SENSUALISM. If we fix our attention, exclusively, on the intelligence, or reason, taken as the principle of pure thought, we shall attempt to explain the universe, geometrically, from the point of view of mere conceptions *a priori*, and shall find ourselves unable to recognize any ontological existence, which is not contained in these pure thoughts, or conceptions.

The only ontological existence contained in these is the thinking subject. Hence, IDEALISM, or, as we prefer to term it, EGOISM. If we pursue our psychological investigations, to which we are driven by the absolute necessity we are under of believing something, and by the unsatisfactory termination of both Sensualism and Idealism, we shall find, that, in the fact of cognition, we are often involuntary, that the cognitive power — the *vis cognitrix* — acts spontaneously, without any intervention of the *me* proper, and reveals to us, as it were, immediately, the sublime principles of the universe, and carries us up into immediate relation with its Original and Cause. By being quiet, by simply opening the mind, and then remaining all passive, the light from its Source will stream into the soul, and we shall know God and nature by immediate intuition. If we fix our attention, exclusively, on the order of facts thus introduced into the consciousness, we shall attempt to explain the universe solely from the point of view of Spontaneity. The philosophy that does this is MYSTICISM.

But all these systems contradict one another; each leaves a portion of the facts of consciousness unexplained; disputes, quarrels follow, and disgust men of plain, practical *good sense*, who, struck with the inconclusiveness of the reasoning of each, conclude that certainty with regard to human knowledge is out of the question. Doubt and uncertainty hang over all human science. They who fix their attention solely on this fact, and erect doubt into a principle; generate a fourth system, which we may call SKEPTICISM. Thus Sensualism, Idealism, Mysticism, and Skepticism constitute all the possible systems of philosophy. Every philosopher must, by virtue of the absolute necessity imposed upon him by the nature of the human soul itself, be either a Sensualist or an Idealist, a Mystic or a Skeptic, — or all four together, and neither exclusively, that is to say, an ECLECTIC.

Having settled all this, we are prepared to run over the History of Philosophy. When we come to a par-

ticular system of philosophy, our first question is, Where does it belong? Is the author a Sensualist? an Idealist? a Mystic? a Skeptic? or, in fine, an Eclectic? For instance, we propose to study Plato; then, What was Plato? With which of the five systems* shall we class him? Having determined that he is an Idealist, we know then that he is one who attempts with mere conceptions *a priori* to explain the universe. This determined, we have comprehended Platonism, and may proceed to Aristotle, and go through the same process. Nothing more simple. After having settled the principle of classification, you have nothing to do, but to determine the method of any given philosopher, and, lo, you are instantly master of his whole system!

Now, in our judgment, this is making the matter quite too easy; and, moreover, is amusing us with mere barren classifications, as barren as are the classifications of a modern botanist, which, when learned, leave us as ignorant of the actual plant as we were before. It has the air of being very scientific, but it really tells us nothing of the individual system we would study. It proceeds on a false assumption. All philosophy is not of an exclusively psychological origin; and there are systems not explicable from the psychological point of view. How, on mere psychological principles, explain the difference between Plato and Aristotle, between Roscellin and Guillaume de Champeaux, or between Abélard and his great opponent, Saint Bernard? Psychologically explained, Plato, Proclus, Erigena, St. Anselm of Canterbury, Roscellin, St. Bernard, Saint Thomas, Jordano Bruno, Peter Ramus, Descartes, Malebranche, Spinoza, Leibnitz, Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, to mention no more, must all be ranged in the same category. Are there between these no generic differences? Assuredly, Plato was not a Nominalist, and yet his method is that of Roscellin, at least so far as it is

* We say *five*, for M. Cousin, though officially admitting only four, really contends for five, in that his own system is not one of the *four*.

possible now to ascertain. Assuredly, Saint Bernard was not a Conceptualist, and yet there is no difference as to method between him and Abélard. Assuredly, never men differed more, one from another, than many of the Scholastics, and yet they all adopt one and the same method; namely, the dialectic method, which rests on the principle of contradiction, the principle of the syllogism. How, then, explain their differences from the point of view of psychology?

The psychological principle of classification is admissible, only when the question concerns a doctrine of science; that is, when the system to be classed is not a system of philosophy, but a doctrine concerning the origin, conditions, and validity of human knowledge. Now, ancient philosophy concerns itself very little with doctrines of science, in this sense, and the scholastic philosophy, never. Plato, indeed, takes up the question of science, but it is in relation to the object of science, not, primarily, in relation to the cognitive subject. In his mind, the question, What is Science? has no reference to the origin, conditions, or validity of human knowledge, psychologically considered, but refers to that in the object, or phenomenon, present to the mind, which must be known in order really to know the object. The refutation of Sensualism, in his *Theætetus*, is not a refutation of it from the point of view of psychology, but from ontology. In this dialogue Socrates labors to show, not that we have another psychological principle of knowledge than the senses, as M. Cousin, in his argument placed at the head of his translation of this dialogue, teaches, but that what the senses give us is no real science; that we must look deeper into the object, to its essence or *idea*, before we have attained to any knowledge of it which may properly be denominated science. Plato is a philosopher, not a psychologist; and, if he touches the psychological question, it is always from the point of view of ontology.

Aristotle, again, though he differs from Plato as to his terminology and mode of exposition, adopts, on

this point the same doctrine. He, no doubt, undertakes to construct a doctrine of science ; but it is always science objectively considered. The inquiry relates always to what it is necessary to know, in order to have science properly so called. His *wisdom*, which answers to Plato's *science*, is never in the knowledge of the mere sensible appearances, nor in that of particulars, but in the knowledge of causes, principles, which is very nearly what Plato means by a knowledge of *ideas*. His categories, or predicaments, are all ontologically derived and reduced, and are the forms, or the laws, of the object, not, as the categories of Kant, the forms, or laws, of the subject. He, doubtless, has a psychology ; he is the father of logic ; but his logic is an *organon*, or instrument, of science, — a logic that determines the *use* of the human mind in advancing science, not the *value* of the human mind as a cognitive subject, as is the case with the Kantian logic. The Fathers of the Church, especially the Scholastics, no doubt, concern themselves with science, with psychology, with logic, and treat at large of the powers and capacities of the human mind, and often with a sagacity, precision, and depth, which we in vain attempt to equal ; but it is always from the point of view of ontology, in the Platonic or Aristotelian sense. How, then, explain their labors, from the point of view of psychology, in the modern sense of the term ?

Since the time of Descartes, down to Fichte, if we except Spinoza, Leibnitz, and some doctors of the Church, as Cudworth and Henry More, the question of science has been, primarily, a psychological question. It has been before all a question of the human mind itself, not as to the mode or manner of its use in the advancement of science, but as to its value or capacity, as the subject of science. Can I know ? Can I know that I know ? What is it, psychologically considered, to know ? What is it to know that I know ? How do I know ? How do I know that I know ? These are the problems, and problems very nearly peculiar to modern times. The great philosophers of antiquity, of

the early days of the Church, of the Middle Ages, troubled not themselves, at all, with these problems. We do not mean, of course, to say, that similar questions were not asked in antiquity, for there were then, as well as now, sophists and skeptics; but, that the great men, the men who had doctrines, and whom humanity owns as philosophers, and reveres as having contributed to her growth, ask no such vain questions. In their estimation, to know is to know, and he who says, I know, says all that he does who says, I know that I know. Now, between the systems left us by these great men, and our modern systems, which take their point of departure in psychology, and assume that the first problem relates to the psychological origin, conditions, and validity of our cognitions, there is, in our judgment, not merely a *specific*, but a *generic* difference. The last seek to explain the origin, conditions, and validity, of our cognitions; they then seek a doctrine of science, the *Wissenschaftlehre* of Fichte; the others seek to explain the origin, principle, and genesis of things, and, therefore, seek a doctrine of life. We have, then, two distinct classes of systems, which we may denominate,

1. Doctrines of Science;
2. Doctrines of Life.

These last are the only doctrines which should be included under the term PHILOSOPHY; the others may be termed, if the reader pleases, PSYCHOLOGY.

This division, it may be thought, rests on the distinction between psychology and ontology. Doubtless, M. Cousin and others, whom we must class among the psychologists, admit this distinction, for they, as well as we, speak of ontology; but with them this distinction means only the distinction between the method and its application. With them, ontology is nothing but the psychological method in its development. Such your method, such your ontology. Given a philosopher's psychological doctrine on the origin, conditions, and validity of human cognitions, and his whole doctrine concerning the cause, principle, and genesis of

things is given. Hence the reason and necessity of Eclecticism, which recognizes all the psychological principles of cognition. If you mutilate the subject in forming your psychology, you will mutilate the object in your ontology. You must, then, include the whole subject in your method, if in its application no portion of the object is to be excluded. But this proceeds on the principle, that there can be nothing in the development not in the method. Ontology, given as the development of the psychological method, can, then, contain nothing, not already contained in the psychological principles themselves. It can, then, be only the logical, — the *ontological* generalization, as we shall hereafter see, is quite another affair, — only the *logical* generalization of psychology, and, therefore, can never carry us out of psychology, that is to say, out of the sphere of the subject. Their ontology is, then, no genuine ontology at all; it is nothing but a logical abstraction, and altogether worthless. It is therefore, that the Absolute, God, the Trinity, about which M. Cousin says so much, considered in the light of his own system, are but the veriest abstractions, and as to substantive existence have no being at all out of the mind itself.

Notwithstanding appearances, then, M. Cousin and the modern psychologists do not make the distinction we recognize, and on which we found our division of all systems into the two classes named. The distinction we contend for is not the distinction between method and its application, for this is common to every possible system, whether of the one division or of the other; nor is it precisely the distinction between ontology and psychology, when this last is taken in its legitimate sense, that is, as the investigation and classification of the faculties of the soul with a view to serve as the organon of advancing science. No philosopher ever failed to have a psychology, for no philosopher was ever yet able to philosophize without serving himself with the human mind as his organon; on the other hand, no psychologist ever sought a doctrine of

Science, save to apply it afterwards to the explanation of the universe, and, through it, to attain to a doctrine of Life. The real principle of our classification must be sought, not in the respective aims or results of the several systems to be classed, but in their respective points of departure. All alike aim at a doctrine of Life, and all arrive at some doctrine which is, or is taken to be, a doctrine of Life. Those systems, only, we class under the head of Doctrines of Science, which take their point of departure in psychology, and seek to solve the problem of Life, by first solving, from the psychological point of view, the problem of Science; all those systems which take their point of departure in ontology, and proceed directly to the solution of the problem of Life, we call Doctrines of Life. We call the first, Doctrines of Science, because it is the predominance of the problem of Science, in the minds of their respective authors, that induces them to take the psychological point of departure; and the others we call Doctrines of Life, because it is the predominance, in the minds of their respective authors, of the problem of Life, that induces them to take their point of departure in ontology. If the problem of Science predominate, the author of the system will concern himself mainly with the principle, the genesis, and the validity of our cognitions, that is, of *ideas* in the sense of Locke; if the problem of Life predominate, he will concern himself with the cause, principle, and genesis of things, that is, with *ideas* in the sense of Plato.

Now, each of these two grand divisions admits several subdivisions. The determination of the number of classes into which we may subdivide the doctrines of Life is no easy matter, and demands a full acquaintance with all the great principles of philosophy; and whether a given system belongs to one class or to another, can be determined only by a profound study of the system itself. The prevailing doctrine, in our times, subdivides the doctrines of Life into two classes,

1. MATERIALISM; 2. SPIRITUALISM.

The objection to this division is, that it is not fundamental, and has no well established principle. What is matter? What is spirit? These are questions which admit no *positive* answer. We can answer them only by negations, by saying what they are not; never by saying what they are. This classification has no ontological basis; and, in point of fact, not even a psychological basis. When we come to clear up our notions of substance, and to investigate anew the cognitive power of the soul, we shall see that this boasted distinction of spirit and matter never concerns either the essences of things, or even the notions which we form of those essences.

We contend for another classification of the doctrines of Life, more philosophical, and less inadequate to the explanation of the historical facts in the case, founded, not in psychology taken in the modern sense, but in the several points of view under which the subject-matter — the object — of science may be contemplated, therefore, in ontology. We may contemplate the object under the several points of view of Plurality, Unity, and Synthesis. If we contemplate Life, with the old Ionians, under the point of view of Plurality, our doctrine of Life will be **POLYTHEISM**, or **ATHEISM**; if under the point of view of Unity, with the old Eleatics, our doctrine of Life will be **UNITYISM**, or **PANTHEISM**; if, in fine, with Moses, Pythagoras, Plato, the Christian Fathers, the Scholastics, in a word, with all great theologians of all ages and nations, under the point of view of Synthesis, our doctrine of Life will be **TRINITYISM**, or **THEISM**; or, as M. Leroux calls it, not inaptly, **CHRISTIAN IDEALISM**. God, in the view of Christian theology, is not Unity, nor Plurality, but their synthesis, or rather, the one in the other, — the Father in the Son, and the Son in the Father, in indissoluble union. The **ONE** God of the Hebrews is, indeed, one God; but, in the ineffable mystery of his single being, is the indissoluble union of Unity in Diversity and Diversity in Unity, as shadowed forth in the very first verse of Genesis, where the Hebrew name

for God is a singular noun with a plural termination. The objections of the Unitarians to this sublime theology proceed from their assuming that it implies a *division* in the Godhead, which, of course, is inadmissible. But the Trinity, so to speak, is more ultimate than their conceptions reach, and concerns a theology which lies back of the conception of God as one. God, with the Trinitarian and the Unitarian, is alike one and indivisible. The Unitarian stops with this proposition. When he has said, God is ONE, he has said all that seems to him important, perhaps all that he believes can be said. But it is precisely here, where this proposition ends, that the Trinitarian solution of the mystery of Being begins. God, regarded as simple Unity, is not the *living* God, and therefore is incapable of being the Source of Life. The Unitarian, no doubt, believes that God is the *living* God; but he enters into no inquiry as to what, touching the ineffable mystery of the Divine Being, is implied in this assertion, that God is the *living* God. He, therefore, stops short of a real doctrine of Life. It is into the mystery of the Divine Unity itself, that the Trinitarian attempts to penetrate. He seeks, by decomposing, so to speak, without destroying, this Divine Unity, to get at the ultimate principle of Life itself. A sublime audacity, to which God himself, by his revelations of himself, invites him! It will be seen, at once, that the Trinitarian theology, which we in our classification term Theism, or Idealism, by no means excludes the Unitarian's faith in one God, but accepts it, and explains it by carrying it up to the principle of Life; by showing, that, in order to be the *living* God, this One God of the Unitarian must be the Triune God of the Trinitarian. The Trinitarian doctrine belongs to a much higher order of thought than the Unitarian, and proceeds boldly in the solution of problems which lie far out of the Unitarian's reach. But more of this, when we come to the direct consideration of the doctrines of Life, in our future numbers.

According to the principle of classification here contended for, that is, the ontological principle of their

origin, we subdivide the doctrines of Life into three classes; namely,

1. ATHEISM; 2. PANTHEISM; 3. THEISM.

It is not our purposé, at present, to enter into any discussion concerning these doctrines, as to which is true, or which is false, nor as to the question, whether the human mind, by its own spontaneous development, could, or could not, have attained to the true doctrine of Life. We shall enter fully into these questions, after we have disposed of the doctrines of Science; we will now only add, in passing, what our readers must suspect, that, for ourselves, we accept Theism, or, if they will, Trinityism, as the true doctrine of Life, and hold and teach that the human mind could never have attained to it without Divine Revelation, in the old-fashioned sense of the term, though possibly it is *now* able, by reflection on the reason and nature of things, to demonstrate its truth. We add, also, to take away all occasion for misapprehension, that we do not, in our view of the economy of salvation, hold, with Protestant divines, that it is belief in this doctrine of Life, though true, that saves us, but the influx into the soul of the Truth, or ontological principle, of which it is a true account. It is never the efficacy of the *doctrine* that redeems and sanctifies, but the efficacy, the real presence, of God himself. The doctrine is efficacious only so far as it brings us within the sphere of the influence of the Divine Reality, or, in theological language, of the Holy Ghost. Not man's *view* of God, but God himself, as manifested and communicated to us, in the way and manner, and through the Mediator and disciplines, he himself has instituted, is our Redeemer and Sanctifier. But this by the way.

The classification of the doctrines of Life, which we have here given, may seem, at first view, to be borrowed from M. Cousin, and to be sustained by his reduction of all our ontological Ideas to three; namely,

1. The Idea of the Finite;
2. The Idea of the Infinite;
3. The Idea of the Relation of the Two.

M. Cousin would contend that the idea of the Finite corresponds to that of Plurality; the idea of the Infinite to that of Unity; and, in fine, the idea of Relation to that of Synthesis; and we are by no means disposed to deny this apparent correspondence; and we have most likely been indebted to our knowledge of M. Cousin's reduction for the principle of our classification. But the correspondence is more in appearance than in reality. M. Cousin's terms are a little too abstract and vague for our purpose; moreover, the terms Finite and Infinite are not the exact equivalents of the terms Plurality and Unity. Unity may be predicated of the finite as well as of the infinite, and the conception of the infinite is very different from that of unity. Our conception of the infinite is a negative conception, merely the conception of the *not*-bounded or undefined; but our conception of unity is one of our most positive conceptions. The attempt to explain the universe from the point of view of the infinite would not result in Pantheism, but in Nihilism; for the infinite, taken, not as a predicate, but as the subject of the predicate, would be equivalent to infinite nothing; and from the conception of infinite nothing, how obtain the conception of infinite something?

Nor is this all. This reduction of absolute ideas, which plays so conspicuous a part in M. Cousin's Lectures on the History of Philosophy, is not part and parcel of his own system; it is one of his loans from the Hegelian philosophy, confessedly a doctrine of Life, — though in our judgment by no means the true doctrine of Life. The principle of this reduction of the categories — not Kant's, but Aristotle's, not the psychological, but the ontological predicaments — to the three ideas enumerated is not by any means a psychological principle. It is impossible to refer the idea of the Finite to the Senses, that of the Infinite to the Intelligence, and their Relation to the union of sensation and intellection. The senses, M. Cousin tells us, can give us no conception of unity; and yet, who dare deny that unity may be predicated of the finite? Moreover, we

shall hereafter see, that the senses are, in themselves, no independent medium of communication between the subject and the object. The intelligence can no more be dispensed with in the fact of sensation, than it can in the fact of cognition. M. Cousin himself, in point of fact, carried away by his admiration for Hegel out of his own poor psychology, virtually admits that the reduction in question is not psychologically obtained. He even makes this reduction the basis of his psychological classification, and attempts from it, after the example of his master, as from the point of view of ontology, to explain the history of philosophy, which, as he had elsewhere laid it down, was to be explained psychologically. Thus the predominance, in an epoch, of the idea of the Finite is given as the *cause* of the prevalence, in that epoch, of Sensualism; the predominance of the idea of the Infinite, as the cause of the prevalence of what he calls Idealism; the predominance of the idea of Relation, of Synthesis, as the cause of the prevalence of Eclecticism. Surely, this is to abandon the field of psychology altogether, and to enter into quite another region.

We do not forget that M. Cousin contends, that he begins in psychology, and from that attains to ontology; and that, after having through psychology arrived at ontology, he has a perfect right to use it for the explanation of his psychology. But his psychology must have been perfectly explicable, and perfectly explained, without ontology, if his ontology was obtained from it; wherefore, then, seek, by means of ontology, to explain it anew? But M. Cousin is deceived; for the ontology, he obtains by generalizing psychology, is only a logical abstraction; it never carries him out of the subject; and is, therefore, as we have seen, no genuine ontology at all. It is quite another sort of ontology from that which he borrows from his friend Hegel, and which he uses to explain his psychology, and is by no means reconcilable with it.

The doctrines of Science may also be subdivided into several classes. Here, since it concerns purely

psychological doctrines, the psychological principle of classification is not only admissible, but necessary ; yet even here we cannot accept M. Cousin's classification, without some important modifications. He reckons four classes, which he names,

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| 1. SENSUALISM ; | 3. MYSTICISM ; |
| 2. IDEALISM ; | 4. SKEPTICISM. |

This classification rests for its principle on an inaccurate psychology. M. Cousin makes the basis of Idealism the reflective reason, and that of Mysticism the spontaneous reason. This presupposes a distinction, or, rather, a division, of reason into the reflective and the spontaneous, which we hold to be inadmissible. Skepticism is, indeed, a fact in history ; but, as it is the negation of all science, and concerns not our powers of science, but their absence, we are hardly willing to call it a doctrine of Science. It has, moreover, no psychological principle. Even M. Cousin does not hold GOOD SENSE, which, according to him, is its principle, to be a fundamental faculty of the *me*. It is the name given, not to one of its original powers, but to a certain practical exercise of all its faculties in mutual support and limitation. We strike from the list of doctrines, therefore, what is termed Skepticism. Of his four systems we retain, then, but three.

Of the three we retain, only the first is rightly named. All these doctrines take their rise in the Subject, and should, therefore, all be called by the general name of Egoism. The principle of each respectively is, the predominance of a given faculty of the subject. The subject has three original faculties, which, so far as concerns doctrines purely psychological, and because all psychological doctrines so regard them, may be named Sensation, Sentiment, Intellect. Hence, three systems, which may be denominated,

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| 1. SENSUALISM ; | 3. INTELLECTUALISM. |
| 2. SENTIMENTALISM ; | |

If we undertake to explain the phenomena of the subject by sensation, our doctrine of Science will be Sensualism ; if by sentiment, it will be Sentimental-

ism; if by intellect, that is, pure conception (*Begriff*), it will be Intellectualism. All doctrines of Science must be referred to one or another of these three classes;

Our classification of all possible systems is, then, first, into two orders; and, second, each order into three classes.

I. DOCTRINES OF LIFE — 1. ATHEISM; 2. PAN-THEISM; 3. THEISM.

II. DOCTRINES OF SCIENCE — 1. SENSUALISM; 2. SENTIMENTALISM; 3. INTELLECTUALISM.

Our present purpose confines us to the second order; namely,

II. DOCTRINES OF SCIENCE:

It is the common opinion among those who in our times pass for philosophers, that there was no philosophy, properly so called, in the Church, from its origin down nearly to the sixteenth century. M. Cousin is hardly willing to allow that the Scholastics were really philosophers; he sees with them only philosophy in germ, prevented by the prevailing theology from attaining to any thing like a fair or full development. Ancient philosophy was born with Socrates, and expired with the closing of the Greek schools at Athens, by order of Justinian, in the sixth century; and modern philosophy was born only with René Descartes, in the sixteenth. But we cannot accept this view. The last three centuries, in our judgment, have been by no means eminently philosophical centuries; and were we to characterize them in a word, we should do so by denominating them unphilosophical, but scientific.

To say that there was no philosophy in the Church prior to what we call the Revival of Letters in the fifteenth century, is to take a very false view either of the Church or of philosophy itself. What were all the great questions debated by the theologians of the Church, against the Gentiles, the Gnostics, the Manichæans, the Sabellians, the Monosphytes, the Arians, the Donatists, the Pelagians, the Predestinarians, represented in the ninth century by the monk Gotteschalk,

the Berengarians, concerning the Real Presence, which last provoked the whole scholastic philosophy, but so many profound ontological questions? Was the question between the Arians and Athanasians nothing but a question of a mere dogma enjoined by authority? Was it for a single diphthong that men disputed and cut one another's throats for some three hundred years? Do not so libel humanity. The difference expressed by that diphthong was all the difference between Paganism and Christianity, between Atheism and Theism. In asserting that the Son was made of a *like* substance with the Father, what did the Homoiousian attempt, but to introduce two kindred substances as the basis of his theory of the universe, and thus to explain Life from the point of view of plurality, which is Polytheism or Atheism? What was, at bottom, the Pelagian controversy? Pelagius asserts the power of the human soul to place itself in a salvable state. Press this assertion, push it to its last consequences, and it annihilates God, and proclaims the supremacy of man. It transfers the creative power to the creature, and makes the universe live by its own inherent life, independent of a supermundane Creator. What, again, was the real doctrine involved in the controversy provoked in the ninth century by Gotteschalk? Gotteschalk is the antipodes of Pelagius. He is the precursor of Calvin. He asserts the Divine sovereignty in a sense which leaves man no freedom. Just so far as you deny man's freedom, you deny man himself. To deny man, to deny the active force of the creature, is to deny the reality of the creature, to make him merely a mode or affection of the Creator, — is, in fact, to deny creation, and to fall into Pantheism. Was here no philosophical question? Does it not become so in the hands of John Erigena, who has been wrongly accused of being himself a Pantheist? Was there no profound ontological question raised up by Berengarius, in the eleventh century, touching the Eucharist, and which engaged in its discussion such men as Lanfranc, St. Anselm of Canterbury, and involved the whole dispute of the

Schoolmen about *genera* and *species*? Understand the matter better, and you will find that it is always in the Church a question of ontology.

The reason why men of no mean capacity fall into this mistake concerning the theologians of the Church is, that they separate in their own minds, fundamentally, philosophy and theology. Philosophy they regard as the work of the human mind, as resting for its authority on human reason alone. They will allow nothing to be philosophy, therefore, which is not entirely emancipated from all theological envelope, and which does not assert the absolute independence and sufficiency of the human reason. If human reason is independent, if it is fully competent, of itself, to attain to the true doctrine of Life, then Revelation, then Divine Communication through the agency of prophets and apostles, is superfluous; and hence nothing is properly philosophy, that does not proclaim the whole teachings of the Church as to the origin and grounds of our religious faith, either false or superfluous. Philosophy, with the moderns, is profoundly infidel; and hence whatever finds its support in the Christian Revelation is denied to be philosophy at all. What with them passes for philosophy, or rather the principle of what passes with them for philosophy, is profoundly hostile to the Church. This both they and the Church have always felt and asserted; hence the condemnation of the one by the other.

We insist on this point. The modern philosopher begins by putting Christianity on trial, and claims for the human reason the right to sit in judgment on Revelation. At one period, its aim is to overthrow the Church; at another, it is to *reconcile*, as it is called, reason and faith. How often in these very days of ours, have we heard it said, that the problem of philosophy is to reconcile faith and reason! Have not we ourselves begun our philosophical course by so affirming? Do not those who were associates and fellow-laborers with us in the outset continue still so to affirm? Faith is questioned; men doubt; and they

seek to *prove* faith, — to get rid of doubt. Reason appears to teach one thing, faith another ; and they seek, by mutual explanations and refinings, to make the teachings of the one coincide with those of the other. Is not this the thought of our “Charles Elwood,” of our “New Views,” of Ripley’s “Miscellanies,” of Walker’s “Lectures,” of Cousin’s labors? Taking this view, we necessarily imply, that philosophy is of purely human origin, and that the human reason, in which it originates, is competent to sit in judgment on all questions which do or may come up.

We proclaim its independence and sufficiency. If we believe, it is because reason has demonstrated our right to believe ; if we disbelieve, it is because reason declares it to be unreasonable to believe. If we reject the Trinity, it is because we find it irrational ; endless punishment, it is because it does not comport with our notions of justice, &c. Now, this being our state of mind, we necessarily transport it into the study of the Fathers and theologians of the Church ; and because we do not find them asserting the independence and sufficiency of the reason, in our sense, because we do not find them studying to *prove* religion, to get rid of doubt, and to harmonize the independent teachings of reason with the independent teachings of faith, we conclude, forthwith, that they were no philosophers ; or that, if they were so in their secret thought, they dared not be so in public. Poor men, they were bound by their actual belief in authority, or by their fear of it, to maintain certain prescribed dogmas, and so could not give free scope to independent thought, or free development to their own reason ! Here is wherefore our modern philosophers can find no philosophy, properly so called, in the Church, prior to the Revival of Letters. Prior to that epoch, men believed, and when men believe, they do not philosophize. Does not this imply that philosophy is held to be of purely infidel origin ?

Now, that philosophy has been, since the Revival of Letters, what this implies, we do not deny ; and, if this

character, which it has since borne, be really the essential character of philosophy, we admit, most cheerfully, that there was very little, if any, philosophy in the Church prior to the epoch named. But it is precisely this fact we controvert. We maintain, with Saint Augustine and John Erigena, the identity of religion and philosophy. Philosophy is nothing but the practical teachings of religion, referred to their ontological principles, and reduced to doctrinal forms. Philosophy is the offspring, not of Doubt, but of Faith, and is impossible in unbelieving epochs. If the moderns could learn this fact, they would form a very different estimate of the Fathers of the Church, and of the Scholastics, from that which now very generally obtains. Without a knowledge of this fact, without rising to the *identity* of religion and philosophy, instead of their *harmony*, it is impossible to comprehend the Schoolmen, or the great Fathers of the Church.

In contradiction to the commonly received opinion, we regard the thought of the Church, from its birth down to the Revival of Letters, as profoundly philosophical. All the great questions debated were, at bottom, great ontological questions. Men believed; they had a doctrine of Life, and this doctrine they labored to comprehend and explain. The Revival of Letters in the fifteenth century marks a decline in religious faith, and the sixteenth century is itself a period of transition from philosophy to science, from religion to doubt.

M. Cousin, in his *Philosophie Scholastique*, adopts the common opinion, that the Scholastic Philosophy was provoked by the celebrated passage of Porphyry, concerning *genera* and *species*, translated by Boëthius; and tries to connect, through Boëthius and Porphyry, the Scholastic Philosophy with the Neoplatonists, and, through them, with the ancient philosophy of Greece. We admit the connexion, but we do not believe this is the precise medium through which it actually took place. He adopts this hypothesis, because he always separates philosophy from theology, and must, therefore,

seek its continuity through a medium comparatively independent of theology. But, in point of fact, the celebrated passage of Porphyry had very little to do with the generation of the Scholastic Philosophy. That philosophy was provoked by the theological controversy raised up concerning the mode, or manner, in which Christ is really present in the Eucharist. That controversy necessarily involved discussions as to the nature of substance, and discussions as to the nature of substance open, of themselves, to philosophical minds, the whole question of *genera* and *species*. The Scholastic Philosophy originated, really and truly, in the theology of the Church, and was connected with the ancient philosophy chiefly by means of that portion of the ancient philosophy which the Church had received and assimilated through the early Fathers.

But, in the progress of the discussions Berengarius had provoked by his doctrine of *impanation*, the disputants began to study more and more attentively the ancient masters, especially Aristotle. They also made themselves more or less familiar with the contemporary Jewish and Arabic schools. Aristotle, the Jews, and the Arabs, all became to them sources of wisdom extraneous to the Church, and, of course, must have more or less weakened the hold the Church had on their minds, if not on their hearts. None of these extraneous sources contained the true Christian doctrine of Life, the unadulterated Word of God. Study of them, naturally and almost inevitably, carried the Scholastics away from the truth, and involved them in the mazes of error. They must necessarily lose more and more the deep sense of the Church; and, in proportion as they lost the sense of the Church, they must cease to love and reverence its authority. In this way was effected the moral and intellectual state which admitted the revival and triumph of heathen literature in the fifteenth century. The Scholastic Philosophy, in its progress, necessarily involved this revival. Ancient heathen literature once revived, and everywhere studied as an authority, faith in the Church could hardly be maintained, and must

continue to become every day more and more difficult ; for this literature did not contain, or at least but very imperfectly, the Christian ontology, and, therefore, in proportion as it took possession of the mind of the scholar, must it obscure his perception of the real sense of the Church. The Schoolmen were carried away, by their discussions, into the society of the Peripatetics, Jews, and Arabs, and these carried them away from the deep meaning of the Church.

The Church, to all who had lost the sense of its profound significance, could appear to be only an arbitrary authority, and its dogmas only empty formulas and unmeaning rites and ceremonies. As an arbitrary authority, it could have no right to command ; and for it to assume to command, to continue to enjoin its dogmas and discipline, could be regarded only as intolerable tyranny, demanding to be resisted. To this point matters were brought at the close of the fifteenth century. The sixteenth century opens with the dominant character of revolt against the whole moral, intellectual, social, political, religious, and ecclesiastical order founded and developed by the Church. This revolt, embodied and directed by Luther against the ecclesiastical phase of this order, becomes *PROTESTANTISM* ; embodied and rendered victorious by the monarchs of the time, under its political phase, it becomes the *SUPREMACY OF THE STATE*, to be subsequently transformed into the Supremacy of the People, and the subjection of both Church and State to the will of the multitude ; embodied, and directed especially against the Schools, by Descartes, it becomes what by courtesy we call *MODERN PHILOSOPHY*, the last word of which is Kant's "*Critic of Pure Reason*."

Now, if we regard the origin of Modern Philosophy, if we pay attention to the circumstances of its birth, we see at once, that it could have been only a doctrine of Science. It was the offspring of Doubt and Rebellion. It must vindicate its own right to be, and its own right to rebel. It must needs find, or erect, some tribunal before which it could summon the Schools, and

compel them to appear and give an account of their right to command, — to show by what authority they pretended to reign. This, evidently, demanded preliminary inquiries as to the origin, the conditions, the extent, and limitations of human knowledge, the evidence and grounds of certainty. It must find the law by which it could justify itself, and condemn the Schools.

Where could this law be found? The first rebels had sought it in antiquity. But antiquity was divided. Men began to study Plato, and, if some quoted Aristotle, others could quote Plato against them, and one ancient school could be overthrown by another. The sixteenth century exhausted itself in the vain effort to get some solid ground, by means of the ancients, on which it could stand. There were great men, and great victims, but nothing solid was obtained. It became evident that the law could not be taken from antiquity; it could not be taken from the Church, because the Church was precisely that which was to be tried; nothing remained, then, but to leave antiquity and the Church, and to fall back on human reason itself, and, starting from that, proceed to the construction of a general doctrine of Life. This was attempted by Telesius and his disciple Campanella in Italy, Bacon in England, and Descartes in France.

Of the Italian school, our knowledge is too limited to speak at much length. We will only add, in passing, that Campanella, the contemporary of Bacon, deserves not less than the Englishman the honorable mention of the historian of philosophy. He is equally admirable under the point of view of method, and much profounder, more comprehensive, more systematic, and complete in his views. As a philosopher, as well as a man, we should place him far above Lord Bacon. Of Lord Bacon we shall soon proceed to speak; we stop now for a few moments with René Descartes, who is, after all, the real father of modern science. Peter Ramus, or Pierre Rameau, one of the greatest of the Platonists of the sixteenth century, had successfully com-

bated the Peripatetics, and greatly weakened their authority in the French schools, but without being able to found a doctrine of Life generally acceptable. Descartes, a native of Bretagne, of the old Celtic race, a layman, a soldier, and a geometrician, undertook to settle the question once for all, and to reconstruct philosophy on a solid and imperishable basis. The age was, as we have seen, an age of Doubt and Rebellion. The fifteenth century doubted the doctrines of the Church, and rebelled against its authority, in favor of Pagan antiquity; the sixteenth century shook and pretty much overthrew the authority of antiquity. The seventeenth century opens with this double doubt and two-fold revolt. It will accept neither the Church nor antiquity. All authority is thrown off; doubt is universal and complete. This entire independence of authority, and this universal and complete doubt, is the point of departure for Descartes. It is so, because it is the point of departure for his age, and more so still for himself. He really felt the doubt; he really felt himself independent of authority.

Here, then, is Descartes, without tradition, without experience, reduced, as it were, to the state of primitive destitution; all is before him; nothing is behind him. He has no ancestors, no recollections; or, if some, in point of fact, none but are to be theoretically repulsed and disowned. What, then, must first of all be the question? Certainly it must be the question of Science. All is to be constructed. In his view there is nothing standing. He has made of the universe a *tabula rasa*, — a universal blank. All is to be re-created. Does any thing exist? As yet, he assumes that he has no right to assert a single existence, not even his own. How know I that I myself exist? What right have I to affirm that even *I* am?

Here is his first problem, and a problem to be solved only by a doctrine of Science. Hence, his first work is entitled METHOD. But we must not be unjust to Descartes. He never confounded method with philosophy. Nor did he propose doubt as the universally necessary

point of departure of philosophy. M. Cousin has on this point misinterpreted him. Descartes proposes the method of Doubt, only because doubt was the fact of his age, and of his own mind. But he proposed it only as preliminary to faith. No man ever felt more strongly, than Descartes, the need of believing, the absolute necessity of a doctrine of Life. Yet, as he takes his point of departure in the question of Science, we must class his system with the Doctrines of Science, not with the philosophical doctrines.

Descartes solves the problem of Science by his famous *Cogito, ergo sum*; I think, therefore I am. But is this a solution of the scientific problem? Descartes was to find his point of departure in absolute Doubt. Doubt can be removed only by Science. Hence we say, his preliminary problem was the problem of Science — Can I know? For, evidently, taking his starting-point, the possibility of knowledge must precede the determination of existence; that is, I must be able to say, I know, before I can legitimately say, I am. He himself accordingly affirms *cogito* as the condition of affirming *sum*. But the very question was in this *cogito*. By what right do I affirm that I think? I am conscious. True; but not that I *think*, but that I *am*. I may, perhaps, very legitimately affirm I am, on the authority of consciousness; but on what authority do I affirm consciousness? Who says, "I am conscious," says, "I know," for Science is already in consciousness. Descartes's problem, then, required him to go behind consciousness, and to establish the validity of consciousness itself; for he has no more right to take Science in the fact of consciousness for granted, than he has anywhere else. Yet he never goes behind consciousness. He trenches the question of Science, and proceeds at once to the question of Life, existence, — *Cogito, ergo sum*. I *think*, which is already to know, is assumed as evident of itself, and the point to be made out is merely I *am*.

This sudden abandonment of the scientific problem for the ontological problem has vitiated the whole

Cartesian doctrine, as a doctrine of Science, and has left the original problem of Descartes to be renewed by each of his successors. Malebranche struggles manfully with it; but, taking his point of departure in the human mind, he cannot, to save his soul, get behind *I know*, or *I am* conscious, and is obliged to resort to *vision in God*, in order to establish the validity of consciousness.

But this is not our only objection to the Cartesian solution. We make no account of the objections brought against the Cartesian enthymeme, *Cogito, ergo sum*. We readily admit that it is defective as an argument, for *I am* is already in *I think*; but Descartes never meant it for an argument. He was too good a reasoner to conclude from *I think* to *I am*. He refers to *cogito*, not as the *data* from which *sum* is inferred, but as the fact in which it is found, or recognized. In the fact of thinking, I recognize myself not only as thinker, but as persisting subject. Since, then, I think, am conscious, I am able to affirm myself ontologically; or, rather, in the fact of thinking, I *do* so affirm myself, do affirm I am. This now becomes his point of departure. I affirm my existence, because, in thinking, I recognize, or rather conceive it. Transfer, now, to the object the kind of evidence on which I affirm my own existence, and for *cogito, ergo sum*, I must say, I conceive the object, therefore it is. The possibility of being conceived is, therefore, made the criterion of the reality of the object. This determined, nothing is more easy than to construct his theory of the universe. All rests on the original conceptions of the subject, given in the affirmation, *I am*. Proceed with these as in the construction of the science of geometry, and you arrive, with mathematical certainty, to a doctrine of Life.

But, unhappily for the truth and value of his doctrine of Life, his point of departure was in the subject alone; and the only ontological existence, contained in the conceptions, was simply what he expresses by the phrase, *I am*. Hence, his system was, after all, pure Egoism; and, since constructed with pure con-

ceptions, as distinguished from sensation and sentiment, a pure *Intellectualism*. This is evident from his assertion of *INNATE* ideas. Doubtless, Plato asserts innate ideas, but in altogether another sense. The *Inneity* for which Descartes contends is, we believe, original with him. Obligated to deduce all from the subject, he must needs give up all external existence, God, and all objects of religious faith, or else found them on something innate in the subject. Man believes in God, because the idea of God is innate, born with the human soul ; that is to say, because he is born with the inherent *faculty* to think God, to conceive his existence. But by what right conclude from the conception to the reality of the object ? The belief, in this case, could have only a subjective value, because conception (*cogito*), on the Cartesian hypothesis, as we have seen, involves no ontological existence but that of the subject. So that, however numerous the innate ideas, they could never carry us out of the sphere of the subject ; a fact which Locke does not appear, in his attack on Cartesianism, to have ever suspected ; for, if he had, he could have made much shorter work with innate ideas.

This doctrine of innate ideas has been recently revived in our own country, and we find men of no mean ability undertaking to conclude from the innateness of the idea, or rather sentiment, in their terminology, to the reality of the object ; not perceiving that what is really subjective in its principle must needs be equally subjective in its application. No conclusion from the subject to the object ever yet was valid. The cause of the self-deception of our friends, on this point, is in their making, or trying to make, a distinction between the subject and the *inneity* of the subject ; as if what is innate, inherent in the subject, is not subject ! What is in the subject, inherent in its nature, born with it, and without which it would not, and could not, be what it is, is essential to the subject, in the fullest sense of the words, *is* the subject.

Descartes, nevertheless, was on the verge of the

truth. If he had analyzed the fact of consciousness in relation to the object as carefully as he did in relation to the subject, he would have escaped his fatal error. He was right when he said, *Cogito, ergo sum*; but he did not discover the whole truth. It is true, I find "I am" in "I think"; but it is equally true that I always, in the same act, in the same *cogito*, find another existence, which is not myself, but distinguished from me. *Cogito, ergo sum*, is true; and *Cogito, ergo est*, is equally true; for both are contained simultaneously and indissolubly in *cogito*. Here is the fact that Descartes overlooked. He attempted to deduce *id est* from *ego sum*, which was impossible; but both were given him primitively in the fact of consciousness, and he had no occasion to attempt to infer one from the other. But it needed the psychological labors of nearly two centuries to place this fact in the clear light of day; and, what is a little discouraging, very able psychologists even yet not only do not perceive it, but cannot be made to understand it, when it is stated to them in the plainest and least ambiguous terms possible.

Descartes had two eminent disciples, Spinoza and Malebranche. But Spinoza, at an early age, abandoned him, and passed from the schools of science to the schools of philosophy. We shall meet him again, when we come to the consideration of doctrines of Life, and, therefore, pass him over for the present. His Pantheism has borrowed little from the Intellectualism of Descartes, except the definition of Substance. Malebranche is the true continuator of Descartes. He, as we have seen, starting with the problem of Science, was obliged to take refuge in Vision in God; that is, that we in ourselves are incapable of Science, and can know, at all, only by virtue of the special intervention of God himself in each and every act of knowing. We cannot linger on this theory, although we agree with M. Leroux, that it is a very remarkable theory, and, at bottom, worthy of altogether more respect than it has received; although M. Leroux's explanation of it makes it really identical with M. Cousin's doctrine

of Spontaneity.* Malebranche, if he had known it, was on the point of touching the truth, and making an end of psychology. If he had been understood, he would have been seen to have demonstrated the impossibility of solving the problem of Science from the point of view of psychology alone; that the *inneity* of the subject, however great or various it may be, can generate no fact of science, save as it acts in conjunction with the object; that, indeed, the fact of science can be explained only by rising to ontology, and taking our point of sight in the infinite and eternal Reason of God, — the doctrine of Plato, of the Fathers, and of all who have thought a little profoundly on the subject, — “*In Deo vivimus, et movemur, et sumus.*”

Malebranche closes the direct line of the Cartesians, and ends in demonstrating the impossibility of explaining Science by means of pure Intellectualism. In the beginning of the seventeenth century, a little prior to Descartes, flourished Francis Bacon. Bacon, in our judgment, is hardly to be regarded as an original genius. He had been preceded, in nearly all that is valuable in his views, by the Italian school, and was, in more respects than one, surpassed by his contemporary, Cam-

* M. Leroux is the uncompromising enemy of M. Cousin, whom he seeks, in season and out of season, to turn into ridicule; and yet, on almost all important points, his philosophy and Cousin's are the same, or come to the same results. In his *Réfutation de l'Eclecticisme*, he showers down his ridicule most unmercifully upon M. Cousin's doctrine, that we see all by virtue of the Impersonal Reason, which, in the last analysis, is identical with God himself; and yet this is precisely the doctrine of his own article on God in the third volume of the *Revue Indépendante*. What is this Universal Life (*Vie Universelle*) of which he speaks, and by union with which all particular beings subsist and live, but the Impersonal Reason of “le grande eclectique”? In the same volume of the *Revue*, we have a very able and elaborate article on the Hegelian Philosophy, which we believe in the main just; but will M. Leroux tell us the difference between the Hegelian doctrine he here so warmly and successfully combats, and his own doctrine as brought out in the fifth book of his *Humanité*? His infinite Virtuality, his invisible *Ciel*, answering, by his own confession, to the *Void* of the Boudhists, what is this, but the God of Hegel manifesting himself through all gradations of being, and coming to self-consciousness in man?

panella, as we have already intimated. Nevertheless, Bacon was a man of great depth and reach of thought, extensive erudition, lofty and comprehensive views. He also undertook to settle the question of Method, but more in the sense of Aristotle than in that of the moderns. His aim was not so much the solution of the problem of Science, to determine the origin, conditions, and validity of knowledge, as to construct a *novum organum* for augmenting or advancing knowledge. Bacon was not a psychologist, nor yet, though endowed with a fine philosophic spirit, was he a philosopher. His views were vast, often profound, oftener wise and just; but his mind was very little systematic, and his labors ended in exerting an influence, rather than in the construction of a doctrine, whether of Science or of Life. To talk of a Baconian Philosophy, save in deference to common usage, is to betray our ignorance. There is not, and never was, any such thing as a Baconian Philosophy, — meaning thereby a philosophy founded by Bacon himself.

But we shall be told, that he has given us a method, that there is a real Baconian Method. Not at all. Nothing seems to us more vague, inconclusive, less scientific, than what Bacon says about *Induction*, unless it be what Englishmen and Americans say after him, and professedly in his spirit. The Inductive Method of philosophizing was no new discovery of Bacon's, but, so far as sound, is the method of the human mind itself, and has been practised by every philosopher in every age. Nor has Bacon thrown any new light upon it, or demonstrated its legitimacy. He does not seem himself to have ever comprehended the great ontological fact on which it depends. If we understand it, the Inductive Method is, from the examination of a certain number of particulars, to obtain a law which shall be applicable to particulars even beyond the sphere of observation. It is to go from the known to the unknown. Now, every tyro in logic knows, that a law thus obtained, which in fact is no law, but a classification, cannot be logically valid beyond the particulars examined.

The generalization, which Bacon and his followers attain to, is no genuine generalization, but a mere classification of particulars. The process is not by examination of particulars to attain to the generic, to what Plato would call the idea, and Aristotle, the principle or cause ; but merely to a class, and the generic it obtains is nothing but a general statement of the particulars ascertained. It has, therefore, no scientific value

Bacon was a lawyer, and he transported into philosophy the method adopted, and very properly adopted, in his own profession, in which a high degree of probability, rather than absolute certainty, is that which is sought. In the profession of the law, this method is not without its validity, because the question there concerns human actions, the generic principle of which may be assumed to be known in our knowledge of human nature, on which they depend. Here the generic principle, that which generates the actions, is human nature. In our reasoning on these particulars, the general is always assumed to be known, and up to a certain extent always is known. From observation of the mode of its manifestation in certain given particulars, we may very legitimately conclude to the mode of its manifestation in certain other particulars of a like character. So, having ascertained, from observation of a certain number of particulars, their generic principle, we may conclude that a certain number of other particular actions not embraced in the number of these, having a like character, have the same generic principle. But, in all this, there is no advance of knowledge beyond the sum of our actual knowledge of the principles and the particulars concerned. Moreover, the whole validity of the induction rests on our knowledge of the general, not as a rule, or a classification, but as the cause generating the particulars. Taken out of the sphere of the law, transported to a region where the generic is unknown, the inductive method, which proceeds from the particular to the general, involves a *petitio*, inasmuch as it assumes the knowledge of the cause, the principle of generalization, the validity of which knowledge was the very point to be made out.

Nevertheless, the application, it is said, of this method to the study of nature has given us the exact sciences. *Exact sciences!* what are they, and where are they? We hear of them; our friends boast of them; but we have never discovered them. So far from its having given us the exact sciences, its warmest partisans deny, with one voice, the possibility of science. What pass with us for sciences are nothing but classifications of phenomena, constantly varying as new phenomena are discovered. What is your doctrine of physics, your famous Newtonian attraction, but the mere classification of observed phenomena? You tell me bodies attract one another so and so, and under such and such conditions. What does this mean? Simply, under such and such conditions, such and such phenomena take place. Call you this science? What is the principle of attraction? You talk of electricity and magnetism; but what do you tell us, but, simply, that you have observed such and such phenomena? Chemistry is one of your exact sciences; yet you are unable to settle your dispute about the primitive *state* of bodies, much less to determine their primitive elements. What is the principle of chemical affinity? Why are new chemical compounds always formed in certain definite proportions, which cannot be varied? Theories in abundance we find, but none of them seem to be settled. We take up Liebig's "Organic Chemistry"; surely, we say, here we shall find exact science, if anywhere; and yet, so far from science, we do not even find facts. We pass to his "Animal Chemistry," and here we do find, indeed, theory, theory to our heart's content, but hardly a recognition of the principle of Life. A certain portion of the phenomena are attempted to be explained on chemical principles, as they were formerly attempted to be explained on mechanical principles; but we find no explanation of that subtle principle in the animal economy, which never fails, during life, to resist your chemical action. One may as well explain the circulation of the blood by capillary attraction, or by the principle of the

forcing pump worked by the lungs serving as the arms and sails of a windmill, as explain, with Liebig, animal heat by means of internal combustion, making the animal a huge furnace for the consumption of carbon. Go into your mathematics, and tell us what is the principle of number? What is the ground of certainty in mathematical reasoning? What is the ground of your mathematical axioms? What is the real science of mathematics? Does it really advance knowledge beyond the few empirical propositions with which it starts? Is it productive, or merely composed of identical propositions piled upon identical propositions? Is it really a science, or only an organon of science? Is it knowledge, or, as the ancients held, and as the name implies, merely a discipline? We could run through the whole list of the so-called exact sciences, and propose similar questions, but it is unnecessary.

We shall be told that these and similar questions are unanswerable; that our knowledge is necessarily limited to phenomena; that to aspire to a knowledge of principles, causes, essences, is to aspire to the unattainable; and that the progress of modern science is owing precisely to the fact that we do not now so aspire. This may or may not be so; for our part, we believe quite the contrary, and are prepared to question, to a very considerable extent, this modern progress, even in departments where it is most loudly boasted. We doubt whether modern science in any department has as yet come up to the ancient. The more we penetrate into the concealed sense of this old world, the more convinced are we that science was not born with Francis Bacon, the more and more do we feel that the world has forgotten more than it knows. But let this pass, which is not stated as a belief, but as a doubt; let it all be as the partisans of the exact sciences allege, that we can only attain to a knowledge and classification of phenomena; still we must beg them to pardon us, if we find it impossible to stretch our courtesy so far as to call this knowledge and classification of phenomena, science.

There is really nothing in these boasts about the exact sciences. We have no such sciences, and every scientific man knows that there is not a single department of science, so called, the principles of which are ascertained and fixed. The most that can be said is, that we have investigated some few departments of nature, and ascertained a few facts, — which are indeed facts, and such as we are able to apply to practical purposes. The Inductive Method has, then, by no means wrought such mighty wonders even in physical science ; while its application to metaphysics and theology has made confusion worse confounded, as Bacon himself told us would be the effect, if so applied. He denied its applicability save to physical science ; and, if he had denied its applicability even to this, and contended for its legitimacy only in the practice of the law, he would have been nearer yet to the truth. Yet we deny not the Inductive Method, when enlightened by a profound philosophy. It contains a truth, but a truth not to be perceived and comprehended on the threshold of the temple of science, but only after we have entered and sacrificed in the innermost sanctuary.

Bacon, we repeat, has left an influence, but no system. Some have charged him with being the father of modern Sensualism ; but he has contributed to Sensualism only indirectly. He does not discuss the question of method from the psychological point of view, and he was himself a believer in an order of facts not reducible to sensation. Yet, by recommending the Inductive Method, and denying its validity when applied to any other phenomena than those of the sensible world, his influence has been exerted almost wholly in the direction of Sensualism. So far as we can class him at all, then, we must class him with the Sensual school. This is his place, so far as he has a place in the history of modern science. Yet, in point of fact, though it is the fashion to attribute almost every thing to him that is good in the modern intellectual world, we do not believe his influence has been great, and we are sure that it has been almost wholly overrated. He has left no school ; he has had no disciples.

Hobbes followed Bacon in the order of time, and has been called his disciple ; for what reason we cannot discover. No two men were ever more unlike. Hobbes is, in our judgment, much the superior man of the two, considered either morally or intellectually. He in part appertains to Philosophy, though we class his system with the doctrines of Science, for the reason, that he takes his point of departure in psychology, and with Sensualism ; for he recognizes in the soul no cognitive faculty but that which he terms *sense*. His genius, however, is mathematical ; and, if he had started with *Cogito, ergo sum*, instead of *Sentio, ergo sum*, he would have stood on the same line with Descartes, but have surpassed him in the reach of his thought, and the firmness of his logic. At bottom, he has a much more philosophic mind than Descartes, and, paradoxical as some will hold it, a much more generous love for mankind. Hobbes is a true Englishman ; and, therefore, must needs profess one doctrine, and practise another. If he loves mankind, he must in doctrine atone for his philanthropy, by maintaining the duty to hate them ; if he hates them, he must be eloquent in praise of universal benevolence. Confide with your whole heart in an Englishman or an American, — unless he preaches philanthropy. When he once mounts that for his hobby, look well to your locks and keys. Nevertheless, the obloquy showered upon Hobbes, for his moral and political doctrines, has deprived him of his true place as the representative of the Anglo-Saxon mind, and made it unnecessary to dwell upon his doctrines.

Hobbes was succeeded by John Locke, who, as every body knows, is regarded as *the* English Philosopher. We regard Locke as inferior in almost every point of view to Hobbes ; but, as it is through him that Hobbes lives, and speaks, and acts on the Anglo-Saxon race, it is in him Hobbism is to be studied and appreciated. Locke is veritably a disciple of Hobbes, and the “ Essay on the Human Understanding ” is little more than Hobbes diluted, or a sort of Hobbes “ made easy ” ; or, as we may say, Hobbes made palatable and fit to be served up to respectable people.

Locke, absorbing, as he does, his master, is the greatest name we meet among the English psychologists. We say *psychologists*, for Locke is never a philosopher. As a philosopher, England has a whole army of great names which must take precedence of his. He can sustain no comparison with such men as Ralph Cudworth, Henry More, Stillingfleet, Butler, and hardly any with such men as Clarke, Wollaston, and, in a later age, Dr. Richard Price. In genuine Philosophy, Cudworth is the greatest name we are acquainted with among Englishmen. But Philosophy is not now our subject ; we are concerned only with doctrines of Science. Locke's system is nothing but a doctrine of Science. His problem is purely the scientific problem. He would, first of all, study the understanding, investigate and determine the powers of the human soul, to know to what objects they are, or are not, applicable. What he proposed, first of all, was what Kant afterwards called a *Critic of the Pure Reason*. But, bred to the profession of medicine, he approaches his subject as a physiologist, and restricts himself to dissection and the investigation of functions.

He asks, like Descartes, Can I know? How can I know that I know? He undertakes to answer this question by a direct investigation of the functions of the understanding. His point of departure, then, is in the subject ; and his system, whatever it be, must therefore come under the general head of Egoism. His real answer is, as we saw in the Article on Berkeley, in our number for January, the answer of the Sensualists. It is true that he does not, officially, like his successor, Condillac, annihilate the *me*, and reduce the subject to mere sensation ; but he makes all our knowledge begin in sensation, and sensation is with him the simple capacity of receiving impressions of external objects. The root of all science is in sensation. His formula is really, *Sentio, ergo sum*, I feel, therefore I am ; and, when transferred to the object, it is, *Sentio, ergo est*, — I feel it, therefore it is.

Unquestionably, Locke does not confine, officially,

the objects of science to objects which are perceptible by external sense. He admits and contends for quite another world, but he recognizes in the soul no innate capacity to seize intuitively this other world, nor a capacity to detect it in the sensible phenomena ; he attains to it solely by reflection ; that is, dialectically. He concludes from the sensible world to the non-sensible. Thus, God is *inferred* from the phenomena of nature, immortality from the phenomena of the soul, and the promises to be read in the Bible. So that all in his system which transcends pure sensation, and the consciousness thereof, is merely logic, and not science. Certainly it is not we who condemn dialectics, or affirm that what is logically true can ever be without scientific validity ; but from pure sensation we cannot logically conclude to any thing, either in the direction of the subject or in that of the object, beyond sensation. Now, in Locke's premises, unquestionably, as a matter of fact, there is, besides sensation, both subject and object ; but officially, under the point of view of his system, there is nothing but the sensation itself. Sensation is nothing but a mode or affection of the subject, — is the subject, in fact. Now, from this it is impossible to conclude to any existence but that of the sensation itself. Hence, all our knowledge is necessarily restricted to what Hume would call momentary "Impressions." And this is what Berkeley and Hume, coming after Locke, and adopting his premises, but with superior sagacity, and greater logical acumen, have easily demonstrated.

Berkeley and Hume have thus done for Locke what Malebranche had done for Descartes. They demonstrate the utter inadequacy of Sensualism as a doctrine of Science, as he had demonstrated the utter inadequacy of Intellectualism. We can arrive at knowledge, by starting from *I feel*, no better than we can by starting from *I think*. This is precisely where the question of Science stood, when Kant came with his *Critic of Pure Reason*. Intellectualism had been convicted of impotence in Malebranche, who, as we have seen, sought ref-

uge in his theory of Vision in God; Sensualism having been convicted of impotence in Berkeley, who took refuge in an analogous theory, and in Hume, who took refuge *nowhere*, but remained floating as a mere bubble on the ocean of universal doubt and nescience, — what was to be done? Was all to end here? Is science impossible? Is it possible? If so, on what conditions? Kant's problem, we see, then, was precisely the problem with which Descartes commenced, and which he trenched, rather than solved, by his famous enthymeme, *Cogito, ergo sum*; and precisely the problem with which Locke also commenced, and which he had undertaken, but failed, to solve by sensation and reflection. There is, then, nothing new or original in Kant's undertaking. He undertook to solve the problem all psychologists had been trying to solve since the revolt against the Schoolmen. His originality is not in his problem, but in his mode of handling it. He has always before his eyes, on the one hand, the sad result of Intellectualism; on the other, the equally sad result of Sensualism; and, without affirming or denying either, he enters into a criticism of both, in order to determine whether we have a right either to affirm or to deny.

We see, now, the problem of the *Critik der reinen Vernunft*. What is Kant's solution of this problem? What is the method by which he obtains his solution? What is its positive value? What contribution has it made to our doctrines of Science? These questions will open up the whole subject of the Critical Philosophy, and will enable us, if answered, to comprehend and appreciate it. But we have detained our readers so long with these preliminary remarks, designed to prepare the way for the exposition and appreciation of Kant's *Critik*, that we must reserve the direct consideration of the work itself to our number for July.

ART. II. — NO CHURCH, NO REFORM. *Addressed especially to the Fourierists.*

IN our Review for January, we expressed our belief in and our desire for, the return of the Christian world to the unity and catholicity of the Church. We propose now to offer some reasons which, in our judgment, go to prove that the question of this return is the first and paramount question for our age and country; because, till this question is settled, and the Church rehabilitated in its authority and glory, no scheme of practical Reform, individual or social, political or industrial, can be successfully attempted. In our present article we attempt to establish only the proposition, No Church, no Reform; in another article, intended to follow in our number for July, we shall continue the discussion, and endeavour to demonstrate the impossibility of succeeding without the unity and catholicity of the Church as an outward visible body or institution, through which will be given us one Lord, one faith, one baptism, or, in other words, unity of faith and discipline.

I do not know that I can take any better method of explaining or of establishing my first proposition, than to state the problems of social reform as they have come up in my own mind, and the difficulties in the way of their practical solution, which I have encountered in my own experience.

It is now over twenty years since my attention was first called to questions of social reform, and I was led to reflect on the discrepancies which everywhere exist between society as it is, and society as all, in their serious moments, feel that it should be. I was struck, as have been so many others, with the wide disparity of social conditions, the general degradation of the operative classes, and the immense advantages which capital, in our industrial systems, holds over labor. I soon discovered that the whole tendency of modern industry is to separate capital and labor, and to create a numerous

proletarian class, whom the representatives of capital may coerce into laboring for the mere minimum of human subsistence, and whose labor must depreciate in value to themselves nearly in the ratio of its productiveness. From that moment I was seized with a passion for social reform, and solemnly consecrated myself to the work of discovering and applying a remedy to the evils I saw and deplored.

My first solution of the problem was sought in the principle of **SELFISHNESS**. The *causes* of existing evils, I assumed to be in the vicious organization of society. Society, as at present organized, creates everywhere an antagonism of interests. Rewards are not proportional to works. We pay a premium for iniquity. The priest lives by our sins; the lawyer by our quarrels; the doctor by our diseases. So is it everywhere. It is for the interest of the trader to cheat — to buy under value, and sell over value; it is for the interest of the master to oppress the workman, by paying the least possible wages for the greatest possible amount of work; of the workman to oppress the master, by getting the greatest possible amount of wages for the least possible amount of labor. Thus is the interest of one everywhere opposed to the interest of another; and every man, in pursuing his own interest, must needs, as far as possible, overreach and supplant every other man.

If the *causes* of social evils are in the universal antagonism of interests, the remedy must be sought in so remodelling society as to harmonize the interest of each with the interests of all. How shall society be remodelled so as to effect this result? This was the problem, and, no doubt, a problem not easily solved. But, at the time it first came up, I regarded the difficulty as extrinsic, rather than intrinsic. The difficulty lies, I said, in the fact, that attention is turned elsewhere. Instead of turning their attention to the solution of this problem, men are wasting their time, their thoughts, and their energies, in seeking to escape imaginary tortures in an imaginary hell. And why is it so? It is all the work of the priests, who have an in-

terest in our sins, and, therefore, an interest in preventing us from ameliorating our condition. They must keep us poor and miserable, in order to maintain their influence over us. Men take refuge in heaven, only when they despair of the earth. Then, Down with the priests; and, as the Church creates the demand for priests, then, Down with the Church; and, as the Church rests on faith in, and worship of, unseen Powers, then, Down with all religious faith and worship. We must drop from the airy heavens to the solid earth, dismiss the fables of the priests, and betake ourselves to the acquisition of genuine science. As soon as we do this, we shall be able to solve the problem, and convert the earth into the abode of science, peace, and plenty.

All this was plausible, and in harmony with the general tendency of thought and speculation, for the last hundred and fifty years, throughout what are regarded as the more advanced nations of Christendom. What wonder, then, that it captivated, for a time, a young socialist, feeling, in his own heart, every wound inflicted upon the heart of his brethren? I found, as I supposed, the priests, the Church, religious faith and worship in my way, and I merely sought to clear the path for my onward progress. Well, these all cleared away, so far as I myself was concerned, I proceeded to solve the problem, and solved it, not by COMMUNISM, as did Robert Owen, but by ASSOCIATION and ATTRACTIVE INDUSTRY, as did Charles Fourier. I do not claim to have drawn out, in my own mind, a complete system of Association, nor to have established all the laws of Attractive Labor; I had not arranged all the details; but I do claim to have seized all the great principles of the practical part of Fourierism, long before Fourier's name was heard of in this country, and even before it had attracted much, if any, notice in his own. My plan was, to organize men and women into corporations, in which the capital should be held by the corporators as joint-tenants, and the profits be shared by each, according to his or her works. The corpora-

tion or community was also to be a school of science, literature, and art, in which science and art should combine to render both labor and study pleasant and attractive.

But the solution obtained, the remedy found, there remained the serious difficulty of reducing it to practice. How to get the remedy applied? The machine is cunningly devised, beautifully constructed, and will work admirably, if it be only once set agoing. But it will not set itself agoing. I must then have some power, by which to put it in operation. Whence this power? Selfishness, or each man's sense of his own interest, will keep it in motion, after it is once fairly in operation; but will it suffice to set it agoing? In my simplicity and inexperience, I thought it would. Was it not for every man's interest to adopt the plan? What, then, had I to do, but to show men that it was for their interest to adopt it? Alas! a short experiment satisfied me that I had reckoned without my host. It required, for its introduction, that very union of interests, which I proposed its introduction to effect. Then, how, without its aid, get men, now separated, and mutually repellant, through prevailing antagonism of interests, to unite, and to coöperate for its introduction? I need, then, the effect of the successful operation of my plan, as the condition of putting it into operation! This will not do. Selfishness, then, will hardly suffice as the motive power.

Is it not so? Here am I, sacrificing my time, my substance, my reputation, my health, for the purpose of remedying social evils. Am I selfish? Am I governed solely by a sense of my own interest? Not at all. Can the reform be effected without similar sacrifices? No. There must be some individuals, at least, who are governed by disinterested motives, and who are capable of making great sacrifices. Then, no reform without the presence and activity of a non-selfish element, that is to say, without benevolence, disinterestedness, sacrifice.

But, after all, is it so certain that selfishness will

suffice for the successful operation of the machine, even when once put into operation? Of what is society, as it now is, the result? Of absolute selfishness, and nothing else? No; selfish as men have been, and are, there has been more or less of disinterestedness at work from the first. Abstract what is due to this, and leave only what is due to selfishness alone, and shall we have any thing better? Then, how maintain, after all, this exquisite harmony in the community, where each individual member regards himself as the centre of the world, and labors continually to make all gravitate towards himself? Can there possibly be a common centre of gravity, where there are, say, fifteen hundred separate centres, all equally attractive? Or can equilibrium be maintained, if the centres be unequal? The community, organized on selfish principles, can be nothing but a community of inherently repellant and antagonist forces, and its only bond of union must needs be the principle of absolute and universal disunion. Then I shall need love, disinterestedness, sacrifice, not only to introduce my plan, but also to secure its successful operation.

Here, then, is a new difficulty. Men now are selfish, and the love, disinterestedness, and power of sacrifice, needed to effect the reform, they do not possess. We have them not; how shall we get them? The discovery of the necessity of a non-selfish order of sentiments brought me out of the cold and heartless philosophy of the eighteenth century, and introduced me into a new moral region. I now found myself alongside of the gifted and philanthropic Channing, with whom, in my humble way, I became a fellow-laborer. But my difficulties were not removed. The problem, how to get the love, the disinterested affections, the power of self-sacrifice, continued to torment me.

Meditation on this problem brought me back, in some degree, to the Gospel, which placed the excellence of character in love, charity, fraternity. Its first and great commandment was, that we love one

another as Jesus hath loved us ; that is, well enough, if need be, to die on the cross for our fellow-men. Well, here in Christianity, said I, for which, in name, at least, men still have some respect, I shall find the motive power I need. Cheered and animated, I went forth and preached the Gospel of love, charity, brotherhood, and many were the burning words I let fall, and not altogether in vain. But, alas ! I was not yet through with my difficulties. I could stand up and say to men, "Love one another ; be ready to die for one another" ; but this would not make them love. It was merely saying, "Be ye warmed, be ye filled, be ye clothed," while I imparted not the things whereof they had need. What the corrupt and selfish, who were oppressing their brethren, and through whose want of love the world was made a vale of tears and a field of blood, most needed, was, not to be told their duty, but to be made to do it ; not to know that they *ought* to love, but to be actually induced to love. They would assent to my preaching, they would applaud my zeal, tell me I was preaching the true Gospel, and then go and sin as before. I might preach, till doomsday, the Gospel of love ; but, unless I had some power to infuse the *power* of love, "the power to become the sons of God," into their hearts, man would continue, as of old, to be the plague and tormentor of his kind. No. I have not got hold of the lever yet. It is in vain that men are told what the Gospel demands, if there be not the authority to discipline them into obedience ; in vain that I demand the disinterested affections, unless I can impart the power that calls them forth. Men are not redeemed by the teachings of Christ, but by Christ himself, by his being formed in them, the wisdom of God and the power of God, and through his indwelling Spirit constituting them sons of God, and heirs of the heavenly inheritance.

We have erred, and been carried away into vague speculations, windy declamations, and idle sermonizings. Modern sects seem to take it for granted, that all Jesus was needed for was, to remove, in a forensic

sense, certain obstacles in the way of our salvation on the side of God, and simply to teach us what we ought to be and to do, in order to be saved. I came, with Dr. Channing, to the conclusion, that the Christian life is the life of disinterestedness, charity, brotherhood, that whoever has the spirit of Christ is a true Christian ; and I then assumed the Christian life as the means of effecting the social reforms I contemplated. Wherein was I wrong ? Is not the Christian life the life of pure, disinterested love ? And will not this life, if lived, effect all needed reforms ? Unquestionably. But Christian life is the end, reforms are only the means of attaining to it. When we live that life, we have already all good, and no evil can befall us. Nor is this all. How shall we get men to live the life of Christ ? If men only lived the life of Christ, we should have no difficulty ; but the evil is, they do not live this life, and the very question is, How to induce them to live it ?

Here is a difficulty, out of which Dr. Channing and my Unitarian friends did not help me. They said, and said truly, that we are Christians only by living the life of Christ ; they said, and said truly, that the fruits of this life are love, charity, brotherhood ; but the means of inducing men to live this life they did not tell. This is the great and troublesome question. How shall we answer it ? Shall we say, Come to Christ, and all needed wisdom and power to live the life shall be imparted ? Doubtless the wisdom and power we need are Christ himself, and all who come to him will receive them. But what means this *coming* to Christ ? To come to Christ is, to come into *moral harmony* with him, to obey the Divine Law, and to be one with God. He who has come to Christ, in this sense, already lives the Christian life. To propose coming to Christ, as the means of obtaining the power to live the Christian life, is to tell a man to live that life as the condition of obtaining the ability to live it !

No, this will not do. Here is the man morally dead, and nothing will answer that does not reach him where he is, and raise him to life. What is not able to raise

the dead, to say to those dead in trespasses and sins, and who, therefore, are without power in and of themselves to move, "Come forth," as said the Voice to Lazarus in his grave, will be inadequate to the demand. You tell me, and you tell me truly, that Christ is this power, that it is he who can, and who does, raise the dead ; but death and life do not stand in immediate relation, Christ and the sinner stand at the opposite poles. Some medium, then, is needed, to connect the two extremes, to bring the unholy within the sphere of the influence of the holy. It is Christ, indeed, that comes, but only through his prepared body, his ministry, that reaches the sinner where he is, and begets him to moral life and soundness.

The sinner, we are told, comes to Christ by faith ; but, prior to his coming, he can exercise only the *sinner's* faith, which, from the nature of the case, cannot be a faith that unites him to Christ ; but, at best, only a faith that brings him to the baptismal font. The faith that makes him one with Christ, which is "the evidence of things not seen, and the substance of things hoped for," — a faith which overcomes the world, and enables him to hold communion with the Father, — the blessed privilege of the true disciple, — is not possible to the sinner before he has been raised from the dead, and made alive in Christ. It cannot be proposed, then, as the means of obtaining the wisdom and the power which we need, in order to live the true life of Christ ; for it is itself the fruit of that wisdom and power. It is a product, not of the moral state in which the sinner is before regeneration, but of that moral state into which regeneration introduces him. So faith cannot serve as the medium of bringing us into moral harmony with Christ, because it is itself a result of that harmony ; and presupposes it.

There can be no doubt, that, to a certain extent, the preacher is the medium through which Christ and the sinner are brought into relation, but he is not, and cannot be, a sufficient medium. Here is the rock on which all modern reformers split. They proceed

on the hypothesis, that, if men do but come to a knowledge of what the truth demands, there is no difficulty as to the practical realization. They begin by calling a true *doctrine* of truth, the *truth* itself, and then, because the Truth has always the inherent power to sanctify, conclude the doctrine will realize itself. Proclaim the truth, say they, and it will make to itself hands, erect the temple, and institute the practical worship of God. So I for a long time believed, preached, and wrote. But such is not the fact. The fallacy is not, that truth is not vital, puissant, and able to do to the uttermost all we ask of it, but in the fact that what we proclaim as the truth is not the truth, but the *philosophy* of truth. Truth is the Living Power, the ontological Principle; not, as we too often, in our shallow philosophy, define it, the agreement of our ideas with their objects. The doctrines we preach may be true, and are true, so far as they give a correct view of the truth, but they are not truth itself. They may be important, indispensable, in bringing us to the truth, within the sphere of the influence of the living ontological Principle; but it is not our belief in them that gives us the power to will and to do, but truth itself, that of which they are true doctrines. Our theory of truth, that is, our philosophy, may be adequate and sound, yet it by no means suffices for our redemption and sanctification. Here is the profound *REALISM* of the Gospel, and here we see how opposed to it are our modern Conceptualisms and Nominalisms. The Church condemned as heretics both Roscellin and Abélard.

Nor are we obliged to rest here. All history comes in confirmation of this conclusion as to the inefficacy of theory, of doctrine, or philosophy, however true or sound it may be. We may regard Christianity under two points of view. Under one point of view, it is the *ETERNAL WORD*; not the word which God spoke, but which God speaks. In this sense, it is the Word incarnated, "God manifest in the flesh," for the salvation of men. We may also regard it, under another point of view, as the *philosophy* of this Eternal, and Living,

and therefore Creative, Word. In this last sense, it is philosophy, or theology; that is, a doctrine, or rather *the* doctrine of Life; not doctrine of Life because it gives life, for the WORD gives life only as being Life itself, but because it explains the origin, principle, and genesis of life. Now, in this sense, as a philosophy, Christianity is older than the Advent of our Saviour. Plato had many very just views of Christian truth; Cicero, Apollonius of Tyana, Seneca, and others, taught morals not at all inferior to those we find in the Gospel. The best instructed Christian may study, even to-day, many of the productions of Gentile philosophers and moralists with advantage, and find much to illustrate and confirm his faith in the doctrines of the New Testament. Yet what have these philosophers and moralists done for the world? They wrought no moral or social revolution, changed no old customs, abolished no superstitious practices. They in no sense purified the national religion, or the national manners. Rome, after her own great moralists and her acquaintance with Grecian philosophy, became more corrupt than ever, and her religion degenerated from its ancient grandeur and severity into Bacchic orgies and Isiac obscenities and prostitutions. Why was this? and why, the moment the same doctrines are taken up and preached by a few humble fishermen and tentmakers, do they found an institution which changes the whole face of the moral world, just in proportion as it extends, and which subsists, even to this day, in all the freshness and vigor of an immortal life? Because the philosophers had only doctrines, and because the fishermen and the tentmakers had, besides the doctrines, that of which the doctrine treated, — Truth itself; for they communicated not merely the words of Christ, but Christ crucified, the wisdom of God, and the power of God, — Him who declares himself to be the Way, the Truth, and the Life.

Our blessed Saviour did not come merely to teach the truth, for he was it; he did not come to establish a true philosophy, for he was that of which all sound

philosophy is the doctrine. The purpose of his mission into this world was to found the kingdom of God on earth, which should be the Kingdom of kingdoms, and in which he should live and reign as King of kings and Lord of lords. His apostles were able to build up this Kingdom, because he was with them, and they had him by whom all things are created, and were, therefore, able, through him, to do all things. There was with them, living in them, and acting through them, the very Creative Word which had framed the worlds, and by whose energy all creation is sustained, and by whose life all creatures live. Thus were they powerful; thus were they able to overcome the world, and to establish the kingdom of God. But if they had had only the doctrine, they could have founded no kingdom. What could they have done, as simple teachers, beyond what had been already done by the great philosophers and moralists of the Gentile world? Philosophy has never founded any thing, has never been an institutor. All its creations are confined to a narrow space, and limited to a brief period of time. Where are the institutions of the early sects, which undertook to build on doctrines? Where is a single institution that was founded on a doctrine? No greater constructive genius ever appeared than John Calvin. He undertook to organize the Reformation, and to found the Reformed Church. Where are his institutions now? Are they living realities? No; they are merely a heavy volume, called "Christian Institutes," lying on the shelves of a few theologians, rarely read, still more rarely studied. All Protestant sects undertake to build on doctrine, and they all fail, and universal Protestantism complains of disorganization, of anarchy, chaos, and cries out, from the depths of its misery, for reform, for reorganization, for a living institution. We are authorized by all experience to say, that the power men need to work out their salvation, social or individual, must come through the communication of 'Truth, of God, not merely through the communication of a just view of God, or of God's Word.

"Except ye eat my flesh and drink my blood, ye have no life in you."

Assuming, now, that the speculative knowledge of truth, or a just view of truth, will not suffice, then we can receive the power we need only by some ministry which can communicate truth itself, the *REAL PRESENCE*. No scheme of reform, then, is, or can be, practicable, that does not bring along with it the "wisdom of God, and the power of God," for its own realization. It must be an institution embodying the Holy Ghost, and able to communicate the Holy Ghost. We say an institution. If it be a doctrine, it will be inadequate; if it is the truth uninstituted, it is beyond our reach. Truth, as pure spirit, is for us as if it were not. We ourselves, not being pure spirit, but the union of spirit and body, can come into immediate relation with spirit, and commune immediately with it, only as it is, like ourselves, the *union* of spirit and body; consequently, we can stand in immediate relation with the truth only as it is embodied. Here is the profound significance of the Incarnation, and wherefore it is always Immanuel, or God with us, "God manifest in the flesh," that redeems and sanctifies.

Let us try our Reformers by this test. We will take up, for instance, Fourierism. This proposes to reform the world by means of *ASSOCIATION* and *ATTRACTIVE INDUSTRY*. Well, is Fourierism truth, or is it only a doctrine of truth? It is a doctrine. Is the truth, of which it is a doctrine, embodied, instituted, on the earth? No. Then Fourierism, granting it to be a just view of truth, a true account, as it professes to be, of the laws of the Creator, will amount to nothing. Go even further; assert and establish its identity with Christian philosophy, it amounts to just as little, for Christianity is not efficacious as the philosophy of truth, but as the truth itself.

But assuming Fourierism to be truth, and not a mere theory of truth, it could not answer your purpose; for it is, at best, merely truth in the abstract, truth

unembodied. It was not born, as is the living child, the union of spirit and body; it was not born, as was the Church, the Spirit of Truth that leadeth into all truth embodied, or instituted, therefore, was not born a *living* thing. It is not *living* truth, — at least to us. How, then, can it give life? or accomplish a work of social renovation and growth?

But, waiving this, and taking Fourier to be merely a seer of truth, and recorder of what he saw, then, Fourierism is only a theory. Grant, if you will, that it is a true theory, though this is more than we believe, it is only a theory, and can change nothing in human affairs, save as it is reduced to practice. It is not yet the actual solution of the social problem, but merely its theoretical solution, and must be applied before it can be an actual solution. Where, then, is your power to apply it? This power is not in the theory itself; otherwise it would not remain a theory. Then it must be obtained, if obtained at all, from abroad. The life is not in your theory, and, therefore, you must obtain, from some other source, the power to give it life. Whence will you obtain this power? From the human heart? Not at all; for has not our falsely organized society perverted the human heart, and is it not expressly to rectify this perverted human heart, to bring it into harmony with what you call the laws of the Creator, that you propose the practical realization of Fourierism? If the human heart, all perverted as you allege, has the power to realize Fourierism, then Fourierism is not needed. If it is needed, then the human heart cannot give you the power you need to realize it. You must look, then, elsewhere, or abandon its realization.

Will you obtain the power from man, without stopping to specify whether from head or heart, or both combined? You then assume that man, in case he has the true theory of life, has, in himself, the power to realize it. That is, teach a man what he ought to do, and he has the power, without further assistance, to do it. This, we suppose, is the doctrine of the Fourierists,

as of all reformers; for they all tell us that ignorance is the cause of all vice and evil. Let us see if this be so. We have seen that the history of the race, thus far, gives no support to this hypothesis. But, Platonists as we are, we shall not question the fact, that all ideas, whether human or otherwise, have a certain potency, and can, and do, produce certain effects. Nor shall we deny that man has, within given limits, the power to realize his own ideas, or views of truth; for we hold, that man was created in the likeness of his Maker, and is, therefore, essentially creative. But all man's creations must be *inferior* to what he himself is, at the moment of creating. He can, then, realize no ideas, the realization of which transcends himself.

But Fourierism is proposed as a scheme of Reform, and its realization is intended to be something superior to what man now is. To say, then, that he has power to reduce it to practice, must be either to deny that its realization would be a reform, or else to assert that man's creations may surpass himself, the stream rise higher than the fountain, the creature be greater than the creator. If, then, your Fourierism is to be the introduction of something superior to what is, you cannot obtain from man the power to introduce it. Whence, then, will you obtain the power?

Do you reply, that, to admit our objection, is to deny to man the inherent power of progress? Admitted. What then? This inherent power of progress is precisely what we have all along been denying, and that man does not possess it is the very thing we are endeavouring to demonstrate. From man you can get only man, and from perverted man, only perverted man. In order to get a product surpassing society as it now is, one of your factors, at least, must be superior to what society, as it now is, can furnish. Granted, your Fourierism sees a truth superior to what now is, yet the *seeing*, the conception itself, does not transcend what is, and, therefore, brings into society no power which it has not already. You can have in your product only the sum of the powers of your factors;

and, if the factors are both taken from existing society, how can the product transcend existing society? Add, abstract, multiply, and it is always existing society, and nothing else. Man, we say very positively, and on a higher than human authority, is never able, of himself alone, to work out his own redemption. Nor is he, in himself, inherently progressive. This innate capacity of improvement, about which we talk so much in modern times, is all moonshine. Man is progressive, indefinitely progressive, *but only by virtue of a wisdom and a power not his own*, and which are graciously communicated to him from Him "who is made unto us wisdom, righteousness, sanctification, and redemption."

Suppose you undertake to realize Fourierism; either your phalanx cannot get into operation at all, or it will only reproduce, under another form, all the evils of the existing social order. Aggregate your sixteen hundred and eighty persons in your phalanx, arrange them in your groups and series, and what have you got? Simply, the sum of moral life they brought with them. You have obtained no accession of life, no increase; and how, without an increase of moral life, are you to obtain a result superior to what you had to begin with? Will you say, "In Union there is strength"? So there is, but only the sum of the strength of the parts. In the union of aggregation there is nothing more.

Here is the fundamental vice of all modern schemes of reform. All our reformers proceed on the false assumption, that man is sufficient for his own redemption, and, therefore, are trying always with man alone to recover the long lost Eden, or to carry us forward to a better Eden. Here is the terrible sin of modern times. We vote God out of the State; we vote him out of our communities; and we concede him only a figurative, a symbolical relation with our Churches, denying almost universally the **REAL PRESENCE**, and sneering at it as a Popish error; we plant ourselves on the all-sufficiency of man, and then wonder that we fail, and that, after three hundred years of efforts at reform, nothing is gained, and a true state of society

seems to be as far off as ever. Three hundred years of experiments and failures ought to suffice, one would think, to teach us, that no reforms, if at all worthy of the name, are ever possible, save by means of a more than human power. Men may cavil at this statement as they will, call us all the hard names for making it they please; but all experience asserts it, all sound philosophy demonstrates it, and all history confirms it.

But we shall be told, that this more than human power is granted us; and so it is, in God's own way, by the ministries he has appointed, and we have no right to expect it in any other way, or through any other medium. "But it is granted us in our higher nature, purer instincts, nobler aspirations, sublimer ideals." Nonsense! Go prattle this to beardless boys and pretty misses in their teens, but talk it not to men with beards on their faces. Man is man, neither more nor less; with one simple nature, which is human nature. His instincts, aspirations, ideals, are himself, and, however lofty they may be, do not carry him above himself. All the power that he has in this way is human power, and gives him no superhuman aid. Either he is sufficient for himself, or he is not. If he is not, you bring him not the power he needs, when you only bring him what he already has.

"But these are the Divine in man." When is this Babel speech to end? When you call the tendencies, instincts, aspirations, of man divine, save so far as quickened by divine influences, that is, by the inflowings of Divine efficacy *ab extrâ*, what do you but identify the human and Divine natures, and either declare God to be man, or man to be God? If you identify man with God, what do you, when you demand reform, but blasphemously assert that it is God himself that needs reforming? Do you not also see, that all the divinity you get, by speaking of man's nature as divine, avails you nothing? What in this way do you get that transcends human nature? What do you get that man has not had from the beginning? These instincts, these nobler faculties of which you speak, are man himself,

and, therefore, must needs be with him wherever he is, and as active as he himself. If, with all this divinity in his nature, and as active as he himself, man has been able to run into all the errors, vices, and crimes, and to undergo all the perversions, of which this very society you are seeking to reform is the exponent, what, we would ask in all soberness, is its value? If it has been insufficient to prevent, can it be all-sufficient to cure? Is it easier to cure than to prevent? How much more philosophic is the declaration, "O Israel, thou hast destroyed thyself, but in *me* is thy help!"

Man is, *in no sense*, sufficient for himself. Strictly speaking, he is not *self-moving*, for he moves in God. He is, indeed, essentially active, and active from within; but only in conjunction with another activity, not himself, but meeting him *ab extrâ*. This applies equally to the most interior emotions of his soul, and to what are more vulgarly called his actions. And, not being himself pure spirit, but spirit in union with body, he can never come into relation, or hold communion, with spirit, save as that spirit, like his own, is embodied. The Truth, the power that is to save him, and to be adequate to his wants, must, then, be not truth as pure spirit, God in the unapproachable and ineffable spirituality of his own essence, but Truth embodied, instituted, — "God manifest in the flesh." This is the result to which we are driven.

Taking it for granted, now, that reforms are possible only by means of *superhuman* aid, and that this aid comes to us through some institution, that is, some divinely instituted medium, we may ask, What is this institution? Is it the State? Formerly, not comprehending that it is the Truth itself, and not the true doctrine of Truth, that saves, and, therefore, holding the Protestant doctrine of justification by faith alone, instead of justification by the communication of Christ himself, I contended, that the State was the only institution needed. I looked upon Christianity — not always, and, in fact, rarely when it was the precise question before me, but, for the most part, in my theo-

riking — as the philosophy of life, rather than the life itself, life in its very principle. I sought to make it the basis of the State, and contended that the State would be the only organic body needed for its practical realization. I wished to get rid of the Church as a *separate* organization, not in order to doom men to live without a Church, but in order to transfer its chief functions to the State. According to my own thought, the State would have embodied the great principles of the Gospel, and reproduced them in its enactments and administration; while the outward service, the *cultus exterior*, would have been left, unorganized, to individual taste, reason, and conscience. This view I advocated when I first came into this community, under the name of the Unity — not Union — of Church and State, and it is but at a comparatively recent day, that I have been forced, very reluctantly, to abandon it. But it is unsound, because the State does not embody Christ, and the same fact that makes it necessary to embody the principles of the Gospel to render them efficacious on the individual, makes it necessary to embody them to render them efficacious on the State. If, unembodied, if as an invisible kingdom of truth and righteousness, they were too remote from humanity to control the life of the individual, how should they be sufficient to control the State, and compel it to embody them in its laws and administration? I must make them predominate in individuals, before I can make them the basis of the moral action of the government; and yet, to make them predominate in the individual citizen is the great question, and the only reason for seeking to make them predominate in the government.

Appreciating this difficulty, but still groping in the dark, struck with the great power and utility of the Church in the Middle Ages, I said, "We must have a Church, a new Church, which shall influence legislators, and the administrators of government." Hence the demand I made for a new Church, and my efforts to establish what I called the "Church of the Future." But the Essay was hardly sent forth before my old

difficulty returned, — Where is my power to form the new Church? Can man constitute a Church which shall embody Christ? Is Christ unembodied? If so, is there any human power that can give him a body? No. Then, either Christ is embodied, and there is already existing a true Church, through which he carries on his work of redemption, individual or social, or there is no redeemer, and no redemption for us. Man cannot raise himself, nor construct, without going out of himself, a machine by which he can raise himself. Archimedes said, he would lift the world, but only on condition of having a stand-point outside of it. The fulcrum of your lever must rest on another body than the one you propose to raise. This is as true in morals as in mechanics, for one and the same dynamic law runs through the Universe. If we have no stand-point out of man, no point of support in God himself, then have we no means of elevating man or society. Then either there is already existing the Divine Institution, the Church of God, or there are no means of reform.

In coming to this conclusion, what have we done, but to apply to social reform the very principle of individual reform, which all Christians admit and contend for? Do we not preach from all our pulpits, that the sinner is not adequate to the work of his own moral redemption; that he can rise from his state of moral death, only through the new life given him by the Son of God? Is man, confessedly inadequate, through the waste of his moral powers by sin and transgression, to the work of his own individual redemption, yet adequate to the still greater work of social regeneration? Of what are social evils the result? You answer, of our viciously organized society, which perverts the minds, corrupts the hearts, and debilitates the bodies of its members. But whence comes your viciously organized society? What is the cause of that? Does society make man, or man society? Grant, what is undoubtedly true, that one acts and reacts on the other, yet, with holy men, could you have ever had a vicious-

ly organized society? With ignorant, depraved men, can you have a rightly organized society? How, then, except on the same principle, and by the same power, that you expect individual reformation, can you look for social reform? Are not both to be obtained by virtue of one and the same law? Then, if the Church be essential to individual salvation, so is it essential to social salvation. But does the Church of God still exist? Doubt it not. Is it still living, and in a condition to do its work? Yes, if you will return to it, and submit to it. You may have abandoned the Church, but *it* still exists, and is competent to its work, and all that reformers have to do is, to cease to be "Come-outers," and to return to its bosom, and receive its orders.

ART. III. — *The Bearings of College Education on the Welfare of the whole Community. The Baccalaureate in Miami University, Oxford, Ohio. Delivered, August 10, 1843, by Rev. GEORGE JUNKIN, D. D., President.*

A DEMOCRATIC friend, in one of the Western States, sent us, some time since, this Address by President Junkin, with a note condemning in severe terms its anti-democratic doctrine, and expressing a wish that we would seize an early opportunity, as they say, of showing it up. We have read the Address with some care, and, though we form no very high estimate of it as a mere literary performance, we assure our friend, that, with every disposition in the world to gratify him, showing up, in the present case, is quite out of the question.

Dr. Junkin opens his Address with some *niaiseries* about self-love and selfishness, which he might have spared us; but his real purpose in his discourse is, to defend the cause of liberal studies and sound learning, — a purpose, which no one who looks a little be-

low the surface of things, and who has the real welfare of the community at heart, can do otherwise than warmly approve. We do not think Dr. Junkin has been very successful in the execution of his purpose ; his remarks are often in bad taste, and rarely rise above commonplace ; he does not go to the bottom of his subject, and give us its philosophy, the foundation of his doctrine in the order of Providence and the nature of man ; but he deserves honorable mention for the earnestness he displays, and the energy with which he protests against the popular doctrines concerning what he calls "college education." He, however, commits one mistake. He makes the question quite too special, by making it a question of *college* education. He should have proposed the question in its generality, namely, the bearings of liberal studies, of high literary and scientific attainments, in the few, on the welfare of the many. The question properly relates to the *education*, not primarily to the place or means of its acquisition. Grant us the education, and we will not quarrel with you about the conditions of obtaining it ; whether it is obtained at college or elsewhere. The real question concerns the utility or inutility, in reference to the welfare of the whole community, of an educated class ; that is, of educating a few to a much higher degree, than we do or can educate the many.

This question we ourselves took up, and treated with some little depth, from the scholar's point of view, in an oration which we gave at the Commencement of Dartmouth College, last July, on the Scholar's Mission, and repeated before the Alumni and other Friends of the Vermont University, last August. Our purpose then, as we were addressing scholars, was mainly to make the scholar perceive and feel his duty to the people, and to stimulate him to its faithful and energetic performance, at whatever hazard to himself, to his own ease, wealth, or reputation. We wish now to consider it, very briefly, from the point of view of the many, in its relation to the mass, the point of view from which the Address before us considers it.

We begin by assuming the necessity of education in general; that, whatever their native capacity, the mass are not competent to judge wisely and justly of the great matters which concern either their moral or material interests, without previous initiation, or preparatory discipline. It is on the assumption we here make, and on this alone, that is founded the necessity, the propriety even, not merely of colleges and universities, but of our common schools themselves. And yet, it is precisely this assumption of the necessity of education, that the popular doctrine of the day denies.

The eloquent, erudite, and philosophic historian of the United States, in an essay on the Progress of Civilization, contributed to the *Boston Quarterly Review*, October, 1838, seriously, earnestly, and enthusiastically contends, that "the natural association of men of letters is with the democracy," and on the ground that the great unlettered mass are better judges of truth in doctrine, of worth in morals, and excellence in art, than are the cultivated few. We ourselves, about the same time, without intending to adopt this doctrine to its fullest extent, nay, while actually denying it in general thesis, not unfrequently so far contradicted ourselves, as to give forth many sayings which implied it, in all its length and breadth. Nothing, in fact, is more common, than to hear whatever transcends the *common* mind condemned, not only as unintelligible to the common mind, but as unintelligible in itself, and, therefore, as worthless. "Why do you not write so as to be understood?" "Why do you talk so the people cannot understand you?" "If your thoughts are clear and intelligible to yourself, you can utter them so as to be intelligible to the *common* mind." What is more frequent than remarks like these? Now, in all this, it is assumed, that the common mind, without previous discipline, without any preparation, is perfectly competent to sit in judgment on all questions which, in any sense, concern the welfare of mankind. Hence, he who should tell the people, that they must take time to study his doctrines, submit to previous disci-

pline, receive the necessary initiations, before undertaking to judge of them, as whoso would comprehend the Rule-of-Three, must first become acquainted with the fundamental rules of Arithmetic, would be looked upon as exceedingly arrogant and *aristocratic*. What right has he to pretend to be wiser than the *people*? What right has he to assume that he can understand what is unintelligible to the *people*? Away with the aristocrat, who would set himself up above the people, and require them to submit their judgments to his.

Now, at the bottom of all this, consciously or unconsciously, lies the doctrine, that all real knowledge is spontaneous, that education is a deterioration, and that, as Rousseau says, "the man who thinks is already a depraved animal." Civilization, on this ground, results from and continues the Fall. The nearer men approach to the state of nature, the wiser they are, the more confidence may be placed in their tastes and judgments. The child is nearer the state of nature than is the adult, and, therefore, the prattlings of children are profounder than the deliberate discourses of the matured intellect. Hence, the poet Wordsworth and the transcendentalist Alcott bid us sit down by the cradle of the infant, and learn the profound secrets of the Divine Wisdom! Hence, on the one hand, the baby-worship, of which we have, within a few years, seen and heard so much, and, on the other, the profound deference to the superior intelligence and wisdom of the uneducated masses so strongly commended.

And yet, the very men who would thus raise the uncultivated understanding far above the cultivated, are great sticklers for common schools, for the education of the masses. Who more eloquent, than they, on the necessity of universal education, on the terrible evils the more favored classes have inflicted on the many, by leaving them in ignorance? Who more powerful declaimers, than they, against the barbarism that confined all learning to the few, and kept the mass from the schools? Who more loudly boast that "the School-

master is abroad," that the friends of humanity, daring as Prometheus in snatching fire from heaven, have wrested the keys of knowledge from the privileged classes, and that now science and learning are beginning to be diffused through the mass? Strange inconsistency! Scholars decrying cultivation, and yet boasting its spread! Nay, scholars of no mean repute doing their best to demonstrate the worthlessness of scholarship, and almost succeeding; for what can better show the vanity of scholarship, than the simple fact, that scholars can seriously believe that the unlettered many are superior to the lettered few?

We have no space now at our command to trace this doctrine, which affirms the superiority, in all matters of morals, science, and art, of the uncultivated many over the cultivated few, to the false philosophy which has obtained since the time of Kant, and to the false theology, which asserts the native divinity of the human soul, and to show how it necessarily results therefrom. Those who are curious in these matters, will find that it is the offspring of German transcendentalism in philosophy, of democracy in politics, and of the theology introduced, and represented among ourselves, by the late pure-minded, eloquent, philanthropic, and gifted Channing. We loved and revered Dr. Channing too much, we feel too deeply the blank his departure has left in our community, and especially in the narrow circle of our own personal friends, to tread with the unhallowed foot of criticism on his new made grave; but we believe, from the bottom of our heart, that his doctrine on the powers and worth of the human soul, *as understood by his disciples*, however it might lie in his own mind, has been, and cannot but be, productive of the most serious evils to the great cause of social and religious progress. It is part and parcel of the more general doctrine, that all knowledge, all science, no matter what its sphere or degree, is by *immediate* intuition, by what M. Cousin calls Spontaneity, which assumes God to be present in the soul, and the author of all that is involuntary and instinctive in human life.

But we leave this, for we have already discussed it at some length in the foregoing article, and shall have occasion to refer to it again hereafter. Our present purpose is more immediately practical.

The popularity of the doctrine we combat has grown out of its being confounded with another doctrine, which, to a superficial view, may seem to have some analogies with it. A prejudice had sprung up in the popular mind against scholars, because it was felt, that scholars used their superior advantages for their own private benefit, and not for the advancement of the people. If scholars had always comprehended and been faithful to their mission, as educators, or as servants, of the people, the present doctrine would never have gained the least currency. The real thought which lies at the bottom of the doctrine in the popular mind is, that scholars ought to serve the people, to devote themselves to the progress of the masses. This is, undoubtedly, the true view of the subject. But to mistake this view for that which makes the scholar *defer* to the masses, and to consult them as his judges, was very easy, very natural, in the case of all who had a horror of nice distinctions, and who regarded all efforts to be precise and exact in one's statements, as merely efforts to split hairs, — unworthy the least respect from a man of plain, practical, good sense. Hence, what should have been stated, in this form, namely ; "Serve the people by devoting to the amelioration of their condition all your genius, talents, and learning," came to be stated in this other form, to wit ; "Serve the people by deferring to them, taking the law from them, and never presuming to contradict them, or in any respect to run counter to their judgments, convictions, or tastes."

The difference between these two statements, when they are brought into juxtaposition, is very obvious. The first assumes that there is a work to be done for advancing the people, and that there should be workmen to do it ; the second virtually assumes that there is nothing to be done *for* the people, that they are right

as they are, and need nothing from individuals. In assuming this doctrine as your rule of action, you really assume that it is the scholar who is to be served, not the people. When Mr. Bancroft contends that "the natural association of men of letters is with the democracy," what is his secret thought? Is it that they are thus to associate with the democracy for the purpose of advancing the people, or for advancing themselves? Evidently, as the condition of advancing themselves; for he assumes the test of the excellence of scholarship to be in the popular taste and judgment. Scholars are not to associate with the people for the purpose of correcting or enlightening the popular taste and judgment, but for the purpose of correcting or enlightening their own. What advantage is this to the people? For what end would scholars exist? This would make the advancement of the scholar, not the advancement of the people, the *end*, and association with the people the *means*; which would be, under another form, the reproduction of the very doctrine intended to be condemned; namely, that the scholar exists for himself, and not for the people.

Assuming that the scholar is to defer to the people as the condition of serving them, he can serve them only by taking away what restrains them, not by adding any thing positive to their progress. The most he can do is to batter down whatever frowns above them, and clear away whatever obstacles the government, the laws, morals, religion, or education may interpose in their path. This, to a certain extent, might be useful in given circumstances, but only where the whole moral, religious, and political order was wrong, and needed to be swept away. But in this case, he could render the people only a service of destruction, a negative service at best, and in a country like ours, where the established order is to be preserved and developed, not destroyed, no service at all, but a positive injury. We cannot, then, accept this doctrine, for it would impose on the scholar the duty of serving the people, by not serving them!

The other statement is the only one to be accepted. We are to serve the people, and, if need be, to devote ourselves to the cross for their progress. But this denies that progress is the result of the simple, spontaneous development of the divinity in humanity, and assumes it to be the result of long and painful elaboration. It assumes that there is a work to be done *for* mankind, a positive work, and which all, who can, are bound to perform to the utmost of their ability. Is any one prepared to contradict this?

“But, in assuming this, do you not depress the common mind for the sake of exalting that of the few?” Not at all. Nothing is here said against the common mind. We simply contend that the amount of knowledge actually attained to by the common mind, is not all the knowledge necessary to the well-being of the whole community. To carry the race forward, to improve the condition of the mass, requires profounder, more comprehensive views of truth, moral and political, scientific and religious, than the common mind has as yet attained to, and to which it cannot attain without thorough mental and moral discipline. This is what, and all, we say. Touching the capacity of the individuals composing the great bulk of the people to receive the discipline, and, through that, to attain to the requisite knowledge and understanding of the great problems of life, we say nothing; we only say they cannot understand these problems without the previous discipline, and that these problems be understood is essential to the welfare of the community.

If the question before us related to the capacity of the masses to receive the discipline, that is, the natural abilities with which they, whom we in a vague way term the masses, are born, we should recognize individual differences, indeed, but no difference of caste or class. We yield to none of our democratic friends in our belief in the capacity of all men for progress. They are all capable of being cultivated, and the children of one class, perhaps, not more or less so than the children of

another. All need to be cultivated, and none can know and comprehend without cultivation.

"But, is not what we call the common mind, that is, the average degree of intelligence of the great bulk of mankind, amply adequate to all the demands of society?" We think not. If it were so, we know not why we should labor for the progress of science, or the diffusion of intelligence. We readily admit that the common intelligence is often sufficient to judge of the practical results of the profoundest science; but, if the science of the few had not surpassed this common intelligence, could those results ever have been obtained? The people can often understand the practical result, when they are wholly unable to comprehend the process by which the result is obtained. Was not the process necessary to the result? Now you have obtained the result, it may not be; but how could you have obtained the result without it? How large a portion of the people are able to comprehend the Kantian philosophy, in the light and spirit of which is written the "History of the United States"? Yet, without days and nights, weeks and years, of study of that very philosophy, wholly unintelligible to the great mass of his countrymen, the author never could have written it. And now that it is written, how large a proportion of the people, all popular as it is in style and expression, have sufficient knowledge to appreciate, we say not the labor of its preparation, but the thoughts, the principles, the doctrines, which the author has embodied in it, and of which it is the vehicle to those whose studies have initiated them into the author's modes of thinking? Who that has attempted discussions a little out of the common order, but has been taken all aback by the vacant stare of his auditory? It is not in the spirit of idle complaint, that he who attempts to discuss the more important philosophical, theological, or ethical problems, demands a "fit audience, though few." The want of a "fit audience" is the great difficulty and discouragement of every genuine scholar, who would speak as a master, and not as

a mere pupil. Every great man is misapprehended, misrepresented, and, therefore, abused and persecuted, till he has succeeded in making to himself a public, disciplined by his labors to understand and appreciate him. It is often more difficult to communicate the truth than it is to discover it. Your words shall be crammed full and running over with meaning, and a meaning which embraces the universe, moves and agitates your whole soul, exalts you to the highest pitch of enthusiasm, and yet to your hearers they shall be only the veriest commonplaces, which you would be ashamed to utter to an auditory of clever lads, a dozen years old. "O, you mean *only* this." "Yes, I understand you." "All very true, very true." The block-heads! they are as far from understanding you as Satan is from loving goodness. Tell them that your meaning lies deeper, and is broader, than they suspect, and forthwith they turn upon you, and demand, why you do not speak so that *they* can understand you. Alas! they little suspect that the darkness is in them, and not in you. The thought they *could* take in, — well, let it pass. Every man, who has any profound, or really valuable knowledge of his own, knows how difficult it is to make himself generally intelligible, that the best part of his knowledge he never can communicate, because, alas! his countrymen have not the previous mental and moral discipline, necessary to enable them to understand him.

That often much passes for education which is not, that often men are classed where they do not belong, some with the educated who ought to be classed with the uneducated, others with the uneducated who ought to be classed with the educated, we by no means deny. All is not gold that glisters. That there are quacks with diplomas in their pockets, as well as quacks without diplomas, none but a quack would undertake to deny, — or to prove. But this has nothing to do with the argument. We care not what men are called; the question is, not what they are *said* to be, but what they *are*; and our position is merely, that, without disci-

pline, somehow obtained, without extensive observation, long and patient study, they are not able to comprehend any of the great problems of life. We know colleges, sometimes, and not unfrequently, send out dunces; and that wise, shrewd men, profound men, learned men, able to instruct their age, are sometimes found among those who have had little *direct* advantage of the schools. But to say that these last are uneducated men, is absurd. Read the history of their lives, and you will find that they have been among the hardest students of their times.

Now, if we are right, in assuming the necessity of educating the common mind, in order to prepare it for the comprehension of the great problems of life, the real question before us is decided, and the necessity of liberal studies, and high literary and scientific attainments, is demonstrated. There cannot be education without educators. There must be some in advance of the mass, to be in some way, directly or indirectly, the educators of the mass, or the mass cannot be educated. Colleges and universities would seem, then, to be essential as the condition of educating the educators; at least, there should be some means provided for the education of the few above that of the mass; for if none rise above the level of the mass, there will be none to quicken and direct the common mind, which, in that case, instead of being progressive, must remain stationary.

"Then you would have a caste of scholars, raised above the people, to whom the people must submit?" Nonsense! Be not so afraid, that, if one happens to know more than his neighbours, you are forthwith to be saddled with an aristocracy. We demand education, and we demand, as the condition of the welfare of the whole community, that the few be educated beyond the degree to which it is possible to educate the many. The reason why the many cannot attain to the highest education necessary, need not be looked for in their want of natural capacity, but in their want of leisure and opportunity. "Then, why

not extend the leisure and opportunity to all?" We should, unquestionably, do so as far as possible; but we cannot extend them in a sufficient degree to all, because the material interests of society, the industrial labor necessary for the support and comforts of life, will not permit it to be done. The merchant demands the practical results of the profoundest legal knowledge; require him to master the processes by which those results are obtained, and he must cease to be a merchant, and become a lawyer, for they demand the labor of one's whole life. The simplest communicant demands, for his spiritual nutriment, the results of the profoundest theological researches; but if he should go into these researches himself, who would cultivate his potato patch? The possibility of combining in the same person, from his youth up, the necessary industrial labors for his material interests, with the highest intellectual and scientific culture, though once a favorite dream of ours, strikes us as more and more problematical, the older we grow. No man can serve two masters. Either he will neglect his studies or his living. If he is to be a successful student, he must be free from drudgery the hours he devotes to relaxation from study.

"Nevertheless, you insist on an educated class." Certainly. But not on a class to be educated. The education determines the class, not the class the education. And here, again, is seen the popular character of colleges and universities, and why in republican countries they should be especially encouraged. Neglect your colleges and universities, and turn your whole attention to common schools, and you build up an aristocracy at once; for nobody can be really so silly as to suppose our common schools, which can at best give only a little elementary instruction, can ever be made to meet all the demands of a finished education. The higher, more thorough, and more finished education will then be possible only to the children of the rich. Then it will be not the education that determines the class, but the class that determines the education. The true interest of republics is to found, and liberally endow, colleges and

universities, so as to bring the highest education within the reach of individuals from the humblest classes. The rich can educate their children without these institutions, by private tutors, or by private seminaries. Demolish these institutions, and the evil would fall very lightly on the wealthy, but with a crushing weight on the gifted sons of the poor.

"But, once more ; you are for an educated class, which is to know more than the people at large." And what then ? Is it a serious evil to those who know little, that there are others who know more than they do ? Is a great, a wise, a learned man, a curse to us ? Are we the worse for our Washingtons, Jeffersons, Adamsses, Hamiltons, Websters, Calhouns ? Out upon the slander ! The people never think so. They are wiser and juster than they who profess to speak in their name. They crave the great man, and rejoice when they find one whom they may trust and reverence. So fond are they of the great man, the hero, that they will sometimes be carried away by his counterfeit. Let us have none of this feeling, that no one must be above us. It was the unwillingness to admit aught superior to himself, that converted Lucifer, the son of the morning, into the prince of hell.

"But you would deprive the common mind of its rights ; you require the people to sustain a class to think for them, instead of thinking for themselves." Nonsense, again. Just as if a man, not a downright fool, could seriously propose that the people should blindly surrender their own judgments to any body whatever ! Do try to understand one a little better, and show, at least, that you have a judgment to surrender. In God's name, in humanity's name, let the people exercise all the mind they have, and their own judgments to their utmost capacity. All we ask of them is, that they seek to understand before they judge ; and all we complain of in them is, that they undertake to judge without first having qualified themselves to judge, that they judge before knowing enough to judge wisely. We would have them understand for

themselves, and what we want scholars for is, to assist them to understand for themselves. We certainly do demand teachableness in the people; a modest self-distrust, a willingness to suspend their judgments till they have become acquainted with the subject in question. We certainly do feel a little indignant when we meet a man, nominally educated or not, deciding, off-hand, on matters of the most momentous concern, on which he has never seriously reflected one half hour in his life. We certainly have no very profound respect for the youngster hardly breeched, who undertakes to decide questions against him who has devoted a long life, rare abilities, and rarer opportunities, to their investigation, and we have an irresistible impulse to whip him back under the charge of his nurse. But we ask no surrender of the understanding. If the people will but exercise their understandings, so as to judge understandingly, we shall be satisfied. The evil is, they will not understand; they will not take the pains to inform themselves, and yet they insist upon it, that you shall have the profoundest respect for their crude notions, and their ill-formed judgments, although the result of an ignorance so profound, that you see, at once, it cannot be refuted.

We ask, indeed, for an educated class, and we ask it not for the benefit of its members, but for the advancement of the general intelligence, as the indispensable condition of the progress of the people. We ask such a class in these times, as a feeble antagonist at least, to the all-triumphant money power. We would raise up MIND, high and thorough SCHOLARSHIP, against WEALTH. We demand it, too, as a barrier against the licentiousness of our times, the loose radicalism, the looser infidelity, and the still more destructive sectarianism, which are now threatening our country with ruin. The situation of our country is alarming. Dangers, numerous and threatening, hang over us, and we have no hope, but in the educated men, the SCHOLARS of the country. It is for them to come to the rescue. It is on their fidelity to their mission, and their bold-

ness, energy, and devotion to truth and social progress, that the salvation of the country, under Providence, depends.

As to the charges of aristocracy, which sciolists and demagogues may bring against these views, we treat them with scorn. A man who has grown gray in the cause of the people, who is indebted to his advocacy of that cause for the place he holds, however unimportant it may be, in the hearts of his countrymen, is full as likely to remain true to it, as to desert it; and full as likely to comprehend the bearing of what he advances on that cause, as are these sciolists and demagogues themselves, who praise the people that they may the more successfully plunder them. We care not for their barkings, come they from what quarter they may. We say to the Scholars, do your duty. Remember that you live not for yourselves, but for the people, and the more of you there are, and the wiser and profounder you are, so much the better.

ART. IV. — *The Democratic Review.* New-York: J. & H. G. Langley. No. LXVI. Art. XV. December, 1843.

THE Article we here refer to, in the *Democratic Review*, was called forth by some Essays, which we had previously contributed to that Journal, on the "Origin and Ground of Government." It is written with considerable smartness, and contains one or two very clever hits; but is, in our judgment, somewhat too light and sketchy for the very great gravity and interest of the questions involved. Its tone and general style of argument are not quite compatible with the dignity of philosophical discussion, nor exactly what we had a right to expect from a professed personal and political friend. But, happily, the question at issue is not of a

personal nature, and there is no necessity of inquiring, whether we or the editor of the Democratic Review is the better man, the warmer friend of liberty, the more consistent republican, the more skilful dialectician, or the better able to turn aside the point of an argument by vehement declamation, a vulgar appeal, a biting sarcasm, or a witty retort. Matters of this kind, however decided, could not tend much to the public edification, nor to the general advancement of political science. The real question at issue is one of grave and abiding interest; it concerns the truth or falsity of a great and influential political doctrine, and can be worthily discussed only when we bring to its discussion our purest affections, our honestest motives, and our best reason.

The question, to which we at present confine our remarks, concerns the truth or falsity of the democratic theory as expounded by the Democratic Review. We enter now into no defence of our own doctrine, for, as yet, the reviewer has offered nothing against it. The objections he has urged, we had ourselves suggested, and answered; and, till the answers we gave are invalidated, nothing more needs to be said. The reviewer has done nothing but to show, that our theory of government contradicts his; and his, therefore, is the theory to be examined. Is the reviewer's own doctrine worthy to be adopted? This is the question.

Before proceeding to the direct consideration of this question, we must pray our readers to understand distinctly our position. We may be easily misinterpreted, and misrepresented; and, by a little play on the ambiguity of terms, be made appear to oppose what we do not oppose, and to advocate what we do not advocate. We say distinctly, that in questioning, as we shall soon proceed to do, the truth and sufficiency of democracy, *as expounded by the Democratic Review*, we are *not* questioning the doctrine and measures of the republican party; we do *not* deny the right, or the capacity, of the people to administer the government

under and through constitutional and legal forms; we do *not* oppose the actually existing political order of this country; but, simply, a new and dangerous interpretation of our institutions, which, if once fully adopted, and acted upon, cannot fail to prove their destruction. We will regard as unwarrantable misrepresentation, and slander even, any repetition of the charge, which has been recently so often made against us, that we intentionally, or by implication, advocate the necessity, or the right, of kings, of nobilities, or of any man, or any set of men, by whatever name called, to rule over the people. We plant ourselves on the institutions of our country; we accept them as they are; we bring in no new doctrine; but we resist with all our energy a mischievous innovation, which is attempted to be brought in by others. This is our position; and we have a right to demand that it be regarded.

What is this innovation, *the* democracy, for which the Democratic Review contends, and which we oppose? This is not easily answered, for the reviewer does not abound in clear, distinct, and compact statements. Nevertheless, aided by his Notes, appended to some previous article of ours, we can answer with tolerable certainty. In his Review for December last, page 660, he says; "The people are the rightful human source and foundation of governmental authority." The little word *human*, was probably thrown in to round the period, for the reviewer's purpose, since he was opposing us, was to assert the absolutely *human* origin and foundation of governmental authority. If he had meant merely to say, that the people are the rightful *human* source and foundation of governmental authority, that is, that all legitimate power in the State, is, *under God*, derived from the people, he would only have asserted our own doctrine, for which he was holding us up to public indignation, and murdering us with his terrible *reductio ad absurdum*. He must, therefore, have meant to assert, in plain language, the simple, absolute sovereignty of the people.

This is evident from what he had previously said, in

a note appended to an Article of ours, on Popular Government, in his Review for May last, page 390.

“ Away with such cobweb subtleties and sophistications. The people—the actual numerical people—including, on terms of equal rights, all persons of reasonable maturity in years and the ordinary degree and completeness of mental competency to think and act for their own self-government,—the people themselves, in their own *native* might and right, are the *primary* and *fundamental* sovereignty.”

And again, on the same page :

“ Our theory is very simple and plain ; and safe enough, too, if Mr. Brownson would be a little less afraid of the people—and if he would consent to pardon their ‘*moment de vertige*’ in 1840—it is, that the sovereignty *resides* in the people [the numerical people]—that sovereignty which made the Constitution, and may unmake. If that people choose to come together, in their own way, *whether inside or outside the existing forms of law*, and to alter the Constitution, it is to their will and their act that my loyalty is morally due, provided I am *bonâ fide* satisfied of the fact of the majority.”

These quotations prove, that democracy, according to the Democratic Review, asserts government to be of purely human origin and foundation, and that the people themselves are, in their own *native* might and right, the primary and fundamental sovereignty. Now we assert, in opposition, 1. That democracy, *so defined*, is tantamount to no government ; 2. That if it be a government, it is a government that has no *right* to govern ; and, 3. That, even waiving the question of its right to govern, it cannot answer the practical ends of wise and just government.

1. Government, of some sort, we assume to be necessary. The question is not, government or no government ; but, the sort of government that is to be instituted, or sustained.

2. Government, to be government, must govern ; and, therefore, a government which does not govern, is no government.

3. The government must not only govern, but have the *right* to govern ; not only be government, but *legitimate* government.

4. The government, if it have the right to govern, necessarily carries along with it the *duty* of the subject to obey.

These postulates all parties must accept, and democracy must fulfil all the conditions here implied, or be abandoned as indefensible. We proceed now to the question.

I. DEMOCRACY IS TANTAMOUNT TO NO GOVERNMENT.

Let no one, we say again, misinterpret us, and accuse us of opposing, under the name of democracy, what we do not oppose. The word, *democracy*, is used in more senses than one. Let us begin, then, by recognizing and defining these several senses, and determining the exact sense in which we oppose it.

1. Democracy is the sovereignty of the people ; this is the sense in which we suppose the Democratic Review understands it.

2. The word, *democracy*, is sometimes used, especially by those of our scholars who have been educated abroad, to designate the mass of the people, the great unprivileged many, as distinguished from the privileged few ; as when we say, the administration of the government should be in the hands of the *democracy*.

3. It is used indifferently to designate either the doctrines and measures of the Democratic party, or the members of the party themselves.

4. It is used to designate the doctrine which teaches that all governments rightfully exist, and are to be administered, only for the common good of the whole people, especially for the protection and elevation of the poorer and more numerous classes. In this sense, it designates the *end* of government, rather than its *form* ; this is the sense, in which we have uniformly used it, when we have called ourselves a democrat ; and in this sense, — the only sense in which we have ever professed democracy, — we are as democratic as ever we were. It was in this sense we used the word, when we defined democracy to be the "Supremacy of man over his accidents," and when we wrote and lectured on "The Democracy of Christianity," endeavor-

ouring to show that democracy, rightly understood, is nothing but the application to our social and political relations of the great principles of the Gospel.

The reviewer sneers at us for making nice distinctions; and yet, just and accurate distinctions, not of words, merely, but of things, are indispensable, if we would speak or write intelligibly, and not make confusion worse confounded. These distinctions in regard to the word, *democracy*, and the several senses in which it is used, are very necessary to be observed; for a man may be a democrat in one of these senses, and not in the others, and much may be true of one, which could not be legitimately affirmed of another of them. In this discussion, as in all our recent writings, we use the word, *democracy*, in the first sense named, and mean by it, that political order which is founded on the principle of the sovereignty of the people, regarded not merely as the administrators, but as the source and ground, of government.

But here, at the risk of another of our friend's withering sneers, we must make a still further distinction. The sovereignty of the people may be taken, 1. **NEGATIVELY**, as the denial of the king, the nobility, or the right of any one man, or any set of men, caste, or class, to rule over the people; or, 2. **POSITIVELY**, as the assertion of the absolute right of the people to govern, of their native, inherent, underived sovereignty. The first is the sense in which the people of this country generally understand popular sovereignty, as is evinced by the fact, that they take our denial of popular sovereignty to be the assertion of the right, or necessity, of some one man, or a certain set of men, class, or caste, to rule over the people. But, in this negative sense, which denies all *human* authority above the people, we accept popular sovereignty with all our heart. We deny popular sovereignty only in the second, the *positive* sense. This distinction is important, as we showed at large in an Essay on *Democracy*, published in the Boston Quarterly Review, for January, 1838. We pray our readers to remember it, and not to accuse

us of asserting the necessity of some *human* power to rule over the people.

Let us, then, be distinctly understood. Our controversy with democracy is not when it denies the right of the one or the few to rule over the people, but simply, when it founds the State on *population* alone, and makes the people the primary and fundamental sovereignty, the *source* and *foundation* of all legitimate authority. This is *the* democracy of the Democratic Review, and which we maintain to be tantamount to no government at all.

We begin by demanding of the reviewer a definition of what he means by "the people." He answers, in his Review, "the numerical people, including, on terms of equal rights, all persons of reasonable maturity in years and the ordinary degree and completeness of mental competency to think and act for their own individual self-government." But this is not enough. Does he mean to embrace all the inhabitants of the globe, and to assert that it is only to the decision of the majority of the whole his loyalty is morally due? Of course not. His numerical people are not all the inhabitants of the globe. Then they must be the inhabitants of a certain portion of the globe, that is, of a given territory. But here is a difficulty. What marks and defines the territory, the majority of whose inhabitants "are, in their own native might and right, the primary and fundamental sovereignty"? Is the territory undefinable? If so, how will he be able to tell how many are necessary to constitute a majority? Nor is this all. Before the people have acted, and established the rule by which it may be determined who have the proper maturity in years, and the requisite degree of mental competency, how will it be possible to tell who are the political people, and who not? We hope the reviewer will not, with proud disdain, exclaim, in view of these questions, "Away with such cobweb subtleties and sophistications," for they are to us serious questions, and we are very anxious to have them answered.

But our difficulties increase. If he says the numeri-

cal people are not all the inhabitants of the globe, but of a certain definite territory, he abandons his doctrine of popular sovereignty, by transferring the sovereignty from the people to the territory, and making the people sovereign, not because they are *people*, but because they are inhabitants of a sovereign territory.

Nor will he, in this case, be obliged merely to abandon popular sovereignty for territorial sovereignty, but he must abandon even this last for an authority more ultimate than territory. The territory can be a sovereign territory, only by virtue of a competent authority which marks and defines it. This authority cannot be the people, for till it has acted, and, through territory, marked and defined them, the people do not exist. It must be, then, an authority independent of both people and territory. Be it what it may, without it there can be no sovereign people, and with it none, because then, not they, but *it* is the sovereign, — at least, the source and foundation of the sovereignty.

Who, then, are the people, of the majority of whom the reviewer predicates his native, underived sovereignty? There are many distinct peoples on the globe, as the American, the English, French, German, Italian, &c. Now, when he predicates sovereignty of the people, is it of the people, in the sense of one of these distinct, so to speak, individual, peoples? But this people exists *already* as a unity, as a *one* people, as an individuality. He has, then, no right to take the people in this sense; for the people so existing are not in the state of a *primary* sovereignty. There must have been something, by virtue of which they were made a *one* people; and *that*, the moment it is assumed, becomes the origin and ground of their sovereignty, and they can, at best, possess only a *derived* sovereignty, not a primary and fundamental sovereignty. The answer, then, that the sovereign people are one of these peoples, would not suffice for the reviewer's doctrine.

To meet the demands of his own doctrine, the reviewer has no resort but that of predicating sovereignty of the people, regarded merely as population, or

more strictly, as persons, and of holding persons to be sovereign by right of their own manhood. Will he take this ground? We presume he will, and very cheerfully. But persons carry their personality, their manhood, with them, always and everywhere. Then he must assume them to be sovereign, in their own native might and right, *irrespective of time and place*. In this case, the sovereignty is not a *national* right, but a *personal* right, and to be predicated of no definite number of persons. The State, then, must be composed of any number of individuals who choose to come together; and the majority of these, — be the number larger or smaller, — will have, according to the reviewer's theory, the right to make such laws as they please. What, then, but their own voluntary act, binds any portion of these persons to the State? Nothing, of course. The right of expatriation must, therefore, be regarded as perfect, unlimited; and as the *country* is not the territory, but the association of persons, expatriation can only mean withdrawing from the association. Then, what is to prevent any number of individuals from seceding from the State, and forming themselves into a new State, whenever they choose? Admit this, and there is an end of government. The State is resolved into a mere *voluntary* association of individuals, who of course are, and can be, bound to continue associates no longer than suits their interest, convenience, or caprice. The members who should incur the penalty of the laws of the association would, doubtless, find it for their interest to escape the penalty; and all they would need to do, would be to secede from the State, resolve themselves into a new sovereign State, and thus place themselves beyond the reach of the laws they had violated.

"But not if they continued to reside on the same territory." But this answer is precluded; for the moment we begin to talk of territory, we are out of democracy, and are predicating sovereignty of the territory, not of the persons. We are now reasoning on the hypothesis that sovereignty inheres in the people

as persons, irrespective of time and place. We predicate it, then, of the people as an indefinite number of persons, not of the inhabitants of a sovereign territory ; nor of the people organized, or constituted, into one people, a nation. Consequently, any number of persons, large enough to admit of the distinction of majority and minority, that is to say, any *three* persons, may, at any time, and in any place, where they chance to be, form themselves into a voluntary association, and claim and exercise all the attributes of sovereignty. Any three persons may, then, at any time, and in any place, secede from the association, and declare themselves a new sovereign State, and thus set the laws they may have broken at defiance. Can any thing worthy of the name of government coëxist with the practical assertion of such a doctrine as this ?

But our difficulties do not end even here. The reviewer, if he assumes the State to be merely a voluntary association of persons, must abandon even his doctrine of popular sovereignty. The State, if a voluntary association, can have no rights, and, therefore, no sovereignty, but the sum of the rights ceded to it by the individual members. It has, then, and can have, no inherent sovereignty, no native, underived right to command. The people, politically considered, are not, then, the primary and fundamental sovereignty ; for their authority is not inherent in them, but *derived* from the individuals composing the association. There could be, in this case, no sovereign *people*, but merely sovereign *persons*.

According to the Democratic Review, all men, touching their rights, are equal one to another. All, then, are equally sovereigns. One, then, can have no inherent right to govern another. Their relations to one another are those of sovereign States, — each is independent of the other. The whole cannot transcend the sum of the parts ; and since there is in the parts no authority to govern one another, it follows, necessarily, that there can be no authority in the whole to govern the parts, or the individual members. Consequently,

there is, if we assume the State to be a voluntary association of persons, equal one to the other, no rightful authority in the community to govern at all.

The exigencies of the reviewer's theory compel him to define the State to be a voluntary association of individuals. All his arguments against us rest for their validity on the hypothesis, that the State is a voluntary association. If he does not adopt this hypothesis, why does he contend, in opposition to our doctrine, that suffrage and eligibility are not matters of municipal regulation, but natural rights, — rights which we hold by virtue of our manhood? Does he not himself define liberty to be the admission and guaranty in the case of every man, if he be a man, of his native, inherent right to be an equal member of the State? Can he conceive it possible for liberty to coëxist with the absence of universal suffrage and eligibility, and not because they are its indispensable conditions, but because they are it? What means all this, if not that the State should be, and that every free State is, the free, voluntary association of individuals? Does he not hold, that the assent of the governed, or of a major part of them, is the origin and foundation of the legitimacy of government? Does he not also hold, that this assent should be free, voluntary; for a forced assent is no assent at all? Most certainly; for this, if we understand it, is his very theory of government. The authority of the people does not vest in them as a political unity, but in the people as individuals, as persons, and the political unity or state is the free, voluntary creation of the people as persons, coming together in their own way, and in such time and place as they please. Do we not state his doctrine correctly? If so, the State is, and can be, nothing but a voluntary association of individuals. Where, then, is the sovereign people? Where is the authority to *govern*?

Will the reviewer say, that it is the *assent* of the individuals composing the association? This is the only answer he can give; but this answer virtually denies all government. Government that does not govern is

not government. Government is, and must be, *authority exercised over subjects*. It is either this or nothing. So far as the individual has a right to resist its action, or so far as it must depend on the will of the individual for its authority, it is a perversion of language, as well as of common sense, to call it, in relation to that individual, government. When the State may exercise no authority over individuals, but by their assent, the authority exercised is not the authority of the State, but of the individuals whose assent is necessary. But the individual over whom no authority may be exercised but his own, is not under government, and can, in no sense, be said to be governed at all. What other definition could be given of no government? How would you describe a man not subject to any government at all, but by saying, he is one who is subject to no authority but that of his own will?

Here, then, is the conclusion to which we must come. If we deny the existence of an authority outside of the voluntary association, to mark and define the people as a political individual, we must assume the State to be a voluntary association of persons; if we define it to be a voluntary association of persons, we allow it no authority to govern but what is derived from the voluntary assent of the individual members; and individuals who can be subjected to no authority but their own will, are free of all government. Are we not right, then, in declaring the reviewer's doctrine to be tantamount to no government?

II. We proceed now to consider our second proposition, namely: But democracy, admitting it to be a government, is NOT A GOVERNMENT THAT HAS THE RIGHT TO GOVERN.

We have already virtually established this proposition; but it may be well to consider it yet further. The question concerns not the mode or medium adopted for the administration of government, nor the agents selected by authority for administering its practical affairs, whether in the legislative, judicial, or executive

department thereof, but the government itself, the authority which governs; that is to say, the SOVEREIGN. Find the sovereign, and you find what we mean, in this discussion, by government. The right of democratic government depends on the fact, whether the people are or are not the sovereign. Establish the sovereignty of the people, in the positive sense, and you have established the legitimacy of democratic government. Are the people sovereign? This is the point to be considered.

Sovereignty is that which is highest, that which not only governs, but which has the *right* to govern. The sovereign has the inherent right to command; therefore, whatever he commands is right. The sovereign can do no wrong. His will is, necessarily, the origin and ground of right. The only possible definition of right is, that which the sovereign wills, or commands. Right and Law are, in this sense, coincident. What is law? That which the sovereign ordains. What is not ordained by the sovereign is not law.

Now, if the people are, in their own native might and right, the primary and fundamental sovereignty, then, they have the inherent right to command, and, whatever they command, is law; therefore, right; and, therefore, binding *in foro conscientiæ*. Will the reviewer assert this? Is he prepared to take the ground, that the people can do no wrong, and that whatever they do is right, and right, simply, because they do it? No, for he himself says, in his Review for April, 1843, page 390, "Collectively, as individually, the people both can do, and often have done, and will often continue to do, very wrong—very foolishly, ay, very *wickedly* wrong." If he is right in this assertion, as he unquestionably is, he denies the will of the people to be the *source* and *foundation* of right; and even more than this, he denies that it is the exact and infallible *expression* of right. Then he himself denies, in as plain terms as can be used, his own assertion, that "the people are the primary and fundamental sovereignty."

But the reviewer will probably say, that he never in-

tended to assert the *moral* sovereignty of the people, that what they will must necessarily be binding in morals. All he meant to assert was, the *political* sovereignty of the people. Very well; can that which is morally wrong be politically right? To maintain the affirmative is to divorce politics from ethics, and to contend that the politician is free from all moral obligation. This, though asserted, practically, by most politicians, the reviewer will hardly maintain in principle. But if not, if he so far conforms to the sublime teachings of the Gospel as to admit that "we should hearken unto God, rather than unto men," he abandons popular sovereignty in the sense he contends for it, brings the people themselves under law, and makes them collectively, as well as individually, amenable to a sovereignty above their own. The will of the people, then, is not sovereign in its own right, and has the right to prevail only so far as it conforms to the law to which the people themselves are subject. Where, now, is the doctrine, that the people, in their own native might and right, are themselves the primary and fundamental sovereignty? Is there no necessity of going behind the people to find that, by virtue of which, their will may become law, their rule legitimate? *

* We may press this point further. One of our postulates is, that the *right* to command carries along with it the *duty* of the subject to obey. According to the reviewer's own admission, the right to command is limited, for the people may, and do, do wrong. But they have no right to command that which is wrong, unless he is prepared to swallow the absurdity, to call it by no worse a name, that it may sometimes be right to do wrong. Now, when the people command, or will, that which is wrong, what is the duty of the subject? Am I then bound to obey? If so, I may be bound in morals to do what is wrong in morals! Surely, the reviewer should be chary of the *reductio ad absurdum*. Has he settled his doctrine of ethics? Will he tell us what is the *foundation* of right? Also, what is, for States and for individuals, the *criterion* of right? What are his solutions of these ethical problems? Does he hold himself able, before solving the ethical problems, to solve the political problems? Which are highest? Does he found his politics on his ethics? Or, with Hobbes, his ethics on his politics? Will he pardon us, if we suggest to him, that these are grave questions, and may, possibly, deserve more serious, as well as more patient and

The reviewer made himself quite merry with us, and was quite witty about the elephant and tortoise. He says, that we rest the world on the State, that is the elephant; the State on the Church, that is, the tortoise. But on what does the Church rest? Will he

profound meditation, than he appears to have bestowed upon them? May not his deference to the "common mind," his horror of scholastic subtlety and scholastic distinctions, and his wish not to exceed, in what he advances, the reach of the "common intelligence," have kept even himself a little too near the surface of things? It may be *democratic*, but not always wise, to resolve never to think more clearly, more deeply, or more justly, than the multitude.

The reviewer says, "Give us *self-reliance*, *self-development*, — freedom — yes, freedom to make mistakes, if you please, but then also to mend them; to reach the 'kingdom of heaven' *in our own way*." Here is the quintessence of modern infidelity. The reviewer, no doubt, felt, that, in writing this sentence, he was uttering a noble sentiment, and the lessons of profoundest wisdom. To a man who has really come to believe in religion, it is painful to see how completely infidel has become modern politics, as well as modern philosophy. The highest agency recognized is man, and all is looked for from man, from man's own inherent nobleness and *divinity*. The reliance is on *self*. *Self-reliance*! heaven itself to be gained in *our own way*, by our own *self-development*! How completely does this set at naught the whole teachings of the Word of God! In that, we are taught, that our reliance should be on God, not on an arm of flesh, and that it is through Providence and grace, not through the *arachneism*, if we may coin a word, of *self-development*, that we attain to the stature of perfect men in Christ Jesus. Then, again, as to reaching heaven in *our own way*, — how completely does this set aside Jesus, who declares himself to be the *way*, the truth, and the life! He is the Door; whoever enters in by any other way is a thief and a robber. Alas! it is this very disposition to go our own way, instead of God's way, that causes all the moral, and no small portion of the physical, evils of this world. How are we deceived! "Ye shall not surely die, but ye shall be as gods." So the age seems to believe in very sooth; and so sets aside the law of God, follows its own instincts, relies on itself, scorns the tree of life, and, with a bold and confident hand, reaches forth and plucks the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. All society feels the wound, and groans in the agony of death. Moral disease and social dissolution threaten us on either hand, and still we exclaim, "Give us *self-reliance*, *self-development*, and freedom to go to heaven in *our own way*." Alas! my friend, our own way, man's own way, never yet led to the kingdom of heaven. If you would serve the people, and ransom them from sin and slavery, you must begin by serving your Maker, and making Him, not human self, that on which you rely.

forgive us if we retort his merriment? He rests the world on the State, that is the elephant; the State on the will of the people, that is the tortoise. But on what does the will of the people rest; that is, what is the foundation of the right of the popular will to govern? The *reductio ad absurdum* is, no doubt, an effective weapon, but the reviewer should not forget, that, in unskilful hands, it is apt to raise the laugh — in the wrong direction. It did not occur to our friend, in his merriment, and amid the ludicrous images with which his exuberant fancy teemed, that, to his question, on what does the Church rest, we might, possibly, give a very satisfactory answer, namely; THE CHURCH RESTS ON GOD, — the Rock of Ages. It was founded by God's own Son, who is its Support, its Head, its Life, its informing Spirit, making it, by his presence, itself "the ground and pillar of truth." Is not this a sufficient support; Alas! they are poor triumphs, which are gained by sneers at the Church of God!

But on what does the reviewer's own tortoise stand? Where is, on his theory, the "Jupiter's hand," by which to hang the chain that sustains the world? The people are not supreme; their will, therefore, cannot be ultimate; then, their sovereignty is not native, underrived; then, we must go beyond them, in order to find that on which their sovereignty is founded, and which gives to their acts the character of Law. You deny that this which legitimates their acts, is the will of God; you sneer at us and talk of the *reductio ad absurdum*, when we say, that no government has, or can have, the right to govern, save as that right is communicated to it by the Supreme Being, the rightful Governor of the Universe, King of kings, and Lord of lords, to whom kings, potentates, peoples, and individuals alike owe allegiance; and yet, you dare not boldly avow the inevitable consequences of your own doctrine, and you yourself really deny the sovereignty of the people, by admitting they both can do, and actually do, do wrong. Do, then, tell us, on what rests the right of their will to govern?

The reviewer's doctrine, the moment it is so construed as to admit of government at all, denies all individual freedom, and reasserts the worst features of ancient democracy. The grand defect of ancient democracy was, its assertion of the absolute supremacy of the State, and its denial of all personal freedom. Under that democracy, the City was supreme, and man had no rights, political, civil, or personal, till conferred by the City. Even the right to reside and transact business within its limits, was a grant, a privilege, that might be conferred or withheld at the pleasure of the City. The inherent duty of government to maintain the freedom of all the inhabitants of the territory under its jurisdiction, and to labor for the promotion of the well-being of all, was nowhere recognized. The man existed for the City, not the City for the man. The reviewer's doctrine, if understood to assert the native, underived sovereignty of the people as a political individuality, goes the whole length of this. It makes the State supreme, and its will, *in all cases*, the ground and measure of right. The individual man has no right but the duty of obedience. If the State reduces the great mass to absolute servitude, it does only what it has the right to do. If it can only get a law enacted, it has the right to enact it, and, therefore, to enforce it, let it strike individual or personal freedom as it may.

The absolute duty of man to obey the sovereign authority, we, of course, assert; that man, before the Supreme, has no rights but submission, we of course contend; but solely because absolute submission to the supreme will, or the sovereign authority, is freedom, and the only intelligible definition of freedom that it is possible to give. But the moment this submission is demanded by an authority not sovereign *in its own right*, beyond the limits prescribed by the higher sovereignty from which it is derived, — the moment this obedience is enjoined by an authority which *may* err, and which often does err, it becomes not freedom but slavery. Now, as the authority of the people is not the highest, as the State may and often does enjoin

what is wrong, to assert the native, underived sovereignty of the people, as the government, is to deny to the individual all right to protection against wrong, and, therefore, is to assert slavery, not freedom.

We object to the reviewer's doctrine, not only in the name of ethics, and in that of personal freedom, but also in the sacred name of religion. To assert that the people, "in their own native might and right, are the primary and fundamental sovereignty," is to transfer to them all the attributes of the Divine Sovereignty itself. Either the people are supreme, or they are not. If they are the fundamental sovereignty, they are supreme. If they are supreme, if it is not lawful to seek out of them, and above them, that which is the source and foundation of their authority, then is the supremacy denied to God; and, instead of the people's owing allegiance to God, he, in strictness, owes allegiance to them, or, rather, *they are themselves God*. This is to put the creature in the place of the Creator, which is the essence of idolatry. There can be but one Supreme. To that one Supreme, the real Sovereign, all allegiance is due, and to that only. Is this Supreme the people? Or is it the people's Maker? Is the reviewer aware of what he is doing? If God is, as none of us dare deny, the Supreme, then he is the only Sovereign; then the people can have no right, no authority, to govern, not derived from Him. To assert, then, that the people, in their own native might and right, are the primary and fundamental sovereignty, is, if there be meaning in language, high treason against God! We pray the reviewer, unless he would prove that democracy is, as its enemies have always alleged, absolute infidelity, and that it is his own wish to be classed among infidels, not again to undertake to hold us up to the indignation of his readers, for asserting that the people, both individually and collectively, are under law, owe allegiance to a Higher than themselves, and, therefore, no government, not founded in the will of God, is, or can be, legitimate. It is unpleasant, no doubt, to be denounced in the name of the SOVEREIGN

PEOPLE ; but to a religious mind, to a real believer in the Gospel of our Lord, it is something far more unpleasant, to hear a mightier than a human voice denouncing us in the name of the SOVEREIGN GOD, before whom "every knee shall bow, and every tongue confess." May we ask the reviewer to reëxamine his doctrine of popular sovereignty, and see if, in his zeal for the people, he has not forgotten his God ?

III. But we must hasten to our third and last proposition, namely : waiving the question of abstract right, DEMOCRACY CANNOT ANSWER THE PRACTICAL ENDS OF WISE AND JUST GOVERNMENT.

We repeat, that we do not, under the name of *democracy*, object to that form of government which places, under constitutional and legal forms, the administration of the government in the hands of the people themselves. In this sense, we are ourselves the strenuous advocates for popular government. In the great movement, which has been going on for these five hundred years in favor of popular power, *as opposed to that of kings, nobles, classes, or castes*, we are on the side of the people, where, we trust, all true American citizens are to be found. We go still further, and declare, as our settled conviction, that the popular will is the only will, *under God*, which should prevail in the State. It is only by intrusting the administration of the government, in all its departments, to the people themselves, and to such agents as themselves choose to select or appoint, that we can infuse into its action the necessary energy and mobility. In a world like ours, where all changes under the very eye of the spectator, mobility in legislation is not less essential than stability. The law of all government, like that of man himself, like that of the universe of which man is a part, is STABILITY IN PROGRESS. The practical realization of this law is the political problem ; and, however diverse may be its solutions in different countries, the least inadequate solution will be found to be that which draws the most liberally on the popular element, and organ-

izes the government so that it may, at all times, feel and respond to the wants and wisdom of the great mass of the people.

But, while contending for all this, we deny that placing the administration of the government in the hands of the people, can, of itself, secure the practical ends of government. Government does not exist for its own sake, but as the means of securing a given end. This end, in general terms, is the good of the governed. The chief element of this good is freedom ; for, though freedom may not, of itself, embrace every good, it is that, without which, no good is possible, or conceivable. The chief end of government, that for which alone it exists, and has the right to be at all, so far as we have occasion now to consider it, is the maintenance of freedom.

By freedom, regarded as the end of government, we understand the *ability* of every man to discharge, without other let or hindrance than his own moral delinquency, his special functions as a human being. All men have the equal right to be men, and each man has the equal right to be *the* man his Maker designed him to be. The maintenance of this equal right, is what we understand by the maintenance of freedom. But this must be maintained in fact, not in name only. We are out of the age of shams, make-believes, conceptualisms, and nominalisms, on our return to realism. The practical maintenance of this freedom, is the maintenance to each of equal ability to attain to his true end as a man ; for I am free to do only that which I have the ability to do. I am free no further than I am *able*, and I am *able* so far as I am *free*. But by equal *ability*, we mean equal only in relation to the special functions of each. I do not ask to be made the equal of my brother, but to have maintained to me in relation to the special functions assigned me by my Maker, ability equal to that which is maintained to him in relation to his special functions. I have the same right to be what God designed me to be, that another has to be what God designed him to be, — the same right to be

myself, that he has to be himself. I do not ask to be another, nor that another should be what I am. God made men with diverse and unequal functions, so that each should be the exponent of a special phase of humanity; and each one has the right to be this exponent; and it is the duty of the government to maintain to each one the *ability* to be it.

Now, the simple question before us is, Does or can democracy maintain to each and every man this ability? Democracy has for its expression UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE AND ELIGIBILITY, or, in other words, it asserts the right of every man, who is a man, to vote, and to be voted for. This is only asserting, in other words still, the equal right of each and every man to take part in the administration of government, which, in the last analysis, is simply the equal right of each and every man to govern. Now, assume that democracy secures to each and every man this right, does it follow, that it secures *freedom* in the sense we have defined it? This right or liberty to govern, is not the freedom to perform one's special functions as a man, unless we assume that the end of man is to govern; which, in principle, would imply that government exists for its own sake, and not for the good of the governed. Freedom to govern is not the end, and is and can be valuable only so far as it is a means to an end. Here is the mistake of the reviewer. He confounds freedom to govern, with freedom to fulfil one's destiny as a man; whereas, the most he can say is, that the former is the necessary condition of the latter.

Democracy secures, at best, only equal ability to govern. But, the equal ability of each and every man to govern, is the equivalent of the equal ability of each and every man *not* to be governed. The utmost of the freedom the reviewer contends for, then, is simply the freedom of each and every man not to be governed by others; or, in other words, freedom to defend himself against the freedom of others. This is something, though by no means all, that we demand of government; but this, which, if men were just, would be, in

the strictest sense of the word, no government at all, is more than democracy does, or can, secure. In order to secure it, democracy demands that man, always and everywhere, and in all respects, internally and externally, be the exact counterpoise of man. For democracy adds nothing to any one's *natural* ability. It admits all into the State, and merely maintains to each one all his natural ability to protect himself. Now if men should chance to be unequal in their weight, and some should overbalance others, the equilibrium would be destroyed, and nothing would remain to prevent the stronger from oppressing the weaker, the cunning from circumventing the simple. But men are by no means equal, and man is never the exact measure of man. This fact alone refutes the pretensions of democracy. The chief necessity, under the point of view of maintaining freedom, of government at all, grows out of this very fact of the original and invincible inequality of men, in their moral, intellectual, and physical powers; and the duty of government is, not merely to maintain to each man the full measure of his *natural* ability, but to be itself wisdom to the simple, and strength to the weak, so that, by its providential intervention, it may establish and maintain the equilibrium which nature does not establish, but tends unceasingly to destroy.

Here is the condemnation of the absurd theory of Free Trade, advocated by the late lamented William Leggett. We admired the bold, earnest, energetic Essays of Mr. Leggett, but we opposed his visionary theories at the time they were published; and, while we applauded his attacks on monopolies, the restrictive policy, and exclusive legislation in general, we recoiled with horror from his fundamental doctrine, which went the full length of denying the legitimacy of all government, and could have ended only in reducing every man to his native strength, or weakness, and there leaving him. Few men have done more than he to pervert the good sense of the Republican party, and to sap the foundations of all salutary government. He started with the assumption, that every man is competent to

protect himself, and wants nothing of government but to be let alone. Poor man ! like our reviewer, he forgot the original inequality of men, and that the weak and simple need a Providence in the shape of government, to protect them against the strong and cunning.

Nor are men only naturally unequal ; they are artificially unequal, and their extrinsic means of influence are very different. Their possessions, the world over, are exceedingly unequal, and it is a well settled fact, that a man's power is always to be measured by what he *has*, rather than by what he *is*. Power always inclines to the side on which is the balance of property. That portion of the community which possesses or controls the balance of the property, is, as Harrington in his "*Oceana*" has well established, the ruling portion. He who has the mess of pottage, can command his brother's birthright, and compel the elder to serve the younger. The relation between the owners or holders of the property, and the owners of simple labor, is always and everywhere, by whatever name it goes, the relation of *masters* and *servants*. They who have not, always serve them who have ; or, if they will not, are exterminated, as Cain exterminated his brother Abel. Here is the great and stubborn fact, which knocks in the head all your fine spun democratic theorizing.

This fact is well established. In no country, in the ordinary course of things, have numbers without property ever availed against the few who possess property. Twenty or thirty thousand free Athenian citizens hold in servitude some four hundred thousand slaves. There have been numerous struggles between the rich and the poor, but there is no instance recorded, in which the poor ever came off victorious. The plebeians maintained for a time a doubtful contest with the patricians of ancient Rome ; but then the plebeians, taken as a body, were hardly inferior in wealth to the patricians themselves, and some of them were superior in the nobility of their families. But as soon as the Senate opened itself and the equestrian order, to some four

hundred of the wealthy and noble plebeians, and by doing so, secured the permanent balance of property to its side, the contest became strictly one between the rich and the poor, in which the poor never gained a single advantage. The subsequent triumph of the plebeians, under Julius Cæsar and the Empire, was not in their quality of the poor, but as commoners, recruited and enriched by the wealthy and influential provincials.

The partial success in the last century of the French *Bourgeoisie*, and which has become complete since July, 1830, is owing to the fact, that the old Court and Noblesse had ceased to command the balance of property. The republic for which Robespierre so pertinaciously contended, after the Girondists had dethroned and decapitated the King, was sustained for a moment, only by the audacity of a feeble minority, and failed, because, in the general distribution of the property of France, the balance was never on its side. The English Commonwealth failed, and gave way to the restoration of the Stuarts for the same reason, as soon as it lost the support of the military genius of Cromwell, and the religious enthusiasm of the Independents which had established it. In neither country would universal suffrage have availed any thing. Some one advised Cromwell to introduce it. "Introduce universal suffrage," said he, "and in twenty-four hours you will have the Stuarts back upon you." There probably never was, during the French Republic, a moment, when the majority of the nation would not have voted for the Bourbons, and to-day, if the vote was put, five to one, we presume, would vote for the young Duke of Bordeaux. It was not Cromwell, who, by his Protectorate, overthrew the English Commonwealth; nor General Monk, that restored the Stuarts; but England herself. It was not Napoleon that overthrew the French Republic, but France who had never fairly accepted it.

Some there are, among ourselves, and also among Englishmen, who are predicting the speedy overthrow of the English Peerage; but that peerage was never in

less danger, and at no moment, since the stout old Earl of Warwick, the "King-maker," has the English nobility held its power with a firmer grasp. If the House of Lords were a close corporation, incapable of being recruited from the wealthy Commoners, in a commercial nation like England, whose merchants are princes, the Peerage might, indeed, be in some danger; but so long as every wealthy commoner may hope one day either to become a peer himself, or to make his eldest son a peer, however small the chance, it may count on having always the balance of wealth on its side.

It is now admitted by both Whigs and Tories, that the Reform bill has, contrary to the expectations of both friends and enemies, tended to extend and consolidate the power of the landholders. We venture to tell the Complete Suffrage Union, and the Chartists, that the success of their schemes will tend to the same result. The poor Chartists are seeking in a cold winter's night to warm themselves with moonshine. The secret ballot, for which English Radicals are contending, will, if obtained, operate against them; for the tenantry have more fear of the radical leaders in their own ranks, than they have of the landlords, and are more disposed, if they can conceal it from their leaders, to vote for their landlords than they are to vote against them. It is worthy of remark, that the only member, the Complete Suffrage Union has as yet been able to return to Parliament, when a question came up in Parliament affecting the principles of the Union, was either absent or silent. We have similar facts in regard to radical members, returned to some of our own legislatures. The weight, and, above all, the confidence of a member depend less on what he is in himself, than on the relative wealth and importance of his constituency. The member returned by the poor and feeble will rarely be able to hold up his head before the members returned by the wealthy and powerful.

Universal suffrage does not, then, in giving to every man an equal vote in the State, give to every man equal ability to protect his own rights and interests. The

master can always command the vote of his servant ; or, if he cannot, he can always contrive some way to escape its effects, and, indeed, to turn it against his servant. We see this in the history of our own country. Free suffrage has done very little with us to protect labor against the usurpations of capital ; in most of the States, it has done nothing. In the Federal legislature, through the influence of that portion of the representatives of wealth, who own labor, and, therefore, have an interest identical with that of our Northern laborer, a severe contest between the two elements has thus far been maintained. But these are now a feeble minority, and the contest is no longer doubtful, as the reviewer may read in the fact, that the confidential friends of his favorite candidate for the Presidency seek to win the support of Northern Manufacturers, rather than that of the Southern Planters, and are restrictionists, and abolitionists, rather than constitutionalists.

The great danger of modern times is this growing Industrial Feudalism, which is springing up in all the more *advanced* nations of Christendom, and taking the place of the old Feudalism, founded on conquest and territory. It is, in many respects, worse than the Feudalism of the Middle Ages, and, so far as we can see, better in none. The old Feudalism was territorial, and the serf lived on, and drew his support from, the land he tilled, and his means of living were in proportion to the productiveness of his labor. He might, indeed, sometimes want, but only in seasons of general scarcity. This new Feudalism is founded on trade, much more fluctuating than agriculture, and the operative's means, instead of being in proportion to the productiveness of his labor, are in proportion to the demand in the market. As his products, owing to the vast increase of the productive power of all industrial nations, run always ahead of the demand, he suffers most, experiences his greatest want, when warehouses and granaries are the fullest.

Now, we ask the reviewer, what universal suffrage has done, in this country, to check the growth of this

system. So far as at present informed, we believe this system has received more direct encouragement with us, than in any other country. By means of corporations, joint-stock companies, for vast industrial enterprises, the whole industry of the country, and the whole legislation which concerns industry, have fallen under the control of, probably, less than two hundred individuals; and there was a moment when it threatened to fall, and had we, instead of Great Britain, been the leading commercial nation, would actually have fallen, under the control of one man alone, the first President of the United States Bank of Pennsylvania. They were not the votes of the Democracy, that prostrated Mr. Biddle. All the voting in the world was impotent before him. We owe our deliverance from him to some few blunders of his own, but mainly to the fact that English cotton spinners could live longer on their old stock of cotton, than he could afford to keep his new stock in warehouses, waiting for higher prices. The commercial superiority of England, not universal suffrage, saved us.

In all our contests with the money power, we have seen the impotence of the reviewer's democracy, and the truth of Harrington's assertion, that power goes always with the balance of property. How did General Jackson sustain himself in his war against the Bank? Was it universal suffrage that sustained him? Or did he sustain himself by separating the interests of the State Banks from those of the National Bank, and thus gaining to his side the balance of property? Deprived of the aid of the State Banks, especially the banks of the State of New York, which wanted the government deposits, then embracing a large surplus, and to get rid of a competitor who paid no taxes, and loaned money at six *per cent.*, instead of seven, would he, with all his overwhelming energy of character and unbounded personal popularity, have been able to sustain himself? He himself thought otherwise, and this was his reason for adopting the "Pet Bank" policy, to which, in his own private opinion, we are assured on good authority, he was opposed.

How was it under Mr. Van Buren? The policy of divorcing the government from all banks, both State and National, necessarily united them all against the government. The Banks represented the great mass of the active capital of the country. On one side we had the government, on the other the money power; and what was the result? The government nominally carried out its policy, but only to be itself instantly overthrown. Mr. Van Buren at the head of the government, the moment the business men of the country united against him, was as the leaf torn from its stem in the autumnal blast. The overwhelming defeat of the government party, in 1840, proves, incontestably, that men, before property, are as the chaff of the summer threshing-floor before the wind.

Nothing in our legislation has done more to favor the march of modern Feudalism, than the restrictive policy of Mr. Clay and his friends. The reviewer agrees with us in utterly condemning it, and in contending that the best interests of the country, especially of the laboring classes, demand freedom of commercial intercourse, that our people be free to buy where they can cheapest, and to sell where they can dearest. Yet has his party ever been able to defeat, or even to restrain, this policy? Did not his favorite candidate for the Presidency vote for the tariff of 1828? Have not his intimate friends, by their votes, even while making speeches against it, fastened the present tariff on the country? Dare the friends of this same candidate make up, before the country, a direct issue on this question? Does not he himself, when questioned as to his views of the policy, answer, after much circumlocution, *yes*, and *no*, and finally, neither *yes* nor *no*? And why does he so answer? Simply, because he knows that population is not the element that decides the question, who shall or shall not be President. He knows that there are certain money or property interests to be consulted and combined. He knows that no *one* of these interests can now make a President against the union of the others. He must, then, be for free trade, just so far as to

make the planting interest of the South regard him as a lesser evil than Henry Clay, and just enough of a restrictionist to divide the manufacturing interest with Mr. Clay in New York, Pennsylvania, and Ohio. Why all this, if population, irrespective of property, is the controlling influence in the State?

Now, the point we maintain is, that, in a country where there is inequality of property, and where the minority of the population, as with us even, holds or controls, through corporations, banks, and the various contrivances invented for creating artificial credit, the majority of the property of the country, the government is, effectively, in the hands of that minority. We go further, and say, that our whole experience as a nation proves it. We demand of the reviewer what it is that he and his party have always complained of. Has not his party, from the very first, complained that this minority controlled the legislation, and, by so doing, secured privileges to itself, unjust and oppressive to the great mass of the people? Was not this the *gravamen* of its charge against the financial policy of Hamilton, and their more recent charges against Mr. Clay and his friends? And what from the first has his party been avowedly struggling for, and which forms the grounds of his and our attachment to it? Has it not been to restrain the undue influence of the moneyed minority? Has not Mr. Benton himself declared the struggle to be, "MAN against MONEY"? Well; has the party ever succeeded? Is it any nearer success than it was fifty years ago? We challenge the reviewer to produce a single instance, in which it has ever gained even the slightest advantage. It has had its triumphs, we own; it has succeeded in electing its men, and securing its full share of the spoils of office; but we fearlessly assert, that he cannot point to a single legislative act that has, in the least imaginable degree, weakened the power of its opponent, or strengthened its own. Will he point to the election of Jefferson? That election changed nothing in the financial policy of the government, or the industrial system of the country. Will

he point to the war with Great Britain? The money power of the country forced the Republican party to make peace at the expense of every object for which it professedly took up arms. Will he refer to the Compromise Act? That, we own, was a temporary victory; but it was gained, not by the votes of the people, but by the interposition of the State veto, and is due to constitutionalism, and not to democracy; for it was gained right in the face and eyes of both General Jackson and his party. Will he refer to the prostration of the United States Bank? That, indeed, was prostrated, or its recharter defeated; but only at the expense of building up a vastly more dangerous and mischievous power in the State Banks. Will he adduce the defeat of the wild scheme of Internal Improvements to be carried on through the Federal Government, by General Jackson's veto on the Maysville Road Bill? In revenge, we refer him to the wilder schemes attempted by the States, to the incalculable evils of gambling in State stocks, the two hundred millions of dollars or more of State indebtedness, resulting from transferring the work of Internal Improvement from the Federal government to the State governments, and the disastrous effects of which, in aiding the growth of modern Feudalism, will be felt as long as this Republic holds a place in the list of nations. We repeat it, nothing has been gained; for we do not count the few organic changes which have been effected, enlarging the basis of popular representation, and making our institutions conform more nearly to the democratic standard; for we cannot count as gain, that which does not actually enlarge or consolidate the power of the many to resist unjust and oppressive legislation on the part of the wealthy and influential few; and the effective power of the masses is enlarged or diminished, not by organic changes, but by laws affecting, as Mr. Webster has well remarked, "the distribution and transmission of property." The reviewer knows perfectly well that property is more unequal with us than it was fifty years ago, and that it is altogether more difficult for a young

man without capital to place himself in an independent position. He knows perfectly well that the money power has been strengthened and consolidated, and that his party, even if it come into *place*, can come into *power* only by yielding to its demands. Thus has it been with us for fifty years, and what better can we hope from the continuance of the old struggle, on the same battle-ground, for fifty years to come? We are tired of these contests in which nothing is gained, — nothing gained for my poor sister who works sixteen hours a day, for her fifteen cents; for these poor children of my brother, growing up in ignorance, in vice, to breed a moral pestilence through the land. Give us the substance; mock us not with the shadow.

Now, if there be any truth in what we have said, there is in the community a minority of the population controlling the balance of the property, and this minority is always, directly or indirectly, the governing power. The need is of a *somewhat* in the State to act as a counterpoise to this governing influence. Without something of this kind, the many are at the mercy of the few, and the *Haves* may carry it at will over the *Have-nots*. It was supposed universal suffrage, by admitting the many into the State, would secure a sufficient counterpoise to the wealthy and influential few; but we now see that it does not. We must, then, seek it elsewhere.

This granted, it follows irresistibly, the practical ends of government being what we have defined them to be, that democracy, which founds the government on population alone, will not, does not, and cannot, answer the practical ends of wise and just government. We must, if we will have wise and equitable government, a government competent to protect the weak against the strong, and the *Have-nots* against the invasions of the *Haves*, so constitute the State that it shall rest on some element in addition to population. Man does not suffice always for the defence of man, and can never suffice for the defence of man against man and property combined. This fact demonstrates

the utter insufficiency of democracy, even to maintain the lowest form of freedom, — freedom not to be governed, or the protection of man against man.

If there is another element than population necessary to the well ordering of the Commonwealth, then have we established our third proposition, and done all that we promised. But the reviewer may think that we have the restraining power in the Constitution, which he admits, for he, too, is a constitutionalist, *after a sort*; but we have not, if we adopt his theory of the Constitution. He sees the great fact, as well as we, which we have set forth; and he, no more than we, is willing to trust the ruling majority for the time, to legislate without restraint. This fact alone ought to show him the absurdity of his democracy; for, the moment you demand a Constitution to strengthen or restrain population, you declare the insufficiency of population alone, and therefore of democracy. If the State be founded on population alone, a constitution is a nullity, even an absurdity. Population is always equal to itself, and is the same with or without a constitution. Hence, the constitution is a nullity. If population be the government, and the sufficient government, a constitution to restrain its power, resting itself for its own support on that power, is an absurdity.

The reviewer seeks to save his democracy, even while admitting the necessity of constitutional checks and balances, by founding the Constitution itself on population, and declaring population, through a *bonâ fide* majority, to be competent at any time to alter it, without even the necessity of the formality of being legally convened. But this saves democracy at the expense of the Constitution, and declares the Constitution, a constitution only in name. Does the reviewer mean by the Constitution, a mere voluntary restraint, — if he will pardon the Hibernianism of a *voluntary* restraint, — which population imposes upon itself, and which can be only a declaration, that, during its pleasure, it will make laws only according to certain rules? Is this his constitutionalism? If it is his, we must tell him,

that it is not ours. The Constitution is, as we understand it, the constitution of distinct powers in the State, which powers are always to be represented in the administration of the several departments of government, and to serve as counterpoises one to another, whenever either seeks an undue preponderance. No constitution, in any intelligible sense, is possible where the State is founded on population alone: for, where population is the only element that enters into the calculation, no constitution of distinct powers is possible. Either, then, constitutionalism, and not democracy, or democracy, and not constitutionalism. You cannot, in the nature of things, have both together. For either population can override the Constitution, and then it is no Constitution; or, the Constitution can override population and restrain it, and then it is no democracy.

Now, the Constitution, if it mean any thing, and is to answer any purpose, must be such a constitution of the State, of governing powers in the State, whose concurrence is essential to the action of the government, as will effectually prevent any one from going beyond certain bounds, that will be of itself competent to say to the Money power, "Thus far, but no farther;" and by so doing, be always a shield interposed between the poorer and more numerous classes, and the wealthy, influential, and all-grasping minority. These constituted powers, unquestionably, are to be *exercised* by persons; but they do not represent persons alone, but possessions and pursuits. The people distributed, constituted according to their property, or their calling, or whatever you make, in addition to population, the foundation of your State, is the legal, the political people. This people, which has no existence outside of the Constitution, and, therefore, can act only through the forms of the Constitution, is *the* people that governs, that makes and administers the laws, and that may, when it pleases, alter or amend the Constitution.

The reviewer, founding the State, as all Democrats must do, on population alone, comprehends no distinction between the legal, political people, representing not

numbers only, but something in addition thereto, and population itself; and, therefore, he contends, that population is competent to make or unmake the Constitution. In this case, his Constitution rests for its support on the will of the very population it is to govern, and would resemble locking up the culprit in prison and intrusting him with the keys. Yet the reviewer talks pleasantly about the *reductio ad absurdum*. If numbers, as we have seen, are not sufficient, in practical legislation, to restrain within due bounds the minority that control the balance of property, how can they prevent that same minority from securing undue advantages in the Convention that makes the Constitution? Are the mass of the people necessarily stronger in the Convention, than in the Legislature? Did it never occur to our friend, that government and law are needed especially, not for the rich and powerful, but for the poor and defenceless?

The reviewer's doctrine as to the power to alter the Constitution is very easily comprehended. As one of the legal people, I have no existence out of the town of Chelsea, and my vote, in determining the majority to be represented in the Convention, can be counted nowhere else; but as one of the population, my vote may be counted anywhere. In selecting delegates for the Convention, then, the excess of numbers in one electoral district may be used to make up the deficiency in another. Might not, in this way, the composition of the Convention be somewhat different from what it would be if legally convened, and representing only the political people? The absurdity of the reviewer's doctrine may be seen at once, by applying it to the Constitution of the United States. According to his doctrine, seven of the large States would be competent at any time, and in any way, to alter the Federal Constitution, for they have the majority of the population. According to our doctrine, which makes it alterable only by the legal people, acting as the legal people, no alteration could be obtained so long as even the seven smallest States refused their assent.

But we must bring our remarks to a close. What should be the real foundation of the State, or what should be the basis of representation, we reserve for a future discussion. We will only add now, in justice to ourselves, that no Constitution, however admirably devised and wisely adapted to the genius and pursuits of a given people, will be alone sufficient. Its success will always demand the presence of a *higher than human authority* to fasten it on the minds, the hearts, and the consciences, of the people, and those they intrust with the management of their affairs. We can, in nothing, dispense with superhuman aid; and no constitution will work well, or accomplish its end, that has not its foundation and support in God.

In conclusion; we have aimed to treat the question calmly, fairly, and honestly. We have spoken freely of the reviewer, but, intentionally, with no disrespect. We sought no controversy with him; and it was far from our original wish to interfere at all with his discussion of his own notions in his own way. But he himself went out of his way, not merely to disclaim all responsibility for our doctrines, but to denounce us in his own Review, to which we were a regular and independent contributor at his own solicitation; and his first denunciation was of views which we thought we had some reason for believing he himself was "becoming more and more inclined to adopt." If aught unpleasant has entered into the tone of any of our remarks, it is owing to the fact, that we have not been able wholly to escape the echo of his own. Yet, we owe him no ill will; we esteem him for many noble and generous qualities, and take a deeper personal interest in his welfare than either he or the public will give us credit for. We believe him wrong on a great and vital question, and wrong because he has adopted his opinions without mature investigation. A fuller investigation, we are confident, will convince him that the great cause of individual and social well-being is not to be promoted by a further extension of the Democratic principle.

ART. V. — *Nature and Office of the Church.* A Letter to the Editor.

WE have received the following letter without name or date, but post-marked "Philadelphia, January 10." It probably was not intended for publication, but we insert it, because it affords us an opportunity to offer a few additional remarks, not uncalled for, on certain points touched upon in the first number of our Journal, and because it is only in this way that we can acknowledge its reception. Should the writer address us again, we hope he will give us his name, for he wants not the capacity to render it honorable, be it what it may.

"SIR :— I have been reading the first number of your Review with deep attention and admiring interest. You have the power of doing good or evil beyond most men of our age and country, and with it a fearful responsibility. God has blessed you with a fearless heart, and a tongue, as you rightly say, 'trumpet-toned,' and, what is better, true to your heart's convictions. With those convictions mine harmonize, in many of the great points to which you call attention. But in some, to me, of all-absorbing interest, I believe you wrong, and think I see *why* you are wrong.

"Most truly do you set forth the *rights* and *powers* of the living Body of the Son of God. Of its *nature* and *office* you have yet to learn.

"How can *you*, who so powerfully appeal to the "*fact* of eighteen hundred years," set aside the *historical* view, by which, alone, you get at that fact? *History* teaches you and the world, that the Church of God *is*, and *has been*, through eighteen centuries. To history I appeal, to show *what* it is, (in its external development—its *shell*, in which the meat must be, and without which there can be no meat) and *where it has been*. By the same evidence by which I know that God has ordained a man, in and by whom to redeem and judge the world, by that same evidence I know *how* this life *has been* perpetuated, and *is to be*, until his coming again. The *inner life* of the Church no history can touch—it is a thing of *experience* and experience only. But the *organized* life of the one Body has been seen, heard, looked upon, and handled, from the day of the Apostles until now. Your own beautiful adaptation of the fable of the quest of Isis seems excellently to point out the *πρωτον ψυδον* of your present view of the Church you are so nobly disposed to serve. *Why* did not Isis *succeed* in revivifying the re-collected fragments of the torn body of "the good Osiris"? Because the *reproductive* organs had been *lost*. Typhon had whelmed them in the sea—that symbol of

the storm-tossed, noisy multitude, who have no ear for history, no eye for the seal of God's own signet. Were you right — which you most certainly are not — in supposing the sects to be the fragments, yet instinct with life, of Christ's living body, some *one* of them must *have*, and develope, the reproductive power, before that Body can be revived by reuniting. You long for the *μὴ πύσις*, and the *ἐν βάπτισμα*. How is it you have not seen that the latter must *precede* the former, and that it is the result of the *μὴ ἀλλήσις* (ἡ ἀλλήσις of Paul) which is a *thing of history*. Whom has God *commissioned* to baptize men *into* the Body of his Son? and how is that *commission* known? is the concerning question of our day. Settle that, and Church authority can show itself, ay, and develope itself, too.

"But your theory of *development* is wrong. Most truly you assert a *continuous inspiration*. But of what kind? of invention? of addition? No; but of *living breath*, of *vocal utterance*, of *articulate expression* of the ONE, unchangeable, changeless, Eternal Word. God changes not. Man changes not. The world changes not. Its phases are *phases* only; the *one* message which was from the beginning, is now, and ever shall be. *With it* the Church came into the world, and goes on her way through it. Her progress is a progress *toward eternity*, not *in time*.

"Go on, Sir, in your outspoken zeal; but beware of speaking without *searching* further. You are yet but a "*forscher*"; you have grappled a fragment of the truth, and a precious one, but not the whole. You have vibrated from your *ultra* Protestant position at the beginning of your course, to the other extreme of the arc of oscillation. You have yet to find the centre. Believe all you do of the Church's *life*, and *work*; but neglect not her *organization*. You have but one half of the "*mystery*" which Paul saw symbolized in human marriage. You know the Church as the Body of Christ. You have yet to know her as His Bride, on whom he is ever begetting children, who are to her instead of fathers (Ps. 45.) the means of perpetuating Herself in time and for eternity. You know the *being* and the *power* of the Living Temple of the Almighty; do not, I entreat you, blind yourself and others to its *mission*."

Our anonymous friend and correspondent mistakes, entirely, the questions we were discussing, and the general bearing of our remarks. If he had paid more attention to the questions we ourselves raised, and less to those with which he himself is preoccupied, he would have spared us his objections. In what we said of the Church in our Review for January, we were not required to enter largely into the question of the *Nature and Office* of the Church. In our Introduction, we were addressing ourselves to our old friends, who are no great sticklers for Church authority, and our aim was to show them, that entire submission to the Church of God demands

no surrender of individual freedom of thought or conscience. We touched only so far upon the nature of the Church as was necessary to render this proposition intelligible.

In the Article on the Church Question, we raised the question of the Nature and Office of the Church, stated it to be the great and paramount question of the day; but we did not undertake to answer it, for we had, at that time, another object in view. Our real purpose was to show, 1. That, throughout Christendom, there is a strong tendency to return to the unity and catholicity of the Church; 2. That, to effect this return, it is necessary to take up the great question of the Church itself; 3. That this question may be taken up and discussed in the freest and fullest manner, in any and all of our professedly Christian communions; 4. That the answer, the germs of which each sect may find in its present faith, so far as it believes in the Church at all, once obtained, all particular communions will be destroyed, by being absorbed in the Catholic Communion.

Now, with what thought could we have written this? On what does our argument rest for its validity? And on what conditions could the means we suggested be adequate to the end we proposed? Supposing we understood ourselves, and were not merely sporting with our readers, we must have implied, what indeed we stated; 1. That men have broken away from the Church because they have lost the sense of its profound significance; and, 2. That the recovery of this sense, that is, a full understanding of the true nature and office of the Church, will bring them back to the one Catholic Communion, because, the moment they come to perceive the true nature and office of the Church, they must perceive that a Church not one and Catholic, can be no Church at all? Does this imply ignorance of the *nature* and *office* of the Church on our part?

We assure our friend that, if he supposed we were suggesting a plan for making up, creating, or recon-

structing a catholic Church, he did us great injustice. Our inquiry was not, How may the Church recover its unity and catholicity? but, How may professedly Christian communions find their way back to the one Catholic Church? The Church has never lost its unity and catholicity, for it cannot lose them without ceasing to be the Church of God. The Church never stands in need of reform. The censures we bestowed, in our remarks, were not bestowed on the Church as an *organization*, but on the Church, in the modern Protestant sense, as an *assemblage of individuals*; that is, upon Churchmen. The Church was as pure in the days of Luther and Calvin, as it was in the days of the Apostles, though, doubtless, many of its members, and some of its dignitaries, even, were corrupt, and abused their powers and privileges. The reform we demand is never of the institution, but of the individuals. We believe in no Church that can ever need reforming.

We do not overlook the Church as an *organization*, for the Church, in any other sense, is to us no Church at all. The Church is an organic body, existing in time and space, under one visible as well as invisible Head, with one common centre of life, out from which, through communion, flows the life to all its members. We may, indeed, recognize a holy brotherhood, the spiritual priesthood, the invisible Church, as some call it, composed of all holy persons, whether in this world or the other, — the grand communion of the Saints; but this is not what we mean by the Catholic Church. The Catholic Church is the divinely instituted body to prepare us for admission into this glorious company of the saints. Like that Gospel net, it gathers all, both good and bad; for we come into it, not because we are sanctified, but that, through its ministries, we may be sanctified. Through its ministries, Christ, who is its head, its life, and its efficacy, works for our redemption from sin, and reconciliation with the Father, and our practical holiness.

We do not set aside, nor count of little consequence, the *historical* view of the Church. If our correspond-

ent had read what we said, with a little more attention, he would not have suspected us of doing so. The Christian world is broken up into particular communions. Whence the cause? In the fact that Churchmen have lost the profound significance of the Church. What is the remedy. To take up the question of *the Church itself*, and ascertain what it is, what its nature, rights, duties, means. Now, this question, we said, and we say still, cannot be answered by the historical method of the Oxford divines; for the very simple reason that it is not a question which relates to the history of the Church, but to its philosophy. The historical method is the proper method, when the question is, *which* is the Church? but not when the question is, *what* is the Church? And it was only in relation to this last question, that we asserted its insufficiency.

We do not agree with our correspondent as to the order in which the several problems, relating to the Church, should be taken up. He wishes us to go, in the first place, into history, and ascertain *which* is the Catholic Church; and afterwards come to the question, *what* is the Church. But, if we know not what the Church is, before we go into history, how shall we know what to look for? Or how shall we know when we have, or have not, found the Catholic Church? The great evil under which we suffer is not so much *wrong-churchism*, as it is *no-churchism*. The great mass of the people have no real, serious, earnest belief, in the Church at all. They see no necessity for it, nor why they cannot just as well commune with Christ without, as with, union with his Body. Nay; they look upon the Church as something interposed between them and Christ, and as separating them from him who is the life of the soul, instead of uniting them to him. It is, in fact, to the great mass, either a stumbling-block, or foolishness. They have lost the sense of the profound mystery of the Incarnation, and will own no Church but what they term holy principle, by virtue of which, every man is, or may be, his own priest, and his own Church. A reaction has, doubtless, commenced

against this no-churchism ; but the great mass are still unbelievers in the necessity of the Church as the instrument, in the hands of God, of bringing us to Christ. Here is the fact our correspondent overlooks. He supposes the age already ripe for the question, *Which is the Church?* But the age demands first, to be shown that any Church at all is necessary. Before you appeal to history to determine what body God hath commissioned to baptize, you must prove that baptism itself is necessary, and that an outward divine commission to baptize is essential. Before all, then, we repeat it, the great question is, the question of **THE CHURCH ITSELF**. What is the Church here for? What is its nature? What is its mission? What are its rights? What is its authority? What the ground of its authority? What the principle of its operation, and efficiency? These are the questions which are to be answered, and these are not to be answered by appeals to history, but by profound meditation on the philosophy of the Church, and on the nature and constitution of things in general. These are great questions, and not to be answered by a few quotations from the Fathers.

Nor is this all. Broach the question of which is the Church, before men are well grounded in what the Church is, and you only provoke the wrath of rival communions, aggravate the evils of sectarianism, already so intolerable, and put still further off the day of union and catholicity. There are some questions, which the wise man, however firmly persuaded in his own mind, will adjourn till they can be profitably discussed.

We accept what the writer of the letter says of the reproductive powers of the Church, and should regard ourselves as having made but little proficiency in our knowledge of the mystery whereby children are begotten unto the Lord, if we had yet to learn the Church as the Mystic Bride of the Lamb, or to be told that without a spiritual mother there can be no spiritual births. The *πρωτον ψεύδον*, of which he speaks, is the very mother falsehood into which we did not fall, and the

very last we could possibly be guilty of, with our general doctrine concerning the genesis and transmission of life. It is not safe always to infer one's ignorance from one's silence.

We did not represent sects, which are so far removed as to have absolutely no intercommunion, and absolutely no access to the common centre of life, as *living* fragments of Christ's body. We stated, that the Church, understood as the great body of professed believers in Christ, exists, at present, in a broken and fragmentary state; and we contended that each fragment has some portion of Christian life. Can this be denied? Will any man with his eyes open, at least, with his heart open, contend that any one Christian communion extant contains, within its own pale, all the Christian life now circulating in Christendom? Will Protestants deny that there is Christian life within the pale of the Catholic communion? Not unless they are mad. Will Catholics say there is nothing of Christian life in any of our Protestant communions? They may say our life is feeble, and that the fruit we bear is rich neither in abundance nor in flavor; but they will not say that we have no Christian life at all, that we are absolutely cut off from all communion with Christ. We contended, and we still contend, and pray God that we ever may contend, if it be necessary, that all sects, *not as sects*, but as professing Christians, however they got it, or get it, do exhibit somewhat of the Christian spirit, have, in some degree, partaken of the Divine Life which God in Christ has communicated to the world. Then, all these communions are, in some way, connected with Christ, and to be reckoned in our account of his body.

Yet, it does not follow from this, that we deny the Church to be a single organic body, or that we reject apostolic succession and canonical appointment. By contending that there is Christian life in each sect, we do not, necessarily, contend that each sect has a valid and sufficient ministry. All we have contended is, that the ministry of each sect is sufficiently valid to author-

ize it to labor, with all zeal and diligence, to bring its own communion into Christian fellowship with the one catholic, apostolic communion. If I find myself invested with authority in a revolted province, I have the right to exercise that authority for the maintenance of order and the restoration of the authority of the legitimate sovereign. More than this we did not contend for, because more than this was not required by our argument. Doubtless, a further question may be raised, but into that we do not enter.

Our correspondent is, unquestionably, a Churchman. He ought, then, to comprehend us, and perceive, at once, what we were contending for, even though not explicitly stated. We were not discussing the question in its bearing on individuals, but on communions. We contended that the question, between the several particular communions and the catholic communion, should not be regarded as a question between the Church and Paganism or Mahometanism, nor as a question between the Church and individuals not professing to be members of Christ's body. It must be regarded as a question between communions, separated by what, in technical language, is called a schism. The *heresy*, be there more or less of it, is abandoned, the moment we become willing to hear and obey the Church. We will suppose, then, that the several communions have come to comprehend and believe the Church, to own, and to be willing to come under, its authority; the question which now comes up concerns simply the schism. The schism is now to be healed; and we contend that it is to be healed without the particular communion being required to break up its religious order, or give up its ministry. Congregations may come into communion with the Church, through their bishops or pastors. The question concerns, then, the conditions of canonical communion for the clergy of the several sects; and this question, which is of great importance in its practical bearings, we proposed should be settled, as it easily may be, on Catholic principles, by a new Council. Are we understood?

But we are told, in addition, that "some *one* of the sects must have and develope the reproductive power of the Church." We believe we understand this. It means, we suppose, that only one of the existing communions has a truly apostolic ministry. As to this, much may be said, and we must be careful that analogies do not lead us away from the truth. We, however, willingly concede, that the reproductive power of the Church is indivisible; for, if it could be divided, and become the property of distinct communions, no argument could be offered for unity and catholicity; in fact, the unity and catholicity of the Church would be words without meaning. If, then, we assume that the Church still exists, un mutilated, in all the fullness of its reproductive energy, we must, undoubtedly, assume that the reproductive power, and the reproductive organs, are possessed by one communion alone, and that the rest, if they have life at all, can have it, only through communion with that one.

But, it is possible, that the reproductive energy, though still retained, is, by the disruption of Christendom, somewhat impaired in the communion which still retains it. We admit that there is still the one catholic apostolic communion, unbroken; but the power and efficiency of that communion, in generating and communicating life, though not destroyed, are yet greatly impaired, and, to no little extent, rendered inoperative by our sectarian divisions. The Evangelist says, Christ "did not many mighty works" in a certain place, "on account of their unbelief." The same thing happens to the Church itself. Not merely they who are in a state of schism suffer, but the whole body suffers, and no longer performs, unimpeded, its proper functions. The whole Church suffers by the distractions and divisions of the so-called Christian world. This is wherefore we speak of it as the torn and bleeding, though it be still the living, body of Christ. We say, then, the reproductive energy, though still retained by the Catholic Church, is not possessed by even that Church, at present, in all its vigor. A work is neces-

sary to be done before it can resume its functions, and prosecute its labors with the requisite energy and success. It is not a reform *within* that it needs, but the removal of obstructions from without. It is the Church, the Catholic Apostolic Church, the spiritual mother of us all, but, alas! not the Church in full strength, full glory, and full operation. This is the ground we take, because it is obviously true, and involves no contradiction of Catholic principles.

But waiving this; we go further, and maintain, that all communion with the one Catholic Church has never been entirely cut off. The regular channels may have been blocked up, and the communication become irregular, feeble, and insufficient; still, there has been, and is continued, *some* communion, through which, Christian life may, and does, find its way from the heart to the extremities. How this can be, we hold ourselves abundantly able to show, and will show, on some future occasion. We will only say now, that, while we contend earnestly for a regular apostolic ministry, as indispensable, essential, to the very being of the Church, yet, we are not prepared to say, that Christian life can be communicated only by the laying on of the hands of the bishop. Apostolic succession and canonical appointment have a profounder significance than some formal, narrow-minded Churchmen suspect. The Gospel is a system of Realism, and everywhere acknowledges the *Real Presence*. The Holy Ghost dwells in the Church not merely by way of promise and external appointment, but *really*, in the fullness of his life-giving energy. The Divine Life enters into every holy man, and every holy woman. Communion with the holy, even though they are not in orders, is a medium of life. A virtue goes out from every good and pious Christian. I cannot meet and converse with a saintly man or woman, for one half hour, without receiving a divine *influence*, as well as impulse. A holy energy is imparted to me, and I never can be again what I was. In this way, every true Christian becomes, in some sense, a priest, and diffuses the Chris-

tian life even beyond the sphere of the regular priesthood. Here is the significance of that promise, "I will make you priests and kings." We must not, in our laudable endeavours to sustain the outward priesthood, overlook this glorious and blessed spiritual priesthood. Doubtless, we should speak with great delicacy, and maintain great soberness in our views, lest we run into the errors, extravagances, and absurdities of the old Montanists. We must, undoubtedly, take care not to make our views of this priesthood a pretext for fanaticism, irregularity, and abuse of the regular ministry. It does not override, supersede, or oppose, the regular priesthood; but operates under it, in harmony with it, — continues and extends its influence. Within its legitimate sphere, the Catholic Church has always asserted it, and it was only the abuse of it, it condemned in the Montanistic heresy. Now, who can say, how much of Christian life has been diffused by this spiritual priesthood, by the lives of holy men and women, far beyond the sphere of the *direct* operations of the regular ministry? Here is a subject deserving more consideration than it usually receives from Churchmen.

Then, again, the sects have not yet exhausted all the life generated and communicated by the Church, prior to the disruption of the Christian world in the sixteenth century, sustained to some degree, as it has been, by the Bible, the literature of the Church, and numerous foundations and social institutions, all running back and having their root in the Church, prior to that epoch. Moreover, all have, in various ways, participated in the life generated by the labors of the Church since that epoch, which, though not equal to its previous labors, yet have not been altogether inefficacious. The Church is the city of God, an illuminated city, set on a hill, and sends out its rays to enlighten many who dwell not within its walls.

We have no room to treat at length the theory of development, which our correspondent so positively condemns, nor to rebuke him, as he deserves, for *his* theory of pantheistic immobility. The Church con-

tains, 1. The Life ; 2. The *philosophy* of the Life. The Life is the principle, the Law, the indwelling Force, or Energy, and is, strictly speaking, the Holy Ghost, the Paraclete. This changes not ; but its assimilation to human nature, and practical realization in the life of man and of men, is a progressive work, and involves development and growth.

The philosophy of the Church, that is, its exposition, interpretation, and practical application of the law of life, must needs be subject to development and growth. In this mutable world, and changing life, new questions are perpetually coming up, or old questions in new forms, which are to be decided. The Written Word, no doubt, contains the principle, the law applicable to each particular case ; but the application itself demands an authoritative interpreter. The law does not change, but men's views of it change, and so do the questions to which it needs to be applied. The outward *form* and *discipline* of the Church, while the principles of each remain unaltered and unalterable, may often need modifying, to adapt them to the altered conditions of society. The Church, we contend, has the inherent power to make such alterations in them, from time to time, as in her wisdom are necessary ; and this power she has always claimed and exercised. No man will venture to say, that the outward form, the usages, and discipline of the Catholic Church, have remained unvaried from the time of the Apostles.

Similar remarks may be made in respect to general science and philosophy. Nothing that concerns fundamental principles can be altered ; but the exposition of these principles is always affected more or less by the state of science, and the prevailing philosophy, at the time it is made. It may so happen, that the Church may sanction an exposition, which, though true in substance, shall yet be faulty in form ; for, while the truth is universal and eternal, the form, under which it is set forth, may be local and temporary. At the time of setting it forth, this form may be as necessary as the Greek language when speaking to Greeks, or the Latin when

addressing the Romans ; but subsequently, when other modes of thought and expression have become current, it may prove inadequate, and become the occasion of misapprehension and error. Instances of this kind could be enumerated. The Church, in all cases of this kind, needs the power to revise ; and to adopt such new forms of expression as will better convey her exact sense. The Church should also have the power to appropriate to herself all the solid improvements, or real discoveries, which may be made, from time to time, in general philosophy, physical science, or any department of human knowledge ; for her office is to blend in one harmonious whole, in one person, so to speak, the human and Divine, what is supernaturally derived, and what is obtained by the natural exercise of our faculties.

Now, here, in short, is what we mean by the power of the Church, to develope and apply to practical life, the great principles of life contained in the Gospel. In claiming this power for her, we have not gone beyond her own theory, though we contend that she has reluctantly submitted to practice always on this theory. But she may assert it, and fearlessly conform to it, for, as the Church of God, she possesses a *continuous inspiration*, which gives her the right and the ability to interpret and apply the law. We did not imply that this inspiration revealed new principles, but merely stated that it authoritatively interprets and applies what is already contained in the Gospel. We are afraid our correspondent overlooks the fact, that Christ *dwells*, in the person of the Holy Ghost, in the Church, and that he, therefore, sees in the Church no ability but what is derived from external appointment and promise. If so, we tell him he has yet to learn what means the mystery of the *Real Presence*, without which, Christianity were a mere system of philosophy, and the Church nothing but a collection of dead forms, arrogant pretensions, and senseless ceremonies.

That we are still a "*forscher*," we own, but we hope we are sometimes, at least, a *finder*, as well as a seeker. Perhaps, we shall be able to satisfy our good friend, if

he will wait patiently, that we have found more things than he is disposed to give us credit for. We have many things to say which we have not yet said. But all in good time. On this question of the Church, we are sure of our ground, for we are attempting no innovation. We see very clearly the end to be reached, and the road that leads to it; but we must be allowed to proceed at our own pace. We cannot be tempted to turn aside, either to the right hand or to the left, to please, or to avoid displeasing, friend or foe; nor to engage in any discussion which we hold to be premature, or not likely to be profitable to the cause of unity and catholicity.

With regard to the personal fling at our supposed *vibration* from one extreme to another, we can only say, that we are quite accustomed to such flings, or, if the writer prefers, such admonitions. But we have never been able to persuade ourselves, that the *via media* between truth and error, God and man, life and death, as much as we have heard said in its praise, is either the pleasantest or the safest road. A Church, which is the mean between the two extremes, has no attractions for us. Death is to us none the less ghastly and repulsive for being decked out in festive robes, and surmounted with cap and plume. Truth is always an extreme view. Either there is life for us or there is not. If there is life for us, as we believe there is, it must be derived either from God or from man. Protestantism, pushed to its extreme principles, derives it from man, and puts man in the place of God, as we may see in all the political, economical, and philosophical theories to which it has given birth. If it is right, if man be sufficient for man, then let us say so, and be consistent with ourselves. But if man is not sufficient for man, and if life can come only from God, then let us take the other extreme, and seek life from God alone, through the only medium, so far as we know, that he has established.

ART. VI. — *Mr. Calhoun and the Baltimore Convention.*

WE are obliged, in consequence of the unexpected length of some of the other articles promised for our present number, to reserve, for a future occasion, the proposed continuation of the Essay on the Life and Speeches of John C. Calhoun. Having, however, a few spare pages at our command, we devote them to some remarks suggested by Mr. Calhoun's recent letter to his political friends, refusing to receive a nomination from the Baltimore Convention as a candidate for the Presidency.

We have read this letter with much interest, and with great satisfaction, so far as it bears on Mr. Calhoun personally. It is what we expected from him, and what he owed to himself and to his friends. No man, who knew Mr. Calhoun, could expect him, and no one, who at all respected him as a patriot and statesman, could wish him, to countenance, in any way, manner, or degree, a measure so corrupt, so hostile to republicanism, and to all elevated and manly politics, as must be the Demagogues' Convention, to assemble at Baltimore next May. The policy of such conventions at all is more than questionable, and can hardly be supported by a wise statesman, even when the delegates are fairly and honestly chosen, by the people at large, in the spirit of the compromises of the Constitution; but conventions, like this, consisting of delegates not chosen by the people, but packed by mere party managers, for the purpose of controlling, not expressing, the will of the people, cannot be entertained, even for a moment, by any one who values his own character and that of his country more than the honors and emoluments of office. Such bodies, interposed between the electors and the candidate, at any time, even when honestly constituted, are inconsistent with republicanism, and the spirit and intent of the elective franchise. They can, at best, be tolerated only when there are great diversities of opinion

as to candidates, and when, in order to secure success, union on some one candidate is indispensable. In such a case, the delegates should be honestly chosen by the several districts, and suffered to meet in convention, unpledged and untrammelled ; free, after mutual consultation and interchange of information and opinion, to unite on the man, who, all things considered, is the best for the country, and most likely to command the suffrages of the people. But if the delegates are to go into the convention pledged, or tied up by instructions given, in the way instructions usually are, by a few wire-pullers, and party managers, no language is too strong in which to condemn the interposition of the convention. If such bodies are to be suffered to intervene, as the settled policy for the management of party affairs, the government of the country must pass from the hands of the men chosen to administer it, must pass from the Constitution, to party, and into the hands of its irresponsible managers. All the advantages expected from general suffrage, are sacrificed, all the guaranties of liberty devised in our Constitutions are broken down, and power is placed in the hands of irresponsible party leaders. We are thankful, therefore, that Mr. Calhoun has exposed the policy, and thrown his whole influence into the scale against it. But, it is *TOO LATE*. He sacrifices himself, but he will fail to redeem his country.

We are surprised to find Mr. Calhoun's friends, in South Carolina and Virginia, construing his letter into a withdrawal of his name from the political canvass for President. The letter authorizes no such interpretation. Mr. Calhoun has never sought a nomination, nor declined one. His friends have withdrawn him, on their own responsibility, and, as we think, unwisely, not to use a harsher epithet. We have read, with equal surprise and indignation, the address of Mr. Calhoun's friends in Virginia. Do our Southern friends need to be told that protests in words, not followed up by deeds, are worse than nothing ? What avails their well written and well reasoned protest against the Baltimore Convention, so long as they leave it to be inferred

that they will support its nominee? Enough of fine speeches, gentlemen, enough of cogent arguments; but we want deeds. We trust that you are not so innocent as to fancy, that reason and argument have any influence over those who have the power. You may protest till doomsday, without the least effect, unless you show that you have the *power*, and the *will*, to make your protest a *deed*. It is amusing, in these days, to find men really believing that reason and justice count for something with party leaders. They who have the power will do what they please; they may listen to your protestations, pronounce them spirited, manly, just even, and — disregard them. South Carolina might have protested, resolved, reasoned, and all that, till doomsday, and effected nothing. It was her action, not her words, that effected the compromise. For ourselves, we are heartily sick of these protests, resolutions, and arguments. We have lived too long, and seen too much to be humbugged, and we do not hesitate to tell Mr. Calhoun's friends, that, in seizing the first opportunity in their power, as they seem to have done, to withdraw his name, and, as it were, back out from his support, they have cast suspicion on their own chivalry and patriotism. They have lost their only chance of redeeming the country. We speak plainly, perhaps harshly, but we who, at the North, have supported Mr. Calhoun, and Southern rights, feel that we have some right to complain, when Southern men desert themselves; and we cannot but be deeply grieved, relying, as we have done, on their coöperation against the demagoguism and centralizing democracy which are crushing us, to find them failing us in the moment of trial. But enough of this.

We have read Mr. Calhoun's letter with pleasure and warm approbation, so far as concerns himself; but with melancholy forebodings so far as concerns the country. We know the character of a croaker is unamiable and unenviable; we know, too, that it is no blessing to be doomed, like Cassandra, to utter prophecies which will not be believed till their fulfilment has

verified them. Still, we will say, that when such men as Mr. Calhoun must give way to your Van Burens, it is a sure sign that "something is rotten in Denmark." It proves, that we have reached that critical period in the life of republics, when men of the first order of talents, genius, and moral worth, high-minded, patriotic, and accomplished statesmen, can no longer be elected to offices of the highest trust, but must give way to second and third rate men, who, instead of giving tone, character, and direction to party, are but too proud to lose themselves in its irresponsibility, and to be its mere "hired servants." It shows that a lust for office and its spoils has taken the place of civic virtue, and that party managers have ceased to aim at the good of the country, and have come to consult only their own ambition and selfishness.

Mr. Calhoun is sacrificed for his integrity, firmness, and energy of character; because party managers know perfectly well, that, if elected President, he would administer the government, not for their private benefit, but with sole reference to justice and the public good. Here is the secret of their hostility. Why, in fact, *should* they support him? What have they to hope from him, — a strong-minded, energetic, self-willed man, who would die, sooner than swerve from his own abstractions for either friend or foe? *We* elect such a man for President? Preposterous! We want no visionary theorist, no abstractionist, no *impracticable*, who will hear no counsel but his own convictions, and is *above taking the advice of his friends*. No; give us a man of practical good sense, one who is able to adapt himself to circumstances, and who does not disdain to consult his friends, and to adopt the policy which they may judge, upon the whole, to be most advisable. So they turn to the "Sage of Lindenswold," a man of easy virtue, no abstractionist, and possessing no convictions or principles in the way of his friends and supporters.

Now, this is a fearful state of things, and threatens the most fatal consequences. Our friends write us from

different sections of the country, not to despair, for the corruption has not reached the great mass of the people. Gladly would we believe them; but corruption has extended much further than to the mere party leaders themselves; for if it had not, these leaders would have little influence, and few followers. The great mass of the younger and more active portion of the party, are, in reality, office-seekers, and do support the party for the sake of the reward. They are afraid to take a firm and manly stand against corruption, lest they be read out of the party, that is, debarred from all chance of obtaining a share of the plunder, — for this is all that reading out of the party means. Doubtless, the chief corruption attaches to the managers; doubtless, if the managers were honest, high-minded, patriotic citizens and statesmen, the rank and file of the party would go right, and, most likely, even prefer to go right; still, the great body of the party, we fear, want the virtue to withstand the corrupting influence of the leaders. We have never met a man who would tell us that he really liked Mr. Van Buren, or thought him the best man in the country for President. The resolutions of various caucuses, declaring Mr. Van Buren to be their first choice, only mean that they think Mr. Van Buren stands the best chance of getting the nomination, and that they prefer to be found the friends of the successful candidate. We cannot, therefore, exonerate the great body of the party from all blame; we readily agree that the party would go right, if their leaders would suffer them; but they have not the virtue to go right in spite of their leaders.

But, be all this as it may, the friends of Mr. Calhoun having unwisely withdrawn his name, and, though protesting against the principle on which the Baltimore Convention is to be organized, having left it to be inferred that they will, *for this time*, support its nominee, — and *for this time* being all that the friends of Mr. Van Buren care for, — there can be no doubt that Mr. Van Buren will be nominated. We had hoped it would be otherwise; but we can hope no longer. The

question, then, comes up seriously, What are we to do? What is the duty of that portion of the Republican party who are still attached to the Constitution, and are not yet prepared to abandon altogether the old fashioned civic virtues? The contest is to be, unquestionably, between Lindenwold and Ashland. What is our duty in regard to such contest?

In 1840, we supported Mr. Van Buren, — though he has done us the honor of ascribing to us personally the principal share in his defeat, — for then we regarded the contest as one of principle. In Mr. Van Buren personally, we never had much confidence; but circumstances made it necessary either to support him, or to abandon our principles. The party rallied on the true republican ground, and threw out the old flag of Constitutionalism and State Rights. No portion of the troops did better service in that campaign, than those who had been previously enrolled in the States Rights party. We forgot the injuries we had received from Mr. Van Buren; we forgot all the wrongs we and our country had suffered, the moment we saw a prospect open of bringing the government back to the principles of the Constitution, and of putting it on the right track. But the party were, as we all know, defeated. Those among us, who had supported the party for the sake of principle, not for the sake of the spoils, regretted this result; but we were not discouraged. We knew that principles never die; and, though they may fail of success, they cannot be defeated. We rallied anew, and, almost instantly, recovered all the ground that had been lost. But our principles all pointed to Mr. Calhoun as the representative of the party, and as the only man in the country, who, at the head of the government, would have the requisite firmness and energy of character to carry them out thoroughly in the administration. So long as we adhered to principles, so long as we stood on the true republican ground, no other man, in the very nature of things, could be our candidate for the Presidency.

But the sudden successes of the party in the State

elections of 1841, and the disappointment and chagrin of the Whig party, in place but not in power, revived the hopes of the old spoilsmen, and flattered them with the hope of again succeeding. But the success of the party with Mr. Calhoun, would be no success for them. They must succeed, if at all, under some chief whom they could use. Mr. Van Buren was their man, and the only man they could bring forward successfully against Mr. Calhoun; but to be able to bring him forward, they must abandon the avowed principles of the party, and make success of party take the place of success of principle. They commenced their game by attempting, as much as possible, to obliterate the lines of party difference; the tariff was under revision, and the Van Buren presses told us that it must not be made a *party* question, that we wanted a tariff for revenue, a judicious tariff protecting alike all interests, &c. Lindenwold visits, and tarries long at, Ashland. "Ashland, you and I have always been good friends; our differences, you know, have been only political. We have always been ready to do each other a good turn, when in our power. You see how it is. Webster is in your way, and Calhoun is in mine. Let us understand each other. I wish to be President, and will be, if my party is in the majority; if I cannot be President, there is no man I should be so happy to see President as yourself." "Lindenwold, you are a man after my own heart. I mean to be President; I have staked all on this last chance; but if I lose, only you shall win." On which, our two friends shake hands, and bid each other *adieu au revoir*. Since then, the friends of each have acted in concert, whenever it has concerned the crucifixion of a man in either's way. A Whig Club decided, that our own article against Mr. Van Buren ought to be hushed up as much as possible, for, if spread out before the public, it might endanger Mr. Van Buren's nomination. Mr. Van Buren himself, in a recent letter to a committee somewhere in Pennsylvania, which had addressed him, virtually avows the understanding we have supposed, and, very coolly, tells the Democratic party, that

it must run him for the Presidency, if it does not wish to stand disgraced in the eyes of the world. Whig presses treat Mr. Van Buren with great tenderness.

But we go further, and demand, in what respect the effective policy of the government under Mr. Van Buren will differ from what it would be under Mr. Clay? "Mr. Van Buren is Anti-Bank." We deny it, save so far as concerns the United States Bank. There is not one particle of evidence to be adduced, that Mr. Van Buren is opposed to the banking system of the country; and a national bank is now an "obsolete idea," and none will be established even under Mr. Clay. Yet, a national bank, if you will treat bank notes as money, is not the greatest of evils. "Mr. Van Buren is opposed to the distribution of the proceeds of the public lands, among the States." Doubted; for the project originated with him and his political friends; but the wants of the government will prevent the execution of the policy even should Mr. Clay be President.

"But Mr. Van Buren is in favor of the divorce of the fiscal concerns of the government from all connexion with the banks and the business of banking." We have no evidence of this fact. The sub-treasury, as proposed by Mr. Van Buren, and as executed by his officers, was the veriest mockery of legislation. It will be recollected that he recommended the measure without the specie clause, and that it passed the Senate, where his friends were in the majority, without that clause. The Republican party demand the divorce, and Mr. Van Buren meekly submits to the demand. "Will you grant us the divorce?" Yes. Let there be a sub-treasury, and the revenues of the government be kept by government officers. "What! Mr. Van Buren," say the banks, "are you agoing to grant the divorce?" No. Let the revenues be collected and disbursed in bank notes. Admirable! The *yes* will satisfy the people who clamor for a divorce; the *no* will satisfy the banks, for they will still have the deposits as before, for a bank note is only a certificate of a deposit to its amount in favor of the holder. The

yes and *no* will satisfy the office-seekers, by creating a number of new offices. So people, banks, and spoils-men will all at once be satisfied. Admirable! Hurrah for Lindenwold! Long live the little Magician, who can effect impossibilities! The specie clause, which alone gave significance to the measure, was moved by Mr. Calhoun as an amendment to the original bill, and was finally carried because he and his friends would not support the bill without it.

On the restrictive policy, Mr. Van Buren's friends differ not in principle from Mr. Clay. Mr. Van Buren, we believe, has always been a tariff man; he voted for the tariff of 1828, that "Bill of Abominations," under instructions, if you please, but that is nothing, for he and his friends could easily have prevented the instructions from being given; he admits the constitutionality of a tariff for protection; his warm friends and supporters fastened the present tariff upon us; the Syracuse Convention, which expresses the policy by which he will be guided, has, in a resolution, declared itself in favor of a protective tariff; and his friends in Congress have voted down every proposition for a tariff framed exclusively on revenue principles. We have, then, the fullest authority for saying, that Mr. Van Buren is a restrictionist, and differs from Mr. Clay only as to more or less. What great principle, then, we demand, is involved in a contest between Lindenwold and Ashland?

Mr. Van Buren's friends, the party managers, who have packed the Baltimore Convention to secure his nomination, on this vital question, and on all others, seem to us to shape their policy with sole reference to the success of the party, as party, and to have no principles they cannot waive or modify as they find it necessary, to secure success in the election. "What you tell us may all be very well. Mr. Calhoun is, doubtless, right in the abstract, but we could never succeed with a policy so ultra." Well; and what then? Which is better, failure with the right, or success without it? Which is the greater evil, a Whig

administration, or a Democratic administration with Whig principles, or, to say the least, with *no* principles?

The time has come, when men should ask, whether the party has, or has not, principles; and to demand, in tones that must be heard, that, if it have principles, they be adhered to. As to Mr. Van Buren himself, regarded as an individuality, he does not enter into our thoughts. Personally, he is not of the least consequence. Give him the honors and emoluments of office, and you may manage the government as you please. All who know any thing of the four years that he was at the head of the government, know that he was any thing but an efficient administrative officer. Excepting a visit now and then, from old habit or personal taste, to the Department of State, he left pretty much the whole business of government to his clerks, and played the part of a gentleman at leisure. Our opposition is not to him personally, but to the party managers who will, if he is elected, be the effective administrators of the government. All will depend on the men who place him in the presidential chair, and who, through him, as their tool, come into power *without its responsibility*. Who are these? We know very well who they are, and what they are, for we see emblazoned on their arms: "TO THE VICTOR BELONG THE SPOILS."

These are the men who are to come into power with Mr. Van Buren, and who, under cover of the impersonality of party, are to wield the effective power of the government, without sharing its responsibility. We do not object to Mr. Van Buren, then, that he is not available, that he cannot be elected. It is not his defeat, but his success, that we should deprecate. His defeat, the country could survive; his success would go far towards ruining it for ever.

But Mr. Van Buren will be the nominee of the Baltimore Convention. The question, then, returns, What ought to be the course of the sound portion of the party? Shall we support the nominee of the Conven-

tion? On what ground? Wherefore should we support him, rather than Mr. Clay? What do we gain for our cause, for our principles, for the mass of the people, for the great agricultural interests of the country, by the election of one rather than of the other? Will the Van Buren men adhere to the Constitution, and silence in Congress the mischievous agitation of the slave-question? Will they adhere to the Constitution, and bring the Tariff, on all articles, down to the revenue standard? Will they open the markets of the world to our agricultural products, and promote the great and abiding prosperity of the whole country, by an utter abandonment of the restrictive policy, not less ruinous to domestic manufactures themselves than to commerce and agriculture? Will they? "Can the Ethiopian change his skin, or the leopard his spots?" We know these men; we know that a steady regard for, and firm adherence to, principles, are incompatible with their nature. They care only to succeed in the election. What possible motive can we have, then, for supporting them? What possible evil have we to apprehend from the success of Mr. Clay, that we should not have equally to apprehend from the success of Mr. Van Buren? We have no sympathy with the Whig measures, but, for ourselves, we believe the complete adoption of the strong measures of Mr. Clay would be better for us as a party, and better for the country, than the half-and-half, betwixt-and-betweenity electioneering policy of the Lindenwolden school. We challenge the Van Buren men to show one good, solid reason, why an honest man and enlightened patriot should wish their success.

What, then, ought to be our course? The answer to this question depends on the fact, whether the withdrawal of Mr. Calhoun's name from the canvass, by his political friends, is to be looked upon as final. We have always relied on the firmness and patriotism of the South; but the conduct of Southern politicians, since the assembling of Congress, has disappointed us. Perhaps we have misinterpreted them, and that they

have a meaning lying deeper than the surface. We will hope so, for we *can* put a good construction upon their doings. Assuming that the South has not fully made up its mind to sustain the nominee of the Convention, the course to be taken is very obvious. The friends of General Cass are manœuvring for 1848, having lost all hope of succeeding, or of making much of a demonstration, in the present campaign. If we come into the support of Mr. Van Buren now, relying on the promises of his friends to go for Mr. Calhoun for the next four years, we shall be deceived; for they will keep no such promises. Mr. Benton is their man, and would have been their candidate now, but for Mr. Calhoun at the South, and Colonel Johnson at the West. Colonel Johnson is politically defunct; Mr. Calhoun, if withdrawn now, will also be politically defunct before the next four years come round, and General Cass will be no formidable rival to Colonel Benton. The Colonel will carry it over the General. It needs but half an eye to see this. If, then, the Van Buren-Benton men can consolidate the party in this campaign on Mr. Van Buren, no other candidate than Mr. Benton can be brought forward in 1848.

If, then, we mean to resist party dictation, party management, and party tyranny, on which Mr. Benton relies as much as Mr. Van Buren, and who would be an altogether more dangerous man at the head of the administration, for really Mr. Van Buren is the best man of his school,—if we really mean to break up the ruinous system of party, and of caucus management, bring the government back to the Constitution and provide for its administration with reference solely to even-handed justice and the public good, we must maintain our present vantage ground, yield nothing, no, nothing, not even for the peace and harmony of the party, but stand fast by our principles and the man who represents them. We shall never be in a better condition to do so. The great body of the Democratic party, in all sections of the Union, are, at heart, with us; and, were it not for caucus management, would go

with us; and party management must be made, and, thank God, can be made to feel, that they can attain to place, only by honestly and unequivocally, in deeds as well as in words, going with us for true republican principles.

It is not our province to give advice, for we are but a solitary individual. We choose to go for principle, instead of plunder, and, of course, must be regarded as a simpleton or as a marplot. Nevertheless, we beg the friends of Mr. Calhoun to reconsider their resolution to withdraw Mr. Calhoun's name from the present canvass. He is the strongest man under whose lead the friends of the Constitution can organize; and if they give up their present organization, with a view to a reorganization after the election for the next campaign, they will lose their vantage ground. The chances of success will be greatly diminished, and they will be too few, too weak, and too disheartened to accomplish any thing. No. Let them treat the Baltimore Convention as a nullity, and its supporters as seceders and schismatics. After Mr. Van Buren is nominated, let them say to themselves, "We are to-day what we were yesterday." Let them fling out to the breeze the flag of their country, and the old republican flag of '98, all torn and tattered as it may be. It can still stream *against* the wind. Let them rally under it, on the true republican platform, around the man of their choice, and march to the fight, and do battle, as best they can. They may lose the first battle, perhaps, the second; but, if they persevere, victory will at length crown their sacrifices, and they will redeem their country. If they will not do this, then nothing remains for us but to yoke ourselves to the car of Van Buren, or to throw up our caps in the train of Henry Clay.

ART. VII. — LITERARY NOTICES AND MISCELLANIES.

1.—*Various Writings of* CORNELIUS MATHEWS. Complete in One Volume. New-York: Harper & Brothers. 1843. 8vo. pp. 370.

MR. MATHEWS is a great writer, if we estimate his ability by his ambition, and the quantity he writes. He is fully persuaded that he is a man of genius, of wonderful genius, of commanding genius, sent in mercy, by a gracious Heaven, to create an American Literature. He is a man of Destiny. He is to give us a literature which shall surpass all that the world has hitherto known, and be read and admired — when all other literatures are forgotten. Well; we like this lofty estimate of one's own powers, and this aspiration to the great and the abiding. They are becoming in the young man. What a pity that years and sober experience should come to demolish all the castles we build on them, and reveal to us, that, after all, we are at least one half "of the earth earthy." Mr. Mathews seems to us to have made Mr. Charles Dickens his model, and all we can say of him is, that his writings, in the language of a young lady, to whom we loaned his volume, "are an intolerable imitation of an intolerable model."

Mr. Mathews's poetry is about on a par with the average of American poetry, characterized by much pretension, some facility, and no genuine poetic inspiration. We were as mad as we could be, at the article in the *Foreign Quarterly*, on American poetry; 1. Because it was written by a foreigner; and, 2. Because that foreigner was Charles Dickens; and yet, here at home, we are not disposed to deny its general justness. We have had a few tolerable poetasters, but no poets; some passable versification, but no poetry. And yet our people try hard enough to be poets, and, no doubt, would be, if they could. The truth is, we have few materials for poetry. Vast plains, primeval forests, lofty and rugged mountains, the wildness, ruggedness, vastness, even beauty and sublimity of nature, are no materials for poetry, save as connected with human life, and associated with struggles for freedom, love, or religion. American life is essentially prosaic; and our history is all too recent, and too destitute of genuine romance, to tell well in the poet's song. Who could set to music the stern old Puritanism of our ancestors, or surround with poetic associations a Congregational Meetinghouse? Just in proportion as you depart from the Catholic Church, do you lose poetic inspiration and imagery. The golden age of English poetry was while Catholic faith and tradition yet lived in the manners and hearts of the English people. The distance between Shakespeare and Wordsworth is all the distance between Westminster Abbey and a modern union work-house. Even the more successful of our own poets find it necessary to leave the prosaic faith of the country, and borrow from the Catholic traditions of the Middle Ages. We are, in truth, a nation without ancestors, without traditions. Nothing is hallowed in our memories, and we are unable to stand before aught venerable for the tide of ages, or of human affection, which has flowed over it. Even our religious institutions are

of yesterday; our government is the work of our own hands, and gives no scope to the loyalty of the human heart. We have had very little heroism in our history. Washington was a great and good man, a true and successful patriot, a prudent and successful officer; but not of the heroic sort. His character has nothing of the poetic. In our calm, collected moments, we yield him the unreserved homage of our heads, but never do our hearts gush forth at the mention of his name or his deeds. He commands our judgments, but he does not kindle our enthusiasm. General Jackson has more of the elements of the hero in his composition than any other man our country has produced; but he is too recent, and the sphere in which he has acted too limited, to call forth any grand display of enthusiasm.

We repeat it, the elements of American life are essentially unpoetic; and, though we may write "*Columbiads*," "*Conquest of Canaans*," "*Empires of Christ*," "*Fredoniads*," "*Napoleads*," "*Washingtons*," "*Bunker Hills*," and fill our newspapers and magazines with our versifications, it will be long before we shall really have a national poetry of which it will be worth our while to speak.

Mr. Mathews deserves our thanks for his good wishes, and his patriotic aims; but we fear that, beyond good endeavours, we shall have nothing else to thank him for. There is no use in our attempting to deceive ourselves. American literature, in any high sense of the term, is a thing which does not yet exist. Saving two or three names in history, and an equal number in fictitious literature, we have no authors worth naming. After Prescott and Bancroft, we would like to know who, among us, has made any solid contribution to the literature of our language? As an Essayist, Emerson has some merit; as an eloquent sermonizer from the press, as well as from the pulpit, Dr. Channing may be named; but the philosophy, the theology of these, is so meagre, and so unsound, that they must be short lived. The evil is, we all write, not only *for* the mass, but *to* the mass, and we become as loose and superficial as is the popular mind itself. We seek not to be profound, but to be popular; and the result is, that scarcely a scholar in our country can be named, who is up with the literature of his special department. In the sciences, in theology, in ethics, in metaphysics, the Old World supplies us with masters, and very few of us know enough to select her best masters. It ill becomes us, then, to boast. Our demagogical politics are fatal to the growth of intellect, or the acquisition of various and extensive knowledge.

Then, again, all our writers are straining after effect, betraying their innate weakness in their efforts to be strong. There is no quiet, no repose, no serenity; all is hurry and bustle. I must crowd my sentences together, run one into another, so as to compel him who reads the first to read the second, or else I may fail to be read at all. We have no confidence in ourselves as writers, and no confidence in our public as readers. All this is undeniable; and yet, we put on airs, and think it shows malice, a Tory conspiracy against our institutions, if a foreigner chances to sneer, as well he may, at American literature. We are quite too sensitive on this point. Foreigners care altogether less about our democratic institutions, and are alto-

gether less hostile to them, than we flatter ourselves. We should thank them for their criticisms, and use their criticisms as mirrors in which we may see ourselves as others see us. Our features are not so regular, and our complexion is not so fair and blooming, as we are accustomed to believe. Let us, at least, produce a literature worthy to command the homage of enlightened nations, or else talk no more about American literature; at least bear with patience the sneers it justly merits.

Mr. Mathews, we had almost forgot to say, is a great advocate of an international copy-right. For ourselves, our interest, so far as we have any, is on the side of authors, and, therefore, opposed to the international copyright law, which can be beneficial only to the bookseller. Yet we advise the government to pass one, so as to be consistent with itself, in laying as heavy burdens on knowledge as possible. It puts a duty on foreign books to aid the American publisher. Those books which are most important to the scholar are never reprinted here, for the demand is too small. But what of that? What is an American scholar in comparison with an American publisher or an American mechanic? But, seriously, here is a great evil. The scholars of the country are poor, and the books they most need are rare and expensive, and many of them in foreign languages; wherefore should the original cost of these be enhanced by a high duty, or by any duty at all, to the great detriment of American scholarship? What reason can be assigned for imposing a duty on books written in a foreign language? In the case of these, there is not even the plea of protecting the American printer and publisher, for very few books in a foreign language would be republished here. But it is the policy of the government to burden all genuine scholarship, and to impose the highest tax on the more elaborate and solid productions of mind. We see this in the new Postage Bill, reported in the Senate. Newspapers may circulate almost free of postage, but Reviews, the class of publications the most difficult to sustain, and which are taken for the most part by scholars and literary men, who, as a class, are much poorer than our mechanics, are to be burdened with a postage that will very nearly exclude them from the mail. If the bill passes as reported, we shall be obliged to stop our Review, for half its circulation is by mail. But Reviews are luxuries; the higher efforts of mind are not necessary to democracy; but newspapers, full of sickly sentimentalism, obscene police reports, horrible accidents, coarse and vulgar abuse of the best men in the country, are necessities of life. Shall we be forgiven, if we say this is a great mistake? If any discrimination is to be made by government, it should be made in favor of the hard plodding scholar, who wears his life out in seeking to enlighten and elevate his countrymen. For the ordinary branches of knowledge, and the average degree, the public patronage is always sufficient; it is the higher departments, and the few who would not only *diffuse*, but *advance*, science, that experience the greatest difficulties and discouragements. But no matter for these few scholars; the newspaper readers can out-vote them a thousand to one; and then, they are accustomed to make sacrifices. They choose to labor for posterity, let posterity, then, take care of them.

2.—THE SOWER'S SONG.

I.

THE dun clouds hide the sun to-day ; —
The winds delight in the delicate tune
That they pipe through the hollow reeds, or play
Through the tender leaves of June.
They will not sweep with too rough a hand
The seed which we sow with care ;
Scatter it wide o'er the waiting land
While the winds are still lingering there.
For lo ! it is their wooing time,
The blessed wooing time !
And the winds that shouted so fierce and bold
Like the battle-god through the winter cold,
Are murmuring music soft and low,
Like strains through our happy dreams which flow.
For 't is the blessed wooing time,
The dreamy wooing time !

II.

Scatter with even hand the seed, —
Herdsgrass, and red-top, and clover, — free, —
Free from each noxious and baneful weed,
Or bare space, let our grass land be.
Haste ! for the daylight will soon be gone ; —
To-morrow will come with rain ;
The trembling lily-buds seem to warn,
That the winds may blow wild again.
And now it is the sowing time,
The mystic sowing time,
And the seed we have sown with patient toil
Will bring beauty and wealth, from the yielding soil ;
And the anthem-thoughts that through us roll
Bring beauty and wealth from the quickened soul.
For lo ! it is the sowing time,
The solemn sowing time.

III.

Home ! for our work is finished now,
And the shadows are growing long and gray.
Home each ! with open and lofty brow,
For we manhood's law obey.
No weary bondman for us is tasked
Till he curses earth and heaven ;
With free right hands is our harvest asked,
Into free right hands it is given.
Lo ! now it is *our* wooing time,
Our happy wooing time :

And our hearts grow faint 'neath a timid glance,
 And strong 'neath a beaming countenance;
 And there lies a spell in silken hair,
 And the touch of a gentle hand and fair,
 In the happy wooing time,
 The blissful wooing time!

Y.

[When we stated this *Journal* would be written as well as edited by ourselves, we of course spoke with a reserve in favor of what has always been regarded as the "poetic license." We hold, ourselves, therefore, at perfect liberty to insert the following from a worthy correspondent and highly esteemed friend. — ED.]

3. — "THE SOUL GRASPS AND GAINS."

BY GEORGE W. THOMPSON.

Λόγου ἀρχὴ οὐ λόγος ἀλλὰ τι κρεῖττον * — ARISTOTLE.

"The principle of Reason is not Reason, but something better."

I.

'Tis evening, — and the large-orbed sun
 Spreads the pavilion of his golden clouds,
 And with light intense his blinding splendor shrouds,
 As glory veils the Eternal One;
 And the long range of hills, which meets the eye,
 Lifts its dark form, and mingles with the sky,
 Save in that break, — there, sunlight pours
 Its flood of glory at evening hours, —
 A sacred vista to the Home above, —
 A visioned prospect to the realm of Love.

II.

And eve's lone star now brightly shines,
 Like a clear eye, from the inner world of thought,
 Flashing its light, with love and beauty fraught: —
 With the bright sun, that star of love declines,
 And evening mourns, with tears and dewy breath,
 These bright companions in their hour of death; —
 The bird that shunned the babbling day
 Warbles forth his melancholy lay,
 Such as the laurelled poet well might frame
 In lasting music to embalm his name.

III.

Beautifully glow the clouds above,
 And, as the stream reflects the hues of even,
 The soul's clear depth gives back its thoughts from Heaven;
 And as the bird sings his song of love,

Ere night shall send him to his happy nest,
With his wild, woodland, warblings blest,
The music of great thoughts will roll
Solemn world anthems o'er the soul,
And open visions to the realm on high,
Reveal the hopes for man that never die.

IV.

The pure hopes for man that never die !
Age piled on the ages, through deepest gloom,
The generations have made earth a tomb,
And nature's voice a funeral cry ;
And around me now decay the crowded dead,
The humblest heart, and, too, the haughty head,
But, like the mythic truth of old,
As the ashes of the dead grow cold,
A spirit rises on the wings of fire, —
'T is LOVE, hov'ring "o'er Nature's funeral pyre."

V.

That pyre, with all human victims piled,
May burn, the cycle of Earth's measured hour,
Yet love and hope are our eternal dower ; —
Love, such as Jesus loved, has been reviled,
But through the gloom of long and distant years,
Through crimes, and sorrows, and absolving tears,
Clings to man's not all-abandoned fate,
And Hope ne'er deserts his low estate, —
Earth's multitudes feed the sacrificial fire,
Yet Love just vindication will require.

VI.

Love his vindication will require !
When will it come? Must man in sadness wait
The vengeance, unavailing, false and late
Of God in grandeur 'midst worlds on fire ?
Wait through long years of wretchedness and gloom,
Crushed down by tyrants' and by bigots' doom,
Unknowing truth, from virtue driven,
A curse of earth and scorn of Heaven !
Such day of fatal vengeance on mankind
Could not *redeem* the long degraded mind.

VII.

Love his vindication will attain !
The renovating death and birth to life, —
The growth through terms of agony and strife
Bring man to his spirit-home again : —
Stern doom for man, — cold faith and blighting creed,
That heads must bow and hearts must ever bleed,

And that the gloom of coming time
 Brings no hope 'gainst the taint of crime
 For the *unperfected* race; — is not all strife
 The soul's earnest grasp for its higher life?

VIII.

Yea, it is, — and love's exultant voice
 From the radiant abysm of distant years,
 O'er the intervening time filled with tears,
 Comes, and its tones make all hearts rejoice,
 For in that solemn time shall stand revealed,
 Humanity, God's blessed child, annealed, —
 Annealed, and pure as the thought, the tone
 That pleads or thunders from his throne,
 Who speaks, and worlds in various orbits roll,
 To raise, expand, exalt, the human soul; —

IX.

The soul which through *sense* so keenly turns
 To catch bright forms of mysterious thought,
 From the great Source of Truth and Being brought,
 And, 'roused, the unquenched mind in glory burns, —
 Through all the realms of thought exultant springs, —
 Escaped from earth, Heaven's light beams on its wings, —
 Up, — up to the highest sphere of thought
 Where earth's robes of beauty all are wrought, —
 Up to the WILL, whose fiat doth create,
 It mounts with Love, and calms the power of fate.

X.

Hope, *through* love, is our eternal dower!
 Stern Will did, in its awful forms embrace
 The early thought of all the human race,
 And teach mankind that God — is Power; * —
 And passing through the mazes of the mighty plan,
 Reason is toiling for the fate of man;
 And Love, as it supremely guides
 Reason and Will and o'er both presides,
 Pours sweetest concord on each heart and brain,
 Its triumph, and its own eternal reign.

NOTE. — The idea of a Trinity is complex, and its philosophical analysis gives Will, Reason, Love. Will is manifested by power. Power is the result of volition, an effect of the will. No power can be philosophically conceived which is not the result of volition, from the motion of a human limb to the action of a steam engine, that powerful instrument of the human brain. And if it requires Will to *construct* the engine, whence the force or power that rolls a world or balances a system? The Trinity in one of its hypostases is Will,

* See Dr. Clarke on the word "Elohim," — 1st Genesis.

the manifestation of which is Power. — In the next, it must be Intellect, Intelligence, Reason, Wisdom: — it will require a rigid and long contemplation of all these to get the true idea of the second, which planned the worlds and comprehends in itself all history and science, — the central conception from which all sprang, and the infinite complexities which bind all together. — Will is mere power, — of itself a blind energy; Reason is the directing form or mere intelligent principle; where is the motive, the impulse, the end, and the object of God's action? Is not creation the product of Love? Love or malice, — God or Demon? Who can conceive Love? — He who has survived the passions and the desires of life and could die a felon's death that Truth and Mercy may triumph, in a few brief moments of a long life, like the eagle in a clear day, that, in narrowing circles, approaches the sun, until the earth is hid from his sight, may escape from the earthliness of his nature to the conception of the holiness of this Love.*

Wheeling, Virginia.

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4. — *History of Vermont, Natural, Civil, and Statistical. In Three Parts. With a New Map of the State, and Two Hundred Engravings.* By ZADOC THOMPSON. Burlington: Chauncy Goodrich, for the Author. 1842. 8vo. pp. 648.

MR. THOMPSON has here given us an interesting and valuable history of his native State. The first part, which treats of the Natural History of Vermont, is exceedingly rich, and, so far as we are able to judge, uncommonly well executed. In it, Mr. Thompson has done, at his own expense, for Vermont, what other States, in their respective cases, have paid thousands of dollars for having done, and not so well done. The second part treats of the Civil and Political history of Vermont, drawn from the most authentic sources, and may be relied on with full confidence in all that relates to matters of fact. It will be found full of interest to all lovers of history, as well as to the Vermonters themselves. The early history of Vermont is full of stirring adventure, and romantic incident; perhaps more so than that of any other State in the Union. The third part contains a Gazetteer of the State, and full statistics. The statistics indicate great industry, activity, and general well-being on the part of the population, and prove, what all Vermonters boast, that "Vermont, for its size, is the best State in the Union." We shall return to this work, at our earliest opportunity.

Vermont makes no great show on the map of the Union; her

* [The exposition of the Trinity as given here, and which embraces the thought which runs through the poem, is not, in our view, a full or adequate exposition of the profound ontological truth in question. But we leave our friend and correspondent to answer for it on his own responsibility, as he is, we doubt not, willing and able to do. — ED. B. Q. R.]

sons have filled none of the higher offices under the Federal Government; very few of them have held a commanding position in political life; but no State in the Union has a more hardy, industrious, and moral population, and none, a population, taken generally, so well educated, and so remarkable for intellectual power and general intelligence. At the present moment, the sons of Vermont, in the literary and professional world, are exerting their full share of influence on the thought and destiny of the country. Our own native county of Windsor, may claim the glory of having given birth to several distinguished men, whose names posterity will not suffer to perish, among whom we may mention our countryman POWERS, the sculptor, now in Italy. The greatest metaphysician this country has produced, unless we except Jonathan Edwards, was a Vermonter, the late lamented President Marsh, — a most excellent man, with a heart, soul, and mind, that did honor to human nature.

We must be pardoned a little patriotic pride in speaking of Vermont. We feel towards that State, though it has not been our home for many a year, all the affection of a son for his mother. Amid her Green Hills we drew our earliest breath, and there are all those associations which become all the dearer as we recede the farther from them. To Vermont we owe our hardy constitution, our fearless love of freedom, and our indomitable spirit of independence; and if, in the restless excitement of youth, or the deeper ambition of manhood, we have ever been touched by that infirmity, "Love of Fame," it has been that we might leave a memory to our own native State, which she would not be unwilling to preserve. But she needs not this. In the struggle for Independence, she was the first to obtain a victory; on her soil was fought the battle that decided the war of the Revolution; and should Liberty be driven from all the rest of the Union, she will still make her eyrie in the cliffs of her Green Mountains, and where her eagle-brood shall continue her line through all time.

5. — 1. *A Lecture on the Mixture of Civil and Ecclesiastical Power, in the Middle Ages.* By Rt. Rev. Dr. HUGHES, Bishop of New-York. Delivered at the Tabernacle, December 18, 1843. New-York: J. Winchester. 1844. 8vo. pp. 24.

2. *A Lecture on the Importance of a Christian Basis for the Science of Political Economy, and its Application to the Affairs of Life.* By the same. New-York: J. Winchester. 1844. 8vo. pp. 27.

DR. HUGHES, the distinguished Bishop of New-York, proves, by these Lectures, that he is not only an eminent member of the Catholic hierarchy, but one of the ablest and most enlightened men of the times. Such a man cannot fail to leave his mark on his age. Of the first Lecture, we can speak, at present, no further than to say, that our own investigations, carried on with a becoming hostility to Popery and the Romish Church, brought us, some years since,

to the same conclusions, as to the influence of the Catholic Church in advancing civilization, in the long period from the irruption of the barbarians of the North, to the time of Luther and Calvin, which the Bishop so clearly, so ably, and so eloquently sets forth in this lecture. The ground he takes is impregnable, and the more thoroughly we explore the period in question, the more deeply shall we be impressed with the services of the Church, and the salutary influence exerted, even by what we choose to call Popery. The Church was always in advance of the age, and she struggled without relaxation to carry the race forward. To speak, as some of us do, of the "dark ages," and the "middle ages," proves nothing but our own ignorance.

The second lecture is one of peculiar interest and importance at the present moment. The Industrial System, which has transformed the serf into the operative, and prepared the way for Modern Feudalism, which we insist is no advance on the Feudalism of the Middle Ages, is beginning to attract the attention, not only of radicals and socialists, but of politicians and statesmen. Its effect in reducing labor to a state of complete servitude to capital, and, therefore, the operative to the proprietor, is beginning to be seen, and to be felt, in the unspeakable misery and distress of the laboring classes. The great fact can be no longer concealed or denied, that the present economical system of what are called the more advanced nations of Christendom, places labor at the mercy of capital, and every increase of wealth on the part of the few is attended by a more than corresponding increase of poverty and distress on the part of the many. Here is the fact. Men may gloss it over as they will, ascribe it to this cause or to that; but here is the fact. The richest nation in the world is the poorest; abundance superinduces want, and, with the general increase of wealth, the mass of laborers find themselves reduced to the starving point, and rapidly falling *below* it. This is the fact our social reformers see, and seek to remedy. Our own labors for twenty years have been devoted almost exclusively to the great work of ascertaining the means by which labor may be emancipated, and the acquisition of wealth prevented from becoming a public curse. The conclusions to which we have come may be inferred from the article in the foregoing part of this Journal, headed "No Church, no Reform." We have been fully satisfied, for some time, that the present deplorable condition of the laboring classes is due to the rejection, in the sixteenth century, by nearly one half of Europe, of the authority of the Catholic Church. The rejection of that authority left men without the necessary moral restraints on their natural selfishness, free to regulate all individual and social matters according to the dictates of the self-interests of individuals and governments, instead of the dictates of Christian duty and love. During the Middle Ages, and prior to the Reformation, the Catholic Church, by insisting on Gospel charity, on the merit of good works, and especially on the merit of voluntary poverty, and self-denial, had confined within some bounds the accumulative propensity of our nature, modified and restrained the empire of capital, and compelled it, through considerations drawn from a

future life, to make rich and ample provision for the poor. The great wealth of the Church was, to no inconsiderable extent, a Fund for the poor. In England, a third part of the revenues of the Church went to building and repairing Churches, another third to the support of the clergy, and the rest to the poor. No poor law was then needed. The Reformation changed all this, and, for the system of Gospel charity, voluntary poverty, good works, and self-denial, substituted self-interest, and sought to neutralize excessive selfishness by pitting the selfishness of one against the selfishness of another. The result has been precisely what ought to have been expected, — the reduction, in the more industrial and enterprising nations, of labor to a complete dependence on capital, and the operatives to the minimum of human subsistence, and in some cases below it. The remedy, we are convinced, — and we have devoted over twenty years of investigation to the subject, — can be found only in a return, if not to the Catholic Church, at least to a system of political economy similar to the one always insisted on, and enforced to a greater or less extent, by that Church. The great evil is, that Mammon reigns in modern society without a rival; and we cannot remedy this evil without some power stronger even than the money-god. This power can be obtained only in and from the Church of Christ.

Such is the conclusion to which we have come, and right glad are we, to find this conclusion set forth in a striking light, and its truth demonstrated beyond the possibility of reply, by Bishop Hughes, in this profound, able, and eloquent discourse. We commend it to the careful study of our political economists. It may go far to show them, what has often been said, that they have omitted the most important chapter of their science, that which treats of the distribution of wealth in relation to the moral and social well-being of the operative. They have considered the operative merely as a machine in the hands of the capitalist, for the production of wealth; it is, perhaps, time to consider him as a moral and religious being, something more than a spinning jenny, and of an innate worth and nobleness equal to those of his employer, and surpassing all the material wealth of the universe.

We return our thanks to the Bishop of New-York for these two able and seasonable productions. We thank him in the name of truth and Christian charity; in the name of the poor and oppressed, the starving widows and orphans; in the name of our country and humanity. So long as the prelates of his Church shall teach the doctrines we find here, and use their authority to realize them, he may be assured the cry of "No Popery" will be of little avail in checking its progress.